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FOREWORD

RATIONALE FOR ENFORCEMENT TRAINING

Introduction

Various projects have provision for the delivery of law enforcement training to police and other agencies in MOU countries. Unless there is effective co-ordination and control in this type of assistance there is distinct possibility of duplication and/or wastage through unstructured, disjointed, inappropriate or inadequate teaching. It is therefore considered desirable to specify the levels of training that are contemplated within project documents and to impose standards to be observed within certain subject areas. For the most part, this can be achieved by prescribing model-training packages for specific topics or subject groupings.

General Concept

Professional and efficient law enforcement depends on the knowledge, skills and initiative of the officers involved. Knowledge and skill are largely imparted through training.

Officers deployed to drug enforcement duty should be adequately prepared for that work and receive training appropriate to their duties. They should be regularly up-dated on enforcement issues and suitably briefed for specific operations. A training needs analysis should be conducted to determine the precise training requirements of personnel assigned to particular areas of enforcement. This must be based on an assessment of the skills and abilities necessary in those work divisions and the design of training curricula within enforcement departments will be largely dictated by the department’s role in the national drug enforcement structure. Designing curricula is a specialised discipline and we can offer assistance to personnel engaged in such tasks.

Levels of Training

Drug law enforcement training will focus on four levels:

- Basic Training
Basic Training

Basic drug enforcement training can normally be delivered within agencies but there should be a standard course syllabus based on the knowledge and skills necessary for officers of each particular department. With greater or lesser emphasis according to the role of the officer’s department, it is generally agreed that a basic level drug investigator should:-

• Have a good working knowledge of the drug laws of his/her country
• Know the nature of evidence and understand what can constitute evidence in drug cases
• Know the character of drugs and be able to recognise drugs in various forms
• Know the character of precursor chemicals and be able to recognise them
• Know when to refer a matter to an officer better able to deal with it
• Be able to recognise irregular or suspicious behaviour and, where appropriate, investigate it
• Be able to recognize forged, counterfeit, and other suspicious documents
• Be able to conduct a full and proper interview of a witness or person with information
• Be able to conduct a full and proper interview of a suspect
• Be able to read the body language of persons being questioned or observed
• Be able to apply for warrants or other authority to search and/or arrest, where appropriate
• Be able to conduct a competent search of people, baggage, cargo, premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft
• Be able to use drug field testing kits
• Be able to operate drug detector equipment used by his/her agency
• Be able to handle exhibits properly and competently
• Be able to cultivate sources of information and perform basic intelligence functions
• Be able to accurately report observations and events
• Be able to conduct a basic crime scene examination
• Be able to take fingerprint and footprint impressions of persons under investigation
• Be able to compile a dossier of documents for forwarding to the prosecutor

• Be able to competently testify in court

• Be able to work with citizen groups, NGOs and officials from other units or departments

• Be able to wisely exercise the powers and authority entrusted in him/her.

**Supervisor Training**

Supervisor training can also normally be delivered within agencies pursuant to a syllabus based on the knowledge and skills necessary for that department’s officers.

As with basic training, and again with greater or lesser emphasis according to the anti-drug functions of the officer’s department, it is possible to identify in general terms the skills and knowledge required of a drug enforcement supervisor. He or she should be able to:

• Do all those things that subordinates can do

• Plan, organise, direct and lead team or group activities

• Check documents submitted for forwarding for prosecution to ensure that all required papers are present or accounted for

• Co-ordinate the functions of officials from different units or departments

• Consistently demonstrate good qualities of leadership and people management

• Recognise situations where a controlled delivery may be employed to advantage and be able to propose a case for higher consideration

• Take charge of a crime scene and allocate investigatory functions to staff

• Solve problems

• Form well-reasoned risk assessments

• Make sound decisions

• Eloquently express himself/herself to other people - in speech and in writing

• Logically debate issues with other people and at public meetings

• Motivate subordinates, citizen groups and other people

• Prepare accurate profiles of drug dealers and couriers
• Assess the weight of evidence in given cases

• In appropriate circumstances, authorize or obtain authority to search people and/or places for evidence of offences

• Adopt or approve the adoption of investigative strategies, operational tactics and suppression activities appropriate to circumstances

• Prepare submissions for higher authority on matters pertaining to drug enforcement, financial administration and the deployment of resources

• Suitably respond to questions from the media on enforcement activities.

Management and Command Training

Dependent upon the capacities and facilities of the national agencies involved, this training may be either conducted within the department or selected officers can be sent to outside training courses or other forms of tuition. The required skills are based on perceptions [canvassed at regional workshops and seminars] that officers with senior command and management responsibilities in drug enforcement should be able to:

• Effectively and efficiently manage and administer the resources under their control

• Know the capacity of subordinates and utilise their skills to best advantage

• Be aware of the existence and development of specialist techniques available for deployment

• Formulate enforcement strategies and tactics appropriate to particular situations

• Plan and direct anti-drug activities at command level

• Understand the concepts of enforcement mutual assistance and know the procedures for requesting and providing assistance to other jurisdictions in given circumstances.

• Approve, arrange and co-ordinate a controlled delivery of drugs or other commodity

• Organise facilities and resources to best effect

• Personally lead major operations

• Co-ordinate with other departments at senior level

• Exercise proper financial controls

• Devise methods of identifying, stamping out and minimising scope for internal corruption and/or other unethical conduct
• Demonstrate good judgement in all things and present a fitting image in the media

• Exercise with proper prudence any special powers invested in him/her for the suppression and/or investigation of crime.

**Specialist Training**

Specialist training can be delivered within or outside national enforcement agencies. UNDCP assistance in this regard must only be given in those areas of expertise as are acceptable within the jurisdictions concerned. It is not intended to provide training in activities, which do not have legal approval in the country involved [such as telephone tapping and the use of concealed listening devices.] Topics in this category could include:

• Surveillance [including the use of electronic devices]

• Modern investigative techniques

• Communications interception

• Other technical support activity

• Advanced intelligence analysis

• Asset tracing and seizure

• Money laundering

• Undercover activities

• Controlled deliveries

• Managing informants

• Witness protection schemes

**Curriculum Construction**

Once the levels of knowledge and skill required in the respective agencies have been identified, the process may then begin of designing curricula by which the training can be delivered.

As mentioned earlier, curriculum design is a specialised discipline and careful thought must be applied to the means of delivery most appropriate to the position of the personnel receiving instruction. The amount of time devoted to any particular topic will be dictated by its relevance to the officer’s duty.

Besides tuition in functions relative to the responsibilities of the officer’s department, modern enforcement training should also include subjects on human rights, organisational values, interpersonal relationships, human dignity and accountability. Ways of avoiding prejudice, hypocrisy, stereotyping, misguided parochialism and other bad practice should also be covered.
So, too, should instruction in the proper exercise of enforcement powers - including the use of force - and sufficient time should be allowed for meaningful discussion on the range of ethical considerations contained in the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.

**Delivery of Training**

Training may be delivered by way of:

- Class-room based courses of instruction
- On-the-job training
- Training workshops, seminars and sessions
- Coaching and mentoring
- CD Rom interactive training
- Sponsoring attendance at regional educational institutions [including ILEA, Bangkok]
- Study tours and
- Funding attendance at selected overseas courses.

**Regional Projects with Major Law Enforcement Training Components**

Projects with substantial enforcement training components are delivered to MOU countries from the UNDCP Regional Centre, Bangkok. Currently, there are five such projects in hand. They are the CD Rom Basic Training Project, the Cross-Border Co-operation Project, the Prosecutorial and Judicial Training Project, the Intelligence Project and the Enforcement Operational Procedures Project. The first two are largely concerned with improving skills for interdicting drugs and precursor chemicals at the distribution/delivery stage. The next provides knowledge and professional skills for prosecutors and judges engaged in drug crime work and the latter two are mainly aimed at developing enforcement techniques and strategies for identifying and gathering evidence against key figures in the regional drugs trade.

All five encourage the development of internal co-ordination, international co-operation, professional competence and personal commitment. Most projects have provision to employ consultants with expertise in relevant areas and, under the guidance of the co-ordinator, to produce training materials which have specific or general application.

**Progressive Drug Enforcement Training**

The concept of progressive training is that tuition is delivered at times and at a pace consistent with the employment of individuals in drug enforcement work. Within enforcement agencies, officers newly moving to a post with drug enforcement functions would normally undertake basic training to provide the necessary grounding for their new role. Those advancing in rank, position or experience could receive supervisor level tuition - delivered in the format most suitable to their situations.

Officers taking up mid-level management or command responsibilities should be instructed at the management level - again, training being delivered in the manner most appropriate to their particular circumstances.
Enforcement Training Arranged by Country Offices

Where country offices have projects, which involve the delivery of training to law enforcement personnel within that country, such training should fit within the overall UNDCP regional enforcement training plan and the policy outlined herein. It is essential that all training be appropriate to the level of persons being trained, that it be consistent with national situations, that it comply with the laws of the jurisdiction involved, that it recognise human rights and UN principles, that it form part of an incremental training initiative and that it be delivered by competent people.

To ensure uniformity and a co-ordinated organisational approach, it is desirable that MOU country offices planning to arrange law enforcement training submit proposals to the Regional Centre, Bangkok, for the consideration of the enforcement professionals located there.

Sponsoring Students to Attend ILEA Training Courses

An International Law Enforcement Academy based in Bangkok offers training courses on selected enforcement topics for students from most countries in the region. That training generally fits well with objectives and funds could be properly be expended in sending persons to ILEA conducted courses where the training is consistent with the terms of this document.

Training Review Committee

In order to ensure that law enforcement training designed [or otherwise intended for delivery] within MOU countries is consistent, relevant and appropriate, it may be necessary in the near future to create a Training Review Committee to examine all training proposals, syllabi or materials.

It would be the function of such a Committee to approve or reject proposals and no UNDCP training would be delivered or received in law enforcement topics unless it had been approved by the Training Review Committee and no funds would be expended on sending people to training that has not been so approved.

It is envisaged that such a Training Review Committee would comprise people with enforcement training experience who may or may not be from within and that, perhaps, three such people would constitute a meeting of the Committee.

Model Training Packages

Training packages to be produced in the present series of Projects B65 and C46 are as follows:

I Basic Intelligence
II Controlled Delivery
III Undercover Work
IV Surveillance
In each case, the training notes will be based on a model Policy and Guidelines document which it is suggested each country adopt [with suitable modifications to fit with law and organisation structures] for its enforcement agencies.

Future funding may allow for the development of more packages covering a wider range of topics but the present series will be confined to those listed above.

**Confidentiality**

Because the material contained in the training notes includes details of operational enforcement procedures, it is necessary to restrict their distribution to law enforcement agencies only.

**Regional Centre Co-operation and Assistance**

The functions of drug law enforcement are substantially the same world-wide and problems confronted in one jurisdiction are invariably similar to those faced in other places. Sharing information, providing details of successful strategies, receiving students for training from other jurisdictions, adopting substantially the same procedures, granting mutual assistance and providing other operational co-operation can all contribute to a consolidated global offensive against a common problem. There have long been calls for communities and countries to stand united against drugs. Similar emphasis should be placed on law enforcement agencies also standing together to present a united front against those who profit from the production and distribution of such illicit substances. To that end, the Regional Centre is willing to co-operate with any agency wishing to improve its training in the fight against the drug menace and will be pleased to share expertise with them.

**Comments Invited**

The Regional Centre will be happy to receive comments on how training packages might be improved. Such advice should be sent to the Co-ordinator, Projects B65 and C46, at the address on the letterhead.
HOW TO USE THE MANUAL

Manual Structure

This manual comprises three volumes.

1. Undercover Policy Manual
   This volume covers policy relating to undercover operations.

2. Undercover Procedure Manual
   This volume is the partner to the Policy Manual. It provides information about specialist services and procedures that officers will use in the course of an undercover operation.

3. Undercover Training Manual
   This volume contains some training material, relating to undercover operations. Not all details of undercover training are contained in this manual, as the nature of undercover policing essentially involves specialised and covert policing techniques. These techniques are highly protected and the success of worldwide undercover programmes relies on secrecy and confidentiality.

Each volume begins with a table of contents and ends with an index. The index is specific to that volume - topics that do not appear in the volume do not appear in its index.

Each chapter is divided into several sections. These are headed according to the content of the topic.

Policy

This deals with policy issues of undercover operations and represents the best practice gleaned from years of experience. It will prove invaluable to those involved in undercover operations.

Procedures

This gives the ‘how to’. Although the instructions are usually rough in chronological order, they are there for reference and are not meant to be in strict time line.

Cross References

Please note: If an introduction states that the chapter must be read in conjunction with another chapter or volume, it is necessary to read both chapters in order to gain a full understanding of the topic.
Undercover Policing

A properly trained and well-managed undercover agent is one of the most feared and effective weapons that the police can use in the war against crime.

Undercover policing is a planned investigative and surveillance process in which police officers use disguises and subterfuges to gain evidence and intelligence against criminal offenders who have become resistant to traditional policing methods.

To obtain the best results and to use resources efficiently, undercover operations should be used, not in isolation, but as part of the whole investigative process.

It is public knowledge that the police conduct undercover operations and, like anything secret, Undercover Operations are a source of considerable curiosity. The integrity and continued viability of undercover operations can be maintained only by ensuring that all officers observe strict confidentiality.

Although this manual is for trained undercover agents, the general principles apply to any undercover deployments using police officers.

This Policy Manual sets out the procedures for conducting the deployment of undercover agents.


This undercover policy manual is a live document, which will be subject to periodic updating and a comprehensive review. Suggestions for inclusion or amendment may be sent to the Project Coordinator Regional Centre.

Purpose

The purpose of undercover policing is to :-
• Determine the nature and extent of criminal activities, whether planned or carried out
• Identify the people involved
• Obtain evidence for court
• Locate stolen property, drugs or other incriminating physical evidence
• Determine suitable times for searching premises or places used by suspects

Scope

Undercover policing is used to combat:-

• Crimes against persons and property
• Offences relating to the manufacture, trafficking and distribution of illicit drugs and other illicit substances
• Terrorism, or significant subversive activity involving the commission of offences

Definitions

Undercover Agent

For the purposes of this undercover policy manual an undercover agent is defined as :-

"a specially trained law enforcement officer working under direction in an authorised investigation in which the officer’s identity is concealed from third parties by the use of an alias and false identity”.

There are generally three types of undercover agent :-

An Evidential Agent
An evidential agent is an officer deployed to obtain evidence to prosecute people involved in criminal activity.

An Intelligence Agent
An intelligence agent is an officer deployed to obtain intelligence about people involved in criminal, terrorist or subversive criminal activity.

A Cover Agent
A cover agent is an officer deployed to improve the penetration of target groups by developing the cover and confidence of operational

Handler

A Handler is the officer allocated to an operation to act as the conduit between the operational team and the undercover agent. In every operation where an undercover agent is deployed, a handler will be allocated.

Handlers should be engaged full-time in managing the undercover agent during the deployment. Handlers should have successfully completed
an approved Undercover Training Course as either a student or have attended as an observer, or have in some other way over a lengthy period of time acquired and demonstrated the required skills.

Supervisor

A Supervisor is an NCO who oversees the handler and undercover agent. He or she plays an important role in managing the considerable resources involved in undercover operations.

Undercover Unit

An Undercover Unit is a unit, which has been established exclusively or mainly for the conduct of operations involving the deployment of undercover agents.

The units, should wherever possible be staffed principally by officers who have successfully completed an approved Undercover Training Course as either a student or have attended as an observer, or have in some other way over a lengthy period of time acquired and demonstrated the required skills.

Operation Commander

The Operation Commander is the officer in overall command of the undercover operation and will be at least a Commissioned Officer. He or she is responsible for the health and welfare of the undercover agent and the efficient management of resources.

Test Purchaser

A Test Purchaser is an appropriately trained law enforcement officer who seeks, by means of authorised activity, to establish the nature and/or availability of a commodity or service, the possession, supply or use of which involves an offence.

The consideration of an individual’s rights to privacy and a fair trial should be at the heart of every law enforcement operation. This is incorporated in the 1988 United Nations Convention.

It is always important to have proper regard to individual rights and freedoms, and to ensure that proposed practices do not become oppressive to citizens or unduly restrictive on legitimate commerce or trade. Appropriate consideration should be given to matters of law, human rights, good practice, professional ethics and proper standards of enforcement procedure.

In order to maintain the ability to argue successfully for the admissibility of evidence gained by covert means, law enforcement agencies need to be familiar with the Convention and to adopt the working principles in this undercover policy manual.
Security

General Security

It is public knowledge that the police conduct undercover operations. As with anything secret, these operations are a source of curiosity to other police officers and the public.

Releasing information on any aspects of undercover operations conflict with the principle, that the safety and security of undercover agents is of paramount importance. Any piece of information disclosed may seriously compromise operational security.

The integrity of undercover operations and their continued viability therefore require strict confidentiality by all police officers.

All product gained from undercover deployments will be evaluated, kept securely and only disseminated in accordance with an approved code of practice for the recording and dissemination of intelligence material.

Disclosure of Methodology & Manuals

The product of undercover operations may be used in evidence.

The methods used in undercover operations, together with any product gained, and are potentially disclosable in the event of these proceedings.

Law enforcement agencies should take all reasonable steps to protect the methodology employed in undercover operations through applications for public interest immunity, even in cases where the product is intended for use in evidence.

Ultimately, whether information should be disclosed depends on the circumstances of each case, bearing in mind that prosecutions stemming from undercover operations often involve a greater need for confidentiality.

Security Classification of Documents

The use of protected markings on case papers, documents and policies should be adopted. Standard markings are -:

- Restricted
- Confidential
- Secret
- Top Secret

Documents should be stored and disseminated appropriate to their security classification. Care must be taken to avoid over-classification.
Documents should be regularly reviewed and assessed to determine whether the initial classification still applies.

Consideration should be given to reducing the marking at appropriate times. For example, at the outset of an undercover operation all material will be highly classified to protect the undercover agent and the operation. However, after the arrest and prosecution many of the papers could be declassified to ‘restricted’ as this information is now within the public domain.

Undercover training, methodology and these instructional manuals should be protected at all times to ensure that this specialist covert technique remains ‘secret’ and the ongoing safety of deployed undercover agents worldwide is ensured.

**BASIC PRINCIPLES**

**Application of Manual**

This manual applies to the deployment of trained undercover agents for investigations into serious crime and similarly serious matters.

**Deployments**

Any decision to deploy an untrained officer in an undercover role involving drugs, or crimes committed by gangs or other significant criminals, must be taken carefully. Undercover work can expose officers to high personal risk; the officer may be pressured to use drugs or become involved in criminal activity, or face open challenges to his or her credibility.

Trained agents, on the other hand, have had extensive training in :-

- Criminality
- Use of cover
- Recording of evidence
- Coping with direct challenges about identity
- Drug avoidance

Deployments must :-

- Ensure the efficient use of resources
- Aim at closely monitored operations, with constructive use of informants. Deployments are authorised only for operations targeting criminals involved in serious crime, or significant subversive activity involving the commission of serious offences
- Obviate the need for the undercover agent to spend lengthy periods establishing basic criminality in order to penetrate target groups and establish cover
- Be realistic and achievable
### Risk Assessments

The risks attached to the deployment of undercover agents will generally be higher than those attaining to other covert/intrusive investigative techniques and they must be carefully considered.

For full instructions on the procedure relating to ‘risk assessments’, refer to the Undercover Procedure Manual.

There is a requirement to carry out a risk assessment in respect of each application and to review the assessment at each application to renew an authorisation.

No undercover agent deployment will be authorised without an adequate risk assessment and where required, completion of a risk management plan. Advice on the completion of risk assessments can be obtained from the Undercover Unit concerned and are also referred to in the Undercover Procedure Manual.

Risk assessment is a continuing process and any changes in risks to the undercover agent or the operation itself must be reported to the Operation Commander and the Undercover Unit.

Risks to consider are :-

- Ethical risks concerning proportionality and necessity (justification).
- Personal risks to targets, officers of the public and officers must be considered.
- Operational risks include the risk and implications of compromise.

**Risk Assessment Conclusion**

Where the risks are deemed to be significant, a risk management plan will be needed. Risk assessment and risk management forms are included in the application form, Appendix A, page 54, and are also referred to in the renewal for authorisation, Appendix D, page 67.

**Buy-Bust Operations or Sting Operations**

Such types of undercover operation are conducted in response to a localised crime problem, or a national or international crime problem, during which the deployed undercover agent will be required to infiltrate a community or group of individuals.

The undercover agent will need to act with logistical support and adopt a cover story. Therefore, 'sting operations' should be authorised as a standard deployment of an undercover agent.

**Criminal Informants**

An informant is an identified person who, for payment or otherwise, gives to a member of the Police, information which, if acted upon, could lead to an arrest or a course of action against persons engaged in
criminal activities with the expectation that his/her identity will be protected.

The standard operating procedures relating to criminal informants is not contained within this undercover policy manual. When using criminal informants in respect of undercover operations all meetings/activities with informants should be documented according to the reporting and recording principles of this policy manual.

Normal reporting requirements (informants) may not apply to meetings between undercover agents and informants, whose activity has been properly authorised in accordance with this manual and where the meeting takes place in furtherance of the authorised undercover activity.

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**Surveillance**

In undercover operations the primary function of a surveillance team is to:

- Provide close personal security for the undercover agent
- Detect and surveill targets
- Detect and surveill associates of targets who may be providing counter surveillance for the target, and
- Ensure the security of any money used by undercover agents in buy/bust operations.

Undercover agents should be aware of counter surveillance tactics in order to protect themselves from targets that may try to identify and discredit the undercover operation.

Counter surveillance and anti surveillance techniques are outlined in the Undercover Procedure Manual.

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**Controlled Deliveries**

The authorisation for the deployment of an undercover agent may include authorisation for an appropriate role in a controlled delivery.

If the controlled delivery was not an issue in the application and subsequent authorisation, the authorising officer, wherever possible, should call for a further application including the circumstances of the controlled delivery so that the implications of the action, and the associated risks, can be properly considered.

An undercover agent participating in a controlled delivery should act within the policy guidelines principally established for the procedure in dealing with controlled deliveries.

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**Technical Support**

Technical Support Units (TSU) will advise upon the appropriate equipment to be used. Only equipment specified by a law enforcement
agency TSU should be used. Such equipment will have been evaluated for suitability and the quality of performance.

Officers who have received appropriate instruction in the fitting or use of such equipment should only carry out the fitting and use of this equipment. Security may be comprised by low standards.

Foreign Agencies

The involvement and tasking of foreign law enforcement agencies in undercover operations matters takes place in accordance with the agreed policies of those respective agencies.

Training Courses

All officers deployed as undercover agents or as handlers will be trained to the standards required, and on courses approved by the respective law enforcement agency. Officers trained solely as test purchasers may not be deployed as undercover agents.

Briefing & Debriefing

Briefing undercover agents in relation to any covert investigation is one of the most important roles of the handler. The briefings should again be concise, clear and leave no doubt in the eyes of the undercover agent what is required of him on each and every time he has a meeting or contact with a criminal target.

At the conclusion of any meeting/contact with a target, the handler should “debrief” the undercover agent.

At the conclusion of the debrief the undercover agent should be given the opportunity to comment on what they believe they can achieve on the next meeting with the target. The handler will often have his or her own strategy for future meetings in mind and needs to hear from the undercover agent as to what is realistically achievable.

At the conclusion of a debrief, the investigation team should have a very clear idea of what potential strategies for future meetings are available to them, with recommendations as to which is most suitable.

For full instructions on briefing and debriefing, refer to the Undercover Procedure Manual.

Court Hearings

The ultimate aim of any undercover operation is to successfully prosecute the suspects apprehended.

Where an undercover agent is to give evidence at court and intelligence exists which suggests that efforts may be made to harm or identify the officer, the Operation Commander will ensure a new risk assessment is prepared. Factors such as the arrival and departure of undercover agent and additional security in court will need to be considered.
In such cases and in cases where there is cause for concern in relation to the undercover agent’s safety or the safety of any member of his family, or where exposure could compromise ongoing or future operations, the Operation Commander must ensure that application be made to the Court for the officer to:

- provide his evidence in his pseudo identity
- be concealed from the public gallery by use of screens

On occasions where there are multiple defendants it may be appropriate to seek the permission of the Judge for the undercover agent to be screened additionally from those defendants against whom he is not giving direct evidence.

The Court has the discretion to hear the application and either grant or refuse it. If an application were refused, the Operation Commander and the head of the Undercover Unit to which the undercover agent is attached must be notified of the refusal prior to the undercover agent being called to give evidence. A conference with counsel and/or the Prosecution Section should be arranged to consider the implications of continuing the prosecution.

Criminal trials will take place where the deployment of an undercover agent is revealed. This may result in media coverage. No officer will give any statement, exposure or disclosure to the media that might lead to the identification of undercover agent’s identity or to undercover methodology/tactics without prior approval of the Operation Commander.

Use of Illicit drugs

The penetration of target groups and establishment of cover must be planned in such a way that undercover agents do not have to spend lengthy periods establishing criminality. In particular, they should not have to use illicit drugs, such as cannabis to achieve these aims.

Cannabis and its derivatives, cannabis oil and hashish, are drugs that are most commonly used by criminals and people in drug scenes. Because criminals and their associates make extensive social use of these drugs, there will, in some situations, be inevitable pressures on undercover agents to be seen to use them also.

Where such pressure occurs, constant abstinence may seriously weaken an undercover agent’s cover and, depending on the circumstances, place them in danger.

Undercover agents who are placed in situations where they are pressured to use cannabis or cannabis derivatives have the following options. The circumstances and level of scrutiny will dictate the approach to be taken in each case.
Avoidance  This means total abstinence - refusing or declining all offers. Where declining to use is possible, it is strongly preferred.

Simulation  Feigning use, without actually inhaling.

If such an occasion arises, the agent must report the matter to his or her Handler as soon as practicable and record the circumstances in the following manner:

- If the avoidance/simulation occurred in a situation that normally requires an evidential Statement, these circumstances should be covered in that statement.

- If an evidential Statement is not required, the avoidance/simulation should be covered in daily notes.

The Handler and Supervisor must regularly assess the extent of the agent’s exposure to illicit drugs and closely observe his or her activities and demeanor, so as to detect any unreported use of drugs.

Undercover Agents must not use any illicit drugs at any time. Similarly the ‘use’ of cannabis or cannabis derivatives is prohibited in all other circumstances.

Drug Training  Due to the extensive social use of cannabis leaf, cannabis oil and hashish by criminals and their associates, undercover agents must be trained in methods of simulation and avoidance techniques before they are deployed.

Reporting Drug Use  Handlers must be informed of drug use at the first opportunity. The circumstances must be thoroughly investigated and the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit and Operation Commander informed immediately.

The handler will require a thorough de-briefing, possibly involving a consultant Health Professional/Welfare Officer.

Undercover agents must be encouraged by handlers to report any incidence of drug use including circumstances where drug use may have or will be in issue. Thorough briefing and preparation can overcome most risks of drug use. Strategies must be explored so that they can be employed to ensure undercover agents are not placed in problematic areas involving continued pressure to use illicit drugs.

The lessons learned by the agent should be adopted for use in future situations, so that drug use can be avoided.
ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

Successful undercover deployment is only achieved when support is received from all levels of the police organisation. The following are guidelines for roles and responsibilities of officers involved in undercover operations.

Undercover Agents

The role of an undercover agent is to infiltrate a specified group or groups to obtain admissible evidence and to provide reliable intelligence on criminal or subversive activities.

Only officers who have successfully completed an Undercover Training Course approved by the law enforcement agency may be used as undercover agents.

Where the deployment is in a foreign country, the relevant authorising officer in that country must give authorisation.

Undercover agents have a continuous responsibility to consider security and other related issues, which include:

- the creation and maintenance of cover
- notification of information threatening personal and operational security
- notification of issues impacting on their personal credibility as a witness

Handlers

A Handler will always be appointed following authorisation for the deployment of an undercover agent.

Handler’s responsibilities include:

- To be fully conversant with current law, procedures and guidelines that are relevant to undercover operations, including aspects relative to disclosure and revelation issues
- To be responsible for the welfare needs of the undercover agent(s) and maintain close liaison with the undercover units
- To remain fully conversant with the ongoing deployment of the undercover agent
- To provide appropriate updates on the undercover agent’s welfare, deployment and any other relevant matters to the head of the undercover unit concerned and, where appropriate, to the officer in charge of the investigation
• Implementing policy and procedure
• Managing, and accounting for, expenditure

**Supervisors**

The supervisor must objectively monitor the health and welfare of the undercover agent and handler. Early intervention can prevent later problems, so it is crucial that the supervisor takes prompt and appropriate action on any health or welfare problem.

The supervisor’s responsibilities include:

• Monitoring the agent’s physical and psychological welfare
• Giving the handler and agent regular support and advice
• Monitoring expenditure and financial operating procedures
• Constantly evaluating the progress and efficiency of the operation
• Ensuring that the correct policy and procedure are followed
• Ensuring that the agent is adequately prepared for his or her court role

**Undercover Units**

Law enforcement agencies, which do not have a dedicated Undercover Unit, should seek advice from one of the Undercover Units recognised.

Where a law enforcement agency or organisation intends to set up an Undercover Unit, it should seek guidance.

All applications, operational updates and applications to renew authorisations will be submitted through the Undercover Unit to the authorising officer. Undercover Units must be made aware of the day-to-day status of the investigation for which the undercover agent has been deployed.

Following receipt of an application for the deployment of an undercover agent, the Undercover Unit will assess the feasibility of the deployment and advise the Operation Commander accordingly. The Operation Commander will also be told of the required support structure that should be in place, in order to conduct the proposed operation effectively. Upon the deployment being deemed feasible and agreement to the support structure requirements, the Undercover Unit will submit an application to the authorising officer.
Once a deployment of an undercover agent has been authorised, the Undercover Unit will :-

- identify an available undercover agent with the appropriate skills and cover to suit the demands of the operation
- nominate a Handler
- provide advice and guidance to the Operation Commander throughout the operation and until the conclusion of any court proceedings
- supply appropriate logistical and psychological support to the undercover agent
- assist the undercover agent in maintaining personal and operational security
- Complete investigations and enquiries as required

Undercover Units will determine, in consultation with Operation Commanders and authorising officers, the need for additional or replacement undercover agents.

Where the head of the Undercover Unit has concerns over the deployment of an undercover agent, he may withdraw the undercover agent(s) from an operation and report the reasons to the authorising officer.

Undercover Units will also ensure that :-

- confidential psychological support be provided for undercover agents
- they have the ability to manage the creation and maintenance of cover for its undercover agents and those seconded to them for specific operations
- any compromise of an undercover operation, methodology or tactics be reported

The Officer in Charge of the Undercover Unit will give authorisation for undercover agents to obtain identity and other documents necessary to support a cover. The Undercover Unit will retain such documentation when not being used by the undercover agents or when it has been withdrawn from use.

Operation Commanders
In most circumstances, the Operation Commander should be a senior commissioned officer. They are responsible for the health and welfare of the agent, and the efficient management of resources.

The Operation Commander must be fully conversant with current legal issues and guidelines that are relevant to undercover operations.

In all cases Operation Commanders must obtain advice and guidance from an appropriate Undercover Unit before the commencement of an undercover operation. Undercover Units will give assistance and advice from the outset of the operation until the conclusion and subsequent court proceedings.

The principal responsibilities of the Operation Commander are:

- To ensure that the undercover agent fully understands his or her role in the operation, and is aware of the policy and guidelines set out in this policy manual;

- To be responsible for ensuring the undercover agent is briefed prior to deployment;

- Where there is any change in circumstances in relation to the operation, to ensure that the authorising officer is updated as soon as practicable;

- To be responsible for the safety and security of the undercover agent, when deployed;

- To be responsible for the safety and security of all correspondence and documentation relating to that operation.

Cases involving the deployment of undercover agents require skilful presentation at court if undercover agents are not to be exposed to unnecessary danger, and to ensure the integrity of undercover techniques. The key to a successful prosecution is early consultation with the Prosecution Service. The Operation Commander must seek the advice of the Undercover Unit concerned as to the timing of the consultation. In the majority of cases this will take place after the arrest of the target. However, in certain circumstances such as in a post-offence investigation, it may be appropriate to commence the consultation during the planning stage of the undercover deployment.

Intelligence gained by the undercover agents will be passed to the Operation Commander during regular meetings. It is the responsibility of the Operation Commander to deal with it in an appropriate manner, having regard to the security of the operation and those involved in it, as well as assessing the future importance of such intelligence.
No intelligence will be disseminated without the prior agreement of the Operation Commander and after consultation with the handler and the Undercover Unit.

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**RECRUITMENT & SELECTION**

**Agents**

**Selection**

The selection of undercover agents is one of the most important aspects of undercover policing. This area of policing, by its covert nature, makes it difficult to extensively screen prospective agents, but rigorous procedures are crucial to ensuring that only suitable staff are selected.

All police officers are eligible to apply for selection and training as undercover agents.

The selection process should comprise of various stages of assessment, background enquiry work, interviews and medical checks. The standards are high and only a small percentage of applicants meet the requirements. The criteria relate not only to an applicant’s suitability to be an undercover agent but, more importantly, to whether they will successfully adjust to general police duties following deployment.

To be successful, applicants require moral and physical courage, excellent interpersonal skills, and determination. The work is challenging, demanding and rewarding.

Participation in undercover operations is voluntary and officers are free to withdraw at any stage.

**Person Specification**

Prospective agents must have :-

- An independent, confident, secure and stable personality
- Maturity, motivation and commitment
- A stable and secure police identity
- Sound work and life experience
- The ability to participate within a group
- A willingness to learn
- No significant personal problems
- No history of over-use of alcohol or use of any illegal substance
- No history of major trauma
- No previous significant medical or psychological problems
Recruitment

Applications for undercover agents should be called for locally, or using other appropriate law enforcement media.

Applicants are invited to forward a report directly to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit. The Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit, collates the applications and requests further action.

When a police officer indicates an interest in becoming an undercover agent an application from should be sent out to their respective station to be completed by District staff. Prospective police officers should not be sent application forms directly.

A suggested ‘Undercover Agent Application Form’ is attached in Appendix F, refer to, page 79.

The Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit, should send a covering letter with each application form that is sent to a District Station. This will cover topics such as, an introduction, person specifications required, stations responsibilities, security of undercover matters and action on completion of enquiries.

Screening

The importance of local enquiries in the recruitment process cannot be overstated. The Officer in Charge: Police Station, or a senior officer appointed by him or her should interview all candidates. This officer should be familiar with undercover operations.

Local Responsibilities

The interview should cover the applicant's current financial and health status, previous occupational experience and skills. Particular focus should be placed on the applicant’s ability to communicate and relate to people.

Reports on the applicant’s suitability should be obtained from immediate supervisors, and enquiries made with colleagues and at least one immediate family member to assess the applicant’s character, judgement, motivation and work record.

There must be particular scrutiny of the applicant’s attitude and behaviour while off duty. Any evidence of alcohol-related problems (past or present) or previous exposure to drugs must be reported.

The applicant’s personal file, personal appraisals and attendance record should be examined to ensure that there are no doubts about his or her suitability. Any misconduct or breaches of discipline should be thoroughly scrutinised.

The applicant’s integrity and credibility must be beyond reproach.
Undercover Unit Responsibilities

The Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit, collates the applications and requests further action.

If the applicant is considered suitable for undercover work he or she will be invited to attend a Pre-Selection Course.

All applicants are advised in writing of the result of their application.

No information concerning an officer’s application for undercover duties should be held on his or her personal file.

Handlers

Selection

The selection of a suitable handler is crucial to the outcome of an operation and the agent’s subsequent successful assimilation into mainstream policing. The selection of handlers is therefore considered to be as important as that of undercover agents.

In recognition of the handler’s special responsibility, the law enforcement agency wishing to deploy an undercover agent must give particular scrutiny to the prospective handler’s work and personal background to ensure that he or she is suited to the duties.

Before being appointed, prospective handlers should attend an approved selection and training course. Undercover agents should only be assigned to handlers who have successfully completed this course, or who have in some other way over a lengthy period of time acquired and demonstrated the required.

Person Specification

Prospective handlers must have :-

- An ability to motivate others
- A proven ability in targeting offenders
- An ability to plan, and solve problems
- Demonstrated sound judgement
- Excellent interpersonal skills
- Excellent local knowledge
- A demonstrated ability in clear report writing
- An ability to work unsupervised
- A commitment to the agent’s welfare
- A commitment to operational success
They must also be self motivated, dependable and security conscious.

**Recruitment**

Reports on a prospective handler’s suitability should be obtained from immediate supervisors, and enquiries made with colleagues and at least one immediate family member to assess their character, judgement, motivation and work record.

There must be particular scrutiny of their attitude and behaviour while off duty. Similar to agent applications, any evidence of alcohol-related problems (past or present) or previous exposure to drugs must be reported.

The applicant’s personal file, personal appraisals and attendance record should be examined to ensure that there are no doubts about his or her suitability. Any misconduct or breaches of discipline should be thoroughly scrutinised.

The applicant’s integrity and credibility must be beyond reproach.

When a police officer indicates an interest in becoming a handler, an application from should be sent out to their respective station to be completed by District staff. Prospective police officers should not be sent application forms directly.

A suggested ‘Undercover Handler Application Form’ is attached in Appendix G, refer to, page 93.

The Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit, should send a covering letter with each application form that is sent to a District Station. This will cover topics such as, an introduction, person specifications required, stations responsibilities, security of undercover matters and action on completion of enquiries.

**Selection & Training Courses**

**Pre Selection**

The Undercover Unit using experienced handlers and undercover agents in an assessment role conduct the Pre-Selection Course. It does not need to be held at a covert location.

Prospective undercover agents selected for the Pre-Selection Course are those who have successfully completed initial screening.

The main purpose of the course is to select suitable agent applicants to attend the Selection and Training Seminar.
It also provides sufficient information for applicants to make an informed decision on their future involvement in undercover duties.

For security reasons, disclosures about undercover operations are made progressively throughout the course as applicants' progress through the various stages of selection. Applicants who are unsuitable or who choose to withdraw must leave the course immediately.

Information is also provided on matters to be addressed before the undercover training course, such as cover, leave and court cases.

**Handler Course**

The Handler Pre-Selection Course is conducted by the Undercover Unit using experienced handlers and undercover agents in an assessment and instructional role.

The course includes training in :-

- Pre-planning
- Health & Welfare
- Identifying and assessing crime problems
- Risk assessments
- Penetration & Cover

It does not need to be held at a covert location.

**Training Course**

The Undercover Training Course provides the opportunity for the applicants to be further assessed by the Undercover Unit, and fully assessed by a health professionals.

It also provides sufficient information for applicants to make an informed decision on their future involvement in undercover operations.

The course is comprehensive and includes training in :-

- The law
- Ethics and policy
- Stress management, health and welfare issues
- Occupational health and safety issues
- Criminal behaviour
- Criminal etiquette
- Drug identification
- Drug avoidance techniques, and simulation
Training Course Location

The Undercover Training Course is held at a covert location to determine which of the prospective agents will be deployed in an undercover role.

Reviews

Weekly Review

An operational review is conducted by the handler every week. It is the Handler’s responsibility to complete, the purpose of the review is to:

- Assess the justification for the deployment as shown by the information in the authorisation and that the deployment remains relevant for authorised target.

- Product of value to the investigation has been obtained since the authorisation and is likely to be gained during the remaining duration of the authorisation.

- The assessments of the risks remain unchanged.

- The deployed undercover agent is operating within the limits recognised by case law and specified by the authorising officer.

- There is nothing to warrant the attention of the authorising officer.

Six Weekly Reviews

A one-day meeting is held every six weeks. It is the Handler’s responsibility to arrange and facilitate it.

This review will primarily establish the continuing justification for the deployment of the undercover agent and whether changes have occurred in the perceived risks. Significant changes in circumstances must be brought to the attention of authorising officers.

The review will also:

- Assess the agent’s general health and well being.

- Provide an opportunity for the agent to relax in police company and reaffirm his or her identity as a police officer.

- Allow police administration to monitor and assess the progress of the operation.

- Complete a review to:
• Identify problems and implement remedies
• Provide encouragement and support

The venue should be suitable for both the operational and social purposes of the six-weekly review. It should allow complete privacy.

3/6/9/12 Monthly Reviews

A one-day meeting is held every alternative six weeks. These are at the 3/6/9 and 12 month stages of an operation.

The venue should be suitable for both the operational and social purposes of the meeting. It should allow complete privacy.

The review follows the same format as the six weekly review, but with added emphasis on:

• Assessing the agent’s general health and well being.
• Psychologically assessing the undercover agents.
• Providing medical support.
• Identifying problems and implement remedies.
• Providing encouragement and support.
• Reviewing expenditure.

RENEWALS :-

If an application to renew the authorisation is to be sought, prior to the review the handler must forward a report to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit. This will always be in writing and will confirm that the grounds for the original application are still applicable, this must be completed prior to the 3/6/9/12 month reviews.

The 3/6/9/12 monthly reports will be based on the weekly reviews and the previous six weekly report, and is a review document not a renewal application.

Operational Debrief

A debrief must be held at some suitable time after an operation, regardless of whether any arrests have been made or whether the operation was considered to be successful. A debrief should not be delayed until the court cases are finalised.

The responsibility for arranging and facilitating a debrief rests with the Officer in Charge: Undercover Unit.
The agent and handler review the selection, the training and the operation itself. Formal notes of the debrief must be completed and retained for planning future operations.

The review has three main objectives:

- To prepare the undercover agent for return to general duties.

- To conduct a full debrief on the selection, training and deployment process, and to highlight areas in undercover operations that require change or reinforcement.

- To provide a basis for independent evaluation by completing a full financial and operational debrief.

During this review and reintegration period, the agent is required to wear full uniform, and complete a written debrief and prepare a self-profile for future supervisors.

The agent receives a full medical examination and is interviewed by a health professional.

A suggested agenda is attached in the Undercover Procedure Manual.

**POST DEPLOYMENT**

On-going medical and psychological follow-up is provided for all agents during and after deployment.

**Reintroduction to Duties**

Usually, the agent is reintroduced to general duties within one or two weeks of the review period. These duties last for a minimum period of five weeks but undercover agents can, if they choose, continue them for a further five weeks before commencing leave.

To assist with the management of the undercover agent’s health and welfare after deployment, the officers, new immediate supervisor, must submit a report to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit.

The report should be submitted after the agent’s five-week period on general duties. It should outline the officer’s performance, including any problems experienced by the officer or their supervisors.

**District Guardian**

To assist with reintegration, a ‘guardian’ from the home station of the officer, is assigned to each undercover agent. This person should be an NCO or senior police officer, preferably with experience of undercover operations. The guardian’s role is to act as a mentor and provide support and guidance, not to supervise the agent.
The Welfare Officer will consult with the undercover agent’s guardian and provide assistance when required. This does not preclude the agent contacting the Welfare Officer directly.

The guardian must advise the Undercover Unit, of any complaints or problems as soon as possible, so that any areas of concern can be addressed promptly.

Physical Education Officer

The O/C Undercover Unit, must advise the Physical Education Officer of the undercover agent’s return to general duties. This officer arranges and monitors an appropriate physical training regime.

Welfare Officer

Once informed by the O/C Undercover Unit that an undercover agent is returning to general duties, the National Welfare Office must advise the local Welfare Officer and give them the personal profile and deployment details prepared by the O/C Undercover Unit. The Welfare officer must make contact with the undercover agent and provide appropriate support.

Area Commander

The Area Commander of the law enforcement agency to which the undercover agent is transferred must advise the Welfare Officer of the agent’s status and duties within the area.

Leave

Following an undercover deployment, the officer completes a period of general duties and is then required to take leave. The officer’s leave levels must be reduced to be consistent with recognised normal guidelines before they return to full policing duties.

HEALTH & WELFARE

The health and welfare of undercover agents is of prime importance to the police and takes precedence over operational concerns. It is the major consideration during selection, training, deployment and return to routine police duties.

The aim is to ensure that police personnel are medically, physically, psychologically and socially fit at the time that they commence undercover duties, that they remain so throughout their deployment, and that they are equally fit when they return to routine duties.

Where officers or former officers of undercover operations develop health problems, the police will provide resources to facilitate their rehabilitation to required health standards.
For Health and Welfare protocols, refer to the Undercover Procedure Manual. These protocols should be regularly reviewed.

**Psychological Services General**

Because of the potentially stressful nature of covert operations and the possibility of long-term personality changes, officers trained as undercover agents are required to have regular contact with staff from Police Psychology Units.

**Appointment of Health Professional**

Police should use their own Police Psychology Units to assist in administering appropriate psychological screening of applicants for the Undercover Training Course. If the law enforcement agency does not have a specialised psychology unit then a Consultant Psychologist should be employed to advise the Commissioner on the psychological well-being and health of officers and former officers of undercover operations.

Regular contact, with a health professional, is primarily for supporting and assisting those engaged in covert duties.

Contact will seek to provide ongoing psychological support, evaluate the psychological well-being of officers, and to evaluate, monitor and assist in the re-integration of officers in their return to regular operational duties.

**Psychological Services Health Professional**

The health professional advises the Commissioner on psychological aspects of assessing applicants for undercover operations, and interviews and/or assesses all applicants.

He or she also advises the Commissioner on psychological aspects of undercover training and assists with undercover training courses.

The health professional assesses officers deployed on undercover operations. This assessment is done on a regular basis - usually every three months - or as requested by the Officer in Charge: Undercover Unit.

The health professional will also see and help officers at their request.

The health professional should provide a written report annually to the Commissioner.

**Psychological Reporting**

The health professional or staff from the Police Psychology Unit will maintain regular visits to the Undercover Unit as often as possible and when time permits, on an informal basis. This is designed to enable them to view officers in their own environment and to establish a liaison, which will assist in the regular clinical visits.
Clinical visits by covert officers with a health professional or the Police Psychology Unit staff should occur as follows:

**UNDERCOVER AGENTS AND HANDLERS ATTACHED TO THE UNDERCOVER UNIT**

- Upon selection and then at a time not exceeding each six months thereafter;

- At any other time deemed necessary by the Officer In Charge, Undercover Unit and/ or Police Psychologist/ Health Professional, having regard to particular operational duration’s, issues or current personal issues.

Consideration should also be given to consulting the Health Professional/ Police Psychology Unit prior to the commencement of an operation in those instances where:

- The operation proposed is known to be medium to long term in nature, and

- The operation is of such a nature that the risks to the covert operative are considered to be greater than usual.

Clinical visits by Handlers, in addition to their own well being is for the purpose of highlighting any unique issues relevant to the undercover agents from their unit.

**PART TIME UNDERCOVER AGENTS**

- At least once every twelve months following the Undercover Training Course, if deployed in that time;

- More frequent and as determined dependant upon the number and nature of covert deployments.

**PART TIME HANDLERS**

- To be assessed by Officer In Charge, Undercover Unit in consultation with the Psychologist/ Health Professional and to be determined upon the number and nature of part-time deployments.

Any officer involved in covert investigations will be encouraged that they may, individually, at any time and without the necessity of having to notify the Undercover Unit, their supervisor or any superior, make contact with and visits to the Health Professional/ Police Psychology Unit should they feel the need or desire to do so.

Confidentiality of contact will be maintained between the Psychologist and the officer except in the following circumstances:
• An officer is suicidal and poses an immediate threat to either themselves or another; and/or

• An officer indicates that they are planning, or have engaged in a serious indictable offence; and/or

• The psychologist forms the opinion that the officer’s well being may be in jeopardy, or the safety of the operation may be jeopardised due to the psychological condition of the undercover agent or handler.

feedback to handlers

No feedback will be given to handlers about any individual undercover agent except in the circumstances outlined in the paragraph above. However, with the undercover agent’s written permission, feedback may be given to handlers to facilitate better working relationships between handlers and agents and/or to address issues of concern for agents. It is important to note that this is not a requirement and it is entirely up to the undercover agent as to whether this occurs.

In situations where confidentiality is broken, the officer is informed immediately that this is to occur and a written report is forwarded to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit.

The Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit is to be advised of handlers or undercover agents who fail to comply with the provisions of regular contact.

psychological records

The Health Professional or Psychology Unit are to maintain accurate records of all consultations and ensure the safety and confidentiality of these records. Officers will be afforded access to their personal records pertaining to their contact with the Health Professional/Psychology Unit.

reintegration

The Psychology Unit will be available to provide recommendations on the re-integration process of officers completing duty as undercover agents, based on the information gathered during regular contact, at the request of the officer.

post deployment assessment

The consultant assesses officers soon after their undercover role ceases, and continues to monitor their return to duties for three years, at a minimum of six-monthly intervals, or at any other time when requested by the Commissioner.

alcohol

In order to infiltrate criminal scenes, some undercover agents spend a considerable amount of time drinking in clubs, hotels and bars. One of
the most dramatic unwanted effects of being an undercover agent in the world of drug dealing is the extraordinary amount of alcohol consumed by many undercover agents.

Alcohol abuse can be a common outcome and alcohol dependence is a high risk. The use of alcohol needs to be considered and managed.

Allowing undercover agents to drink and drive endangers themselves and others, and must not be permitted. The courts, the police administration and the public regard drinking and driving offences seriously. This is reflected in the penalties imposed for such offending.

**LEGAL**

To maintain cover and credibility, an agent may sometimes find it necessary to commit ‘technical’ offences. In order to maximise the effectiveness of undercover operations, in some countries there are special legislative provisions to exempt undercover agents from liability. These exemptions apply only in the execution of the undercover agent’s duty, and each country must ensure that the undercover agents are fully aware of any legislation that impacts upon their duties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection in Respect of Offences</th>
<th>Apart from any specific exemptions or defences, undercover agents and handlers are subject to the general criminal law.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities in Respect of Offences</td>
<td>Any offences clearly committed outside undercover policy guidelines may result in the undercover agent and handler being prosecuted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Identity in Judicial Proceedings</td>
<td>Where undercover agents are called as prosecution witnesses, evidence should be given under the name by which the agent was known during the undercover operation (cover name).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The witness should not be required to state his or her true name or address or to give any particulars likely to lead to the discovery of that name or address.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of Charges</td>
<td>If leave to question identity is granted by the judge, and it is the police view that such questioning will jeopardise the safety of the undercover agent concerned, the prosecution should withdraw the indictment, or choose, in lieu of disclosure, not to proceed with any particular count in the indictment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legal provisions should provide for the withdrawal of an indictment where charges are being heard, and this matter will be referred to the Office in Charge of the Police Prosecutions Section.

Agent Provocateur

In general terms, an ‘agent provocateur’ is a person who encourages or stimulates offences, which would not otherwise have been committed.

This may be contrasted with the person who merely facilitates the opportunity to commit offences for those who are disposed to, and already have the intent to, commit them.

For a number of years courts have recognised the need for undercover agents, particularly in the area of ‘victimless’ crimes, such as vice and drug offences, where it is often the only effective method of obtaining evidence. However, the courts have made it quite clear that they will view with disfavor the activities of an undercover agent who acts outside acceptable police policy and guidelines.

Excluding Evidence

The courts have the power to exclude evidence that is unfairly obtained. Some courts have never acknowledged the defence known in the United States as “entrapment”. They prefer instead to rely on the residual discretion of the Judge to prevent unfairness in the trial process. This approach provides a practical basis for dealing with objections to the actions of a police undercover agent.

Unfair Defined

In the context of undercover work ‘unfair’ means “to persuade, trick or force a person to commit a crime that he or she would otherwise not have committed”. However, it is not unfair to present people with the opportunity to commit a crime that they would have committed whenever such an opportunity arose.

Agent Provocateur

Guiding Principles

Some guiding principles are :-

- Undercover agents should always play a part of minimal activity - that is, they should go along with what a suspect says, but refrain from making any material suggestions to assist the suspect in accomplishing his or her object.

- The undercover agent should not encourage the commission of an offence if the subject gives up the idea. The suspect should not be harassed, persistently pressed to continue, or threatened with some consequence if he or she does not carry out the offence.

- The undercover agent should not deceive, lure, or trick the suspect into committing an offence. Where possible, what the agent says
should be true, or based on fact. The agent should not make exaggerated promises about consequences, which could not be met (for example, promises of a reward quite beyond the normal reward, for the type of activity in question).

- Complying with a suspect's wishes is acceptable, and reasonable persuasion is permissible, but care should be taken to keep such inducement to a minimum.

- The undercover agent should believe that a potential offender is involved in illegal activity before any overture or request is made. For example, a request to 'buy' drugs should only be made to a person whom the undercover agent suspects of being a seller. It would be rare for the agent not to know of the potential offender's predisposition to commit the particular crime.

**Asset Seizure & Proceeds of Crime**

Undercover agents should be aware that they have an important role to play in recovering the proceeds of crime. Undercover agents may become part of the 'asset seizure' process by monitoring the proceeds of crime gained by the group or individual they are targeting. In maintaining this role, the undercover agent helps to remove the profitability, and thus the attraction, of crime.

Where serious offences are being committed, undercover agents should monitor what targets are doing with their money. The undercover agent should document in his or her daily notes:

- What the money is being spent on - this applies particularly to tangible property such as cars, houses and boats.
- Where the money is being spent.
- How the target is paying for things - that is, by cash, credit card or other means.

Ideally, the undercover agent should identify every asset that the target is identified with, whether ownership of that asset is admitted or not. The asset should be identified as clearly as possible. Where possible, the undercover agent should talk to the target about the target's use of illicit gains.

**Requests for Information**

Where one party asks the police for information about another party or thing, generally, the information should be made available unless the police can show conclusive reasons for withholding it. Conclusive reasons relevant to Undercover Operations include prejudice to the maintenance of the law and endangering the safety of others.
Partial disclosure of information in file documents should be considered in these circumstances.

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**Arrest of Agents**

Because of their association with criminals, undercover agents are at risk of coming to the notice of operational police.

If an undercover agent is arrested for, or charged with, any offence, the following procedures should apply:

- Unless the safety of the undercover agent is seriously jeopardised, the undercover agent must not reveal his or her police identity, even to other officers.
- The undercover agent must, as soon as possible, advise the handler of the situation.
- The handler must immediately inform the Officer in Charge of the Undercover Unit, who will be responsible for obtaining all relevant details.
- The Officer in Charge of the Undercover Unit must immediately inform the Operation Commander, to allow sufficient time for a decision to be made before the undercover agent is due to appear in court.
- The Operation Commander, in consultation with the Officer in Charge of the Undercover Unit, must decide whether:
  - the charge should be withdrawn or disposed of without a court appearance.
  - the undercover agent should be released from police custody or granted police bail to enable further evaluation.
  - the undercover agent should appear in court using the confidential cover name, or his or her true identity.
  - the operation should continue.

Although all situations are examined on the factors involved in the arrest or apprehension, the final decision is based primarily on the principles of truthfulness to the courts and the police reputation for honesty and sincerity of purpose.

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**Legal Guidelines for the Operation Commander**

**Offence Protection**

The Operation Commander must ensure that undercover agents are aware of the extent of protection they have in respect of offences they might commit whilst deployed undercover. He or she should stress that, generally, undercover agents and handlers are subject to the criminal law, and should monitor the extent to which an undercover agent is being forced into offence situations.

**Agent Provocateur**

Undercover agents and handlers must understand the concept of agent provocateur. The Operation Commander must monitor the agent's
tactics during the operation, to ensure that the legal aspects that pertain to agent provocateur are borne in mind.

Asset Seizure

The Operation Commander must ensure that the undercover agent is aware of his or her role with respect to asset seizure and recovery of proceeds of crime, and co-ordinate this task with any Regional Unit specialising in this area.

REPORTING & RECORDING

The purpose of the reporting regime for undercover operations is to ensure the efficient management of resources and to effectively monitor agent welfare.

All correspondence relating to undercover deployments must be forwarded as classified documents under restricted cover.

All verbal and written references to an undercover agent will be in the undercover agent's pseudonym (cover name) or by reference to his Undercover Identity Number.

Undercover Agents Daily Notes

The purpose of the undercover agents daily notes is to provide a detailed and accurate account of events and of their movements during the undercover deployment. Remember that there are other public and organisational records, such as telephone records, which the defence may be able to use to find discrepancies that could impact on the undercover agent’s credibility.

The undercover agents pseudonym (cover name) or unique Undercover Identity Number should be used on any documentation which may be disclosed in court proceedings in order to prevent the identification of the officer.

For security reasons, it is of paramount importance that the undercover agent keeps the daily notes in a secure place and gives them to the handler as soon as possible. The handler must retain and secure them, while the supervisor is responsible for monitoring access to them and disseminating the information they contain.

The daily notes should be used in the same way as an officer’s notebook. The agent can use them to refresh his or her memory for court and to negate possible defences. Defence counsel may request access to the notes.

The undercover agent should complete daily notes in every 24-hour period.
For the ‘daily notes’ format, refer to the Undercover Procedure Manual.

**Handlers Diary**

Handlers are required to maintain a daily diary, which is used in much the same way as a police notebook. Because the handler will refer to this diary while giving evidence in court, it should contain a full record of events.

The diary must be neat and accurate, and project a professional image of how the undercover agent was managed. It should be headed up with the day, date and time, and cover the handler’s daily routine and any matter of relevance to the operation.

In respect of the undercover agents daily notes, the handler is responsible for ensuring that the daily notes contain accurate, relevant and up-to-date information recorded in sufficient detail. They will maintain an indexed folder of the notes, for easy reference and disseminate intelligence and complete any enquiries arising from the daily notes.

**Weekly Reports**

For undercover deployments the handler must forward a weekly report to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit.

The report format is consistent with the weekly review, with the purpose of the review being:-

- The justification for the deployment as shown by the information in the authorisation remains relevant for authorised target.

- Product of value to the investigation has been obtained since the authorisation and is likely to be gained during the remaining duration of the authorisation.

- The assessments of the risks remain unchanged.

- The deployed undercover agent is operating within the limits recognised by case law and specified by the authorising officer.

- There is nothing to warrant the attention of the authorising officer.

The report must include detail to justify continued deployment along with a number of further administrative matters.

For the report’s format, refer to the Undercover Procedure Manual.

**Six Weekly Reports**

For undercover deployments a six-weekly report must be completed and forwarded to the Office in Charge, Undercover Unit.

The report must arrive prior to the scheduled six-weekly review.
The purpose of the report is to provide a complete operational and financial summary of the operation.

For the report’s format, refer to the Undercover Procedure Manual.

3/6/9/12 Monthly Reports

For undercover deployments that exceed six weeks, a 3/6/9/12 monthly report must be completed and forwarded to the Office in Charge, Undercover Unit.

The report must arrive prior to the scheduled 3/6/9/12 monthly review.

The purpose of the report is to provide a complete operational and financial summary of the operation. The three-monthly review establishes the continuing justification for the renewal of the deployment of the undercover agent. It will assess whether changes have occurred in the perceived risks, and significant changes in circumstances must be brought to the attention of authorising officers.

For the report’s format, refer to the Undercover Procedure Manual.

Evidential Statements

The details of any incident likely to be used as evidence in any criminal proceedings must be recorded in a Statement, whether charges are expected to be laid or not. Daily Notes and Reports must not be used for this purpose.

The undercover agents pseudonym (cover name) or unique Undercover Identity Number should be used on any statements which may be disclosed in court proceedings in order to prevent the identification of the officer.

The original Statement must be kept in a secure area, preferably a fireproof safe. A working copy should be made for reference.

For the ‘evidential statement’ format, refer to the Undercover Procedure Manual.

Post Deployment

On the completion of an undercover deployment, the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit must submit a report to the Operation Commander. The report must contain, results, undercover agents performance and a schedule of expenditure.

On the completion of the court hearings, the handler must complete a further report including a summary of -

- A schedule of offenders, including a summary of the charges and sentences received.
• A list of the assets seized as a result of the operation.
• An assessment of the quality of the undercover agent’s evidence.
• Any problems encountered during the court cases.
• Any comments by the Prosecution Section.
• Any adverse comments by Judges.
• Any recommendations in relation to preparing cases and presenting evidence for undercover operations.
• Details of the agent’s health and welfare.

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**Reporting Drug Use**

This section should be read in conjunction with the section “Basic Principles: Reporting Drug Use”. See page 23.

When cannabis and cannabis derivatives have been used (simulation), the handler must:

- Fully debrief the agent.
- Review the incident to ensure that the agent acted appropriately in the circumstances, and within policy.
- Advise the supervisor and, within 72 hours, submit a report, which fully outlines the circumstances.
- Hold the originals of the undercover agent’s statement or daily notes and a copy of the handler’s report on file.
- Submit a copy of the undercover agent’s statement or daily notes and the original of the handler’s report to the O/C: Undercover Unit.

For further information, see “Basic Principles: Use of Illicit drugs”, page 22.

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**ACCOUNTING**

A book of permanent record is maintained by the handler. It is a separate and complete set of covert accounts that records the expenditure of all monies received. These covert accounts are referred to as a ‘permanent book of record’.

There should only be one set of covert accounts for each undercover operation.

In the book of permanent record, separate accounts are kept for:

- Living expenses
- Evidential purchases
• Special advances

Each set of accounts is broken down into periods. A period represents the expenditure of an advance up to and including any reimbursement. The maximum period must not exceed two weeks. Each transaction within the period must be itemised separately and referenced to supporting documentation, such as invoices and receipts.

Where the book of permanent record is maintained electronically, the Internal Audit Section of the law enforcement agency should specify the accounting program to be used.

Operational Budgets

So that the resource can be managed effectively, all requests for expenditure should be referred to the Officer in Charge: Undercover Unit in the first instance, and then forwarded to the appropriate approval authority.

Reviewing Expenditure

The handler and supervisor are responsible for reviewing the undercover agent’s expenses to satisfy themselves that these are accurate and reasonable.

This requires them to determine:

• Whether there are supporting invoices and receipts, or an acceptable explanation from the undercover agent, for all items of expenditure.
• Whether the expenditure was justified. Were there any unnecessary or extravagant expenses?
• Whether the expense was departmental or personal.

Internal Control

The Operation Commander, or a commissioned officer appointed by him or her for the purpose, must carry out an independent internal control check over all accounts maintained. This must be in accordance with Police accounting policy and procedures for the law enforcement agency.

All books, records and documents must be treated as confidential and kept under strict security.

Auditing

The permanent book of record must be made available to the Internal Auditors, of the law enforcement agency for audit at three and six-monthly intervals and at any other time they are required.

Within six weeks after the undercover operation is completed, the permanent book of record must be forwarded as restricted documents direct to the Internal Auditors of the law enforcement agency.
Retaining Records

Once the Books of Permanent Record have been returned by the Internal Auditors, the handler is responsible for ensuring that they are stored in a secure location.

As required by individual tax legislation, all accounting records must be retained for the specified period.

After the required period of time, the operational accounting records can be destroyed on the authority of the Officer in Charge: Undercover Unit.

APPLICATIONS & AUTHORISATIONS

Applications

Applications and authorisations will be in writing unless grounds of urgency can be justified.

Suggested forms for undercover applications ‘Application Form’ can be referred to Appendix A, page 54.

Numbering of Applications

All investigations will be given a unique reference number. All applications, authorisations, reviews and cancellations within the investigation will bear the investigation’s unique reference number.

Before any authorisation is given, authorising officers will ensure this reference is present.

Information Required

The information required by the authorising officer in order that an application may be authorised. A checklist of these requirements is :-

- the deployment of an undercover agent is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, the maintenance of public order or community safety, or in the case of a significant public interest;

- the desired result of the deployment cannot reasonably be achieved by other means – by potentially less intrusive methods, such as surveillance;

- the deployment is likely to be of value to the investigation – important intelligence or evidence should be expected to be gained;

- the risks of collateral intrusion have been properly considered – estimates of the persons other than targets likely to have contact with the undercover agent have been made and procedures are in
place to limit collateral intrusion as far as possible and to keep any product gained securely if it cannot be immediately destroyed;

- the name (where known) of the target of the investigation - sufficient details to 'identify' the target(s);

- the likelihood and extent of the undercover agent's being required to be a participant in criminal activity - estimates of the undercover agent's role and required actions and that they will remain within limits recognised by case law and specified by the authorising officer;

- if access to or acquisition of 'confidential material' might occur, the nature of it and its relevance to the objectives of the investigation - the acquisition of and access to such material must be of substantial value to the investigation, or unavoidable, when special measures for its collection and destruction must be put in place.

Content of Intelligence

When detailing the 'intelligence case' in the application, officers should take note of the possibility of application forms being adduced and examined in proceedings. The use of sensitive material, the disclosure of which could result in harm to individuals, compromise of operations or of the effectiveness of covert techniques, should be avoided, or the material be properly sanitised before use.

Risk Assessments

The risks attached to the deployment of undercover agents will generally be higher than those attaining to other covert/intrusive investigative techniques and they must be carefully considered. There is a requirement to carry out a risk assessment in respect of each application and to review it at each application to renew an authorisation.

Suggested forms for risk assessments are contained within the 'Application Form' and can be referred to in Appendix A, page 54.

Confidential Material

In cases where acquisition of 'confidential material' (legal privilege, confidential personal information or journalistic material) may occur from the deployment of undercover agents, the authorising officer must be satisfied that access is essential to the conduct of the investigation and will state his requirements for the handling or dissemination of the material. Such material is extremely private and sensitive and great care must be taken with its handling and dissemination outside the investigation for which its collection was authorised.

Where it can be foreseen that the use of undercover agents will access 'confidential material', but there will be no relevance or benefit to the authorised investigation, the covert activity should, wherever possible, be curtailed for that particular period.
Where an authorised undercover agent comes unexpectedly into possession of 'confidential material', and expects that access to continue, he should seek appropriate authorisation before continuing the operation.

Authorising Officers

Each law enforcement agency dependant upon their individual size and structure will determine the rank/position of their authorising officers.

Jurisdiction of Authorising Officers

Authorising officers may only give authorisation for the deployment of undercover agents for investigations being conducted by their own law enforcement agency.

Due to the nature of undercover operations it is often impossible to restrict an undercover agent to his own law enforcement agency or agency area. Authorising officers and Operation Commanders will use their judgement about approaching other law enforcement agencies to advise of their presence, if not the exact activity taking place. The safety of undercover agents is paramount although approaches to the relevant law enforcement agency should be made wherever possible.

Interpretation of Absence

An authorising officer is permitted to nominate a deputy to authorise applications in his absence. In such circumstances 'absence' should be interpreted strictly.

Pressure of work is not normally to be regarded as rendering it impracticable for an authorising officer to consider an application. Whenever an authorising officer is able to make a considered, and therefore 'real', authorisation, he or she cannot be considered as absent.

Cases of Urgency

Urgency can only be justified where in all the circumstances the use of the normal application procedure would defeat the purpose of the application.

In so far as is practicable the same quality of information as required for a written application will be given to the authorising officer when making oral application.

Authorising officers giving oral authorisation will make a suitable record of the authorisation.

Where an oral authorisation has been given, written application and authorisation may follow, if required, at any time during the period of the oral authorisation.

Suggested forms for cases of urgency, 'Record of Oral Authorisation' and can be referred to in Appendix B, page 65.
Duration of Authorisations

Authorisations should be given for the relevant period where that is known to be less than the maximum permissible authorisation.

Maximum authorisation periods:

- written authorisations last for a maximum of three months, beginning with the day on which they were given and may be renewed at intervals of not longer than three months.

- oral authorisations last for a maximum of seventy two hours from the time they were given.

Written and oral authorisations may not be extended beyond their maximum duration where the limit of the authorisation would fall during the night or at the weekend.

Review of Authorisations

Authorising officers are not required to specify the frequency of reviews as these will be carried out in accordance with the policy and guidelines for reviewing undercover operations as set out in this policy manual.

Although an oral authorisation lasts for not longer than seventy two hours, authorising officers should not, as a matter of course, exclude the need for reviews within this short period.

Reviews will establish the continuing justification for the deployment of the undercover agent and whether changes have occurred in the perceived risks. Significant changes in circumstances must be brought to the attention of authorising officers.

A suggested covering report form, for reviewing undercover applications ‘Review of Authorisation’ can be referred to Appendix C, page 66.

Renewal of Authorisations

Applications to renew any authorisation will always be in writing and will confirm that the grounds for the original application still apply. Where the application for renewal of an authorisation follows an oral application, the full written application process will apply.

A copy of the ‘review’ report updating the progress of the case and a summary of the product gained from the undercover operation, including an assessment of its value to the case, and an assessment of the undercover agent, should be attached to all applications to renew an authorisation (refer to reports, page 45).

Renewals of authorisations may be given at any time within an authorisation period. It is therefore permissible to synchronise the
renewals in respect of targets previously authorised separately in an operation.

Suggested forms for renewal of undercover applications ‘Application for Renewal’ can be referred to Appendix D, page 67.

**Cancellation of Authorisations**

As soon as the need for the covert activity ceases, the authorisation must be cancelled, wherever possible, by the officer who gave the authorisation. The reason for cancellation will be given together with any instructions concerning future handling or dissemination of any product gained from the undercover operation.

Particular attention must be paid to requirements for handling confidential material acquired during the course of the deployment.

It is not permissible merely to allow authorisations to lapse.

Suggested forms for canceling undercover applications ‘Cancellation: Undercover Operation Authorisations’ can be referred to Appendix E, page 78.

**FORMS**

**Preformatted Forms**

The examples shown in the appendices are guidelines on the minimum standards required in documentation for the deployment of undercover agents. The forms are believed to reach a satisfactory standard for adoption by law enforcement agencies who wish to do so. However, it is recognised that some law enforcement agencies have further developed procedures to suit the particular requirements of their operational responsibilities. It is therefore, acknowledged that individual law enforcement agencies will wish to ‘tailor’ these forms to suit their particular needs. Each should, however, ensure that these minimum standards are preserved.

**MAINTENANCE OF STANDARDS & PROCEDURES**

**Adherence to Standards & Requirements**

A senior commissioned officer of each law enforcement agency should be appointed to oversee the adherence to the standards and requirements of the undercover policy manual and the undercover procedure manual.
## Appendix A  Application Form

**APPLICATION FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNDERCOVER AGENT(S)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPLICANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRANCH / DEPARTMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENCY / FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELEPHONE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME &amp; NUMBER OF OPERATION</th>
<th>AUTHORITY LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Number (URN):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITIES REQUESTED AND AUTHORITY LEVELS (Please tick)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating informant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undercover Agent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance in or onto <strong>private</strong> place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance in or onto <strong>public</strong> place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Has oral authority previously been granted?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If oral authority granted  

Date & time  

AND  

By whom
# Appendix A – Application Form

## TARGET(S) OF THE INVESTIGATION *(where applicable)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Intel Ref No:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age / Dob:</td>
<td>Personal Record No:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address:</td>
<td>Previous relevant convictions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description or other identifying information <em>(when name unknown)</em>:</td>
<td>(include sentences received)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Intel Flagged: Yes / No**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Intel Ref No:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age / Dob:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description or other identifying information <em>(when name unknown)</em>:</td>
<td>(include sentences received)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Intel Flagged: Yes / No**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Any history/information about use of violence or intimidation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Use additional sheets where necessary.*

## INFORMANT

**Number:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

RESTRICTED
1. INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE
   (Use separate sheets where necessary)

2. OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES/PLAN OF ACTION
   (Include sequential description of tasks, also details of any surveillance requirements, including technical needs. Include locations where the contact with the targets might take place (where known)
### Appendix A – Application Form

#### 3. CRITERIA FOR APPLICATION

**THE INVESTIGATION CONCERNS:**
- SERIOUS CRIME; or
- THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY; or
- THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER OR COMMUNITY SAFETY; or
- A SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC INTEREST.

Where there is a likelihood that access to ‘confidential material’ will be acquired in the course of the deployment please state. If this is the case, such deployments will only be authorised in connection with serious crime or the interests of national security

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Suspected offences under investigation:

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Note: ‘Serious Crime’ involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or loss, or is conducted by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose

**OR**

The offence, or one of the offences is one for which a person who has attained the age of twenty one with no previous convictions could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to three years imprisonment (or more)

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### WHERE IT IS INTENDED TO USE A PARTICIPATING INFORMANT

**(FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF AN UNDERCOVER AGENT ONLY)**

#### 4. CREDIBILITY / RELIABILITY OF SOURCE

---
## Appendix A – Application Form

### 5. RISK
Submit separate risk assessment for undercover officer, operation and participating informant (see attached risk assessment forms)

**ETHICAL RISKS**
- Is the use of this technique proportional to the problem it is intended to solve? Is the method essential to the success of the case? Are we tightly focussed on the target? Collateral intrusion must be considered.
- Is there a risk of damage to our professional reputation if the operation is exposed or Prosecution unsuccessful?

THE RISKS ARE SIGNIFICANT / LOW (Delete As Appropriate)

Comments:

**PERSONAL RISKS**
- Are there any physical risks faced by the officers, informants or members of the public who may assist or be subjected to collateral intrusion?
- What support measures are in place?
- Consider psychological pressures that may be experienced by officers or informants placed in vulnerable situations.

THE RISKS ARE SIGNIFICANT / LOW (Delete As Appropriate)

Comments:
### OPERATIONAL RISKS

Are legal guidelines/instructions being adhered to? Are informants and officers conversant with their responsibilities and case law? Keep possibility of participation and Agent Provocateur prominent in our assessment. Is the operation cost effective and is target selection in line with force goals?

**THE RISKS ARE SIGNIFICANT / LOW** (Delete As Appropriate)

Comments:

### COLLATERAL INTRUSION

- Degree of likely intrusion into privacy of persons not targets of the operation.
- Include the names or types of individuals who may be affected

**COLLATERAL INTRUSION IS SIGNIFICANT / MINIMAL** (Delete As Appropriate)

Comments:
Appendix A – Application Form

RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

Where are significant risks describe the action to be taken to remove or minimise them.

A risk assessment has now been carried out on this operation and there are no issues known as to why the deployment should not be approved based on the details of this application.

Comments- Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit (if applicable)

Signed
Date

Comments- Detective Chief Inspector/ Inspector
(Officer in charge of operation)

Signed
Date

UNDERCOVER POLICY MANUAL
Appendix A – Application Form

6. OTHER INFORMATION

Officer submitting information:
SIGNED:
RANK:
NAME:
DATE:
Appendix A – Application Form

MINUTE 1

Operation Commander:

The Operation Commander should sign here to confirm that the information supplied is complete, accurate and up to date.

Signed: 

Name: 

Rank: 

Date: 

Contact number: 

Additional Comments:
MINUTE 2

Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit.

I refer to the attached papers requesting the services of an undercover agent(s) from the

This matter has been discussed with ______________________ who will be the Officer in Charge of the operation and a suitable undercover agent(s) are available to carry out the requisite role.

The operation will be recorded at the Undercover Unit.

The necessary approval is sought.

Signed:

Name:

Rank:

Date:

Contact No:

Additional comments:
MINUTE 3
AUTHORISATION

Authority is given for the participation of Informant (No.) and/or Undercover Agent (No.) in this case to the extent outlined in the attached document. This undercover investigation is to receive the PERSONAL AND DIRECT SUPERVISION OF

He/She is to ensure that the instructions laid down are strictly followed in that participation should only be allowed to continue where:-

(Delete as appropriate)
1. He / She does not actively engage in planning and committing crime
2. He / She is intended to play a minor role.
3. His / Her participation is essential to enable Police to frustrate the principal criminals and to arrest them (albeit for lesser offences such as an attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime or carry offensive weapons before injury is done to any person or serious damage to property).

The same conditions at 1 – 3 apply to any other undercover agent involved in this operation.

Authority is also given for the use of surveillance including technical equipment for surveillance purposes as requested at item 2 (Operational Objectives/Plan of Action) of this application. Officers are reminded that this authority expires in three calendar months and if renewal is required a further request must be received prior to this expiry.

Is to ensure that a report reviewing the operation is submitted to my office by or earlier when there is any significant development. A closing report at the conclusion of the operation is also required.

I am satisfied that the criteria is met for such an operation.

Signed: Date:

Additional Comments:

Authorising Officer
Appendix B  Record of Oral Authorisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECORD OF ORAL AUTHORISATION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(to be completed by the authorising officer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation name:</td>
<td>Operation No. (URN):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICER MAKING APPLICATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BRANCH / OFFICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target details and/or target number</td>
<td>(only one target should be named on this form)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFENCE UNDER INVESTIGATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DETAILS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE INVESTIGATION</strong> (including reasons for urgency):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RISK ASSESSMENT:</strong></td>
<td>Comments / special measures required:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical risks are significant / low.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal risks are significant / low.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational risks are significant / low.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks of collateral intrusion are significant / low.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Confidential material' will / will not be accessed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• I am satisfied that the use of the deployment is proportionate and necessary to the investigation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• I am satisfied that the desired result of the deployment cannot be reasonably achieved by other means.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The undercover agent will only play a minor role and not actively engage in planning and committing crime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• I am satisfied that an appropriate risk assessment (including the risks of collateral intrusion) has been conducted and where the risks are significant, appropriate measures are / will be in place to minimise the risks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Access to 'confidential material' is / is not required to further the investigation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There are / are no restrictions on the use of the product that might be gained from the deployment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Undercover Agent (No.) may be deployed and act within the limits recognised by case law and this authorisation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• My further comments and / or instructions are (use an additional sheet if necessary):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The application is hereby authorised and expires at ___________ hours on ___________ hours on ___________ hours on following which written application and authorisation is required for the deployment to continue. A review of this authorisation will be conducted every ___________ hours / days by ___________.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A SECURITY CLASSIFICATION HAS BEEN ASSIGNED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANK</td>
<td>TIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESIGNATED DEPUTY ACTING IN ABSENCE OF AUTHORISING OFFICER</td>
<td>YES / NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFICE</td>
<td>TELEPHONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNATURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix C  Review of Authorisation

### REVIEW OF AUTHORISATION

This form does not renew an authorisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION NAME:</th>
<th>Operation Number (URN):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Deployment of an Undercover Agent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET NAME / NUMBER</th>
<th>AUTHORISATION DATE</th>
<th>AUTHORISATION EXPIRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(only one target should be named on this form)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The justification for the deployment as shown by the information in the authorisation described above (and supporting application) remains relevant for authorised target.
   - YES / NO
   
   *(If 'NO', formal cancellation of the authorisation must now be conducted.)*

2. Product of value to the investigation has been obtained since the authorisation and is likely to be gained during the remaining duration of the authorisation.
   - YES / NO
   
   Give brief details:

3. The assessments of the risks remain unchanged.
   - YES / NO
   
   If there has been any change, give details:

4. The deployed undercover agent(s) are operating within the limits recognised by case law and specified by the authorising officer.

5. There is nothing to warrant the attention of the authorising officer.

6. The next review is at on

---

A SECURITY CLASSIFICATION HAS BEEN ASSIGNED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REVIEWING OFFICER</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>TELEPHONE NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

UNDERCOVER POLICY MANUAL  66
## Appendix D  
Renewal of Application

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPLICATION FOR THE RENEWAL OF AUTHORISATION FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNDERCOVER AGENT(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPLICANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRANCH / DEPARTMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENCY / FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELEPHONE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME &amp; NUMBER OF OPERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INFORMANT URN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE ORIGINAL AUTHORITY GRANTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME OF EXPIRY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFICER AUTHORIZING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

RESTRICTED
## Appendix D – Renewal Application Form

### TARGETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DATE OF FIRST AUTHORISATION</th>
<th>DATE OF LAST AUTHORISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DEPLOYMENT OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS

Include:
- the location(s), and types thereof, where contact with the targets has taken place and might take place (where known);
- a sequential description of tasks;
- details of any technical needs.
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

(Use separate sheets where necessary)
OBJECTIVES / PLAN OF ACTION

(Include any changes in the objectives of the investigation since the last authorisation. Progress made. Also include the estimated duration of the deployment.)
AUTHORITY REQUESTED
(To include continued deployment of Undercover Officer AND any renewal authority for surveillance, and continued deployment of the participating informant.)
Appendix D – Renewal Application Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Comment on continued validity of original Risk Assessment/Management Plan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHICAL RISKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE RISKS ARE SIGNIFICANT / LOW  (Delete As Appropriate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL RISKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE RISKS ARE SIGNIFICANT / LOW  (Delete As Appropriate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix D – Renewal Application Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONAL RISKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE RISKS ARE SIGNIFICANT / LOW  (Delete As Appropriate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLLATERAL INTRUSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| COLLATERAL INTRUSION IS SIGNIFICANT / MINIMAL  (Delete As Appropriate)  
  *(Include the names or types of individuals who may be affected)* |
| Comments: |
Appendix D – Renewal Application Form

RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

Where are significant risks describe the action to be taken to remove or minimise them.

Officer submitting information:

SIGNED:

RANK:

NAME:

DATE:

Contact Number:
Appendix D – Renewal Application Form

MINUTE 1

Operation Commander:

Signed: Name:

Rank: Date

Contact number:

Comments:
MINUTE 2

Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit.

Renewal of this application is sought.

Signed: Name:

Date:

Rank:

Contact No:

Comments:
MINUTE 3
AUTHORISATION

Authority is given for the continuing participation of Informant (No.) and/or Undercover Agent (No.) in this case to the extent outlined in the attached document. This undercover investigation is to receive the PERSONAL AND DIRECT SUPERVISION OF He/She is to ensure that the instructions laid down are strictly followed in that participation should only be allowed to continue where:

(Delete as appropriate)
1. He / She does not actively engage in planning and committing crime
2. He / She is intended to play a minor role.
3. His / Her participation is essential to enable Police to frustrate the principal criminals and to arrest them (albeit for lesser offences such as an attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime or carry offensive weapons before injury is done to any person or serious damage to property).

The same conditions at 1 – 3 apply to any other undercover agent involved in this operation

Authority is also given for the use of surveillance including technical equipment for surveillance purposes as requested at item 2 (Operational Objectives/Plan of Action) of this application. Officers are reminded that this authority expires in three calendar months and if renewal is required a further request must be received prior to this expiry.

Is to ensure that a report reviewing the operation is submitted to my office by or earlier when there is any significant development. A closing report at the conclusion of the operation is also required.

I am satisfied that the criteria is met for such an operation.

Signed:

Authorising Officer

Date:

Comments:
CANCELLATION:
UNDERCOVER OPERATION AUTHORISATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation name:</th>
<th>Operation Number (URN):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The deployment of the undercover officer(s) is/are hereby cancelled with immediate effect in respect of:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(only one target should be named on this form)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE OF ORIGINAL AUTHORISATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REASONS FOR CANCELLATION
(Such as: successful conclusion of the investigation, lack of justification to continue.)

THE ACTIVITY CEASED AT (where applicable):

A SECURITY CLASSIFICATION HAS BEEN ASSIGNED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANCELLING OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RANK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELEPHONE NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNATURE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F  Application Form - Agent

(Security Classification)

UNDERCOVER PROGRAMME
Undercover Agent Application Form

APPLICANT: ...........................................................................
(SURNAME) (FORENAMES)

POLICE. NO.: ..............................

CHECK LIST:

1. Undercover Agent Application Form  Yes / No
2. Police Referee  Yes / No
3. Family Interview  Yes / No
4. Previous Supervisor form  Yes / No
5. Psychological Profile questionnaire  Yes / No
6. Police Welfare Checks  Yes / No
7. Personal File checks -  Yes / No
PERSONAL DETAILS

NAME: ___________________________ (SURNAME) ___________________________ (FORENAMES)

RANK: ___________________________ POLICE NO: ___________________________

ADDRESS: ________________________________________________________________

PHONE: (H) ___________________ (W) ___________________ STATION: _______________________

AGE: ___________________ DOB: ___________________ RACE: ___________________

MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE / MARRIED / SEPARATED / DIVORCED (when) ________

GIRLFRIENDS / BOYFRIENDS: (comment on closeness of relationship) ________________

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

PREVIOUSLY LIVED (address and dates): _______________________________________

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

NEXT OF KIN / CLOSE RELATIVES (names, relationship and addresses): ________________

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________
EMPLOYMENT / SKILLS / TRADES

PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO JOINING POLICE: (include where)


OVERSEAS TRAVEL / INTERESTS

PLACES: DATES: ___________________________ -


HOBBIES / INTERESTS: ___________________________


SPORTS: (include names of clubs) ___________________________


HEALTH ISSUES

PERSONAL:

SMOKER: YES / NO / REFORMED No. Per day: ___________________________

ALCOHOL INTAKE: YES / NO / REFORMED

Average Weekly Intake: ___________________________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: ___________________________


PERSONAL DOCTOR: ___________________________

PSYCHOLOGIST / PSYCHIATRIST: ___________________________
FAMILY HISTORY

WIFE / PARTNER

SMOKER: YES / NO / REFORMED No. per day: ____________________________

ALCOHOL INTAKE: YES / NO / REFORMED

Average Weekly Intake: __________________________________________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: __________________________________
                                                                                   __________________________________
                                                                                   __________________________________

FAMILY DOCTOR: ____________________________________

CHILDREN

NAME: ___________ AGE: ________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: __________________________________
                                                                                   __________________________________
                                                                                   __________________________________

FAMILY DOCTOR: ____________________________________

CHILDREN

NAME: ___________ AGE: ________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: __________________________________
                                                                                   __________________________________
                                                                                   __________________________________

FAMILY DOCTOR: ____________________________________

CHILDREN

NAME: ___________ AGE: ________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: __________________________________
                                                                                   __________________________________
                                                                                   __________________________________

FAMILY DOCTOR: ____________________________________
LEAVE LEVELS

ANNUAL LEAVE: (days) ______

FITNESS

CURRENT FITNESS CERTIFICATE: ________________________________
(Ne w one required if more than three months old)

FINANCIAL SITUATION

PROPERTY OWNED: ____________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

VEHICLES OWNED: ____________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

DEBTS (state amounts)

CREDIT CARDS: ________________________________________________

HIRE PURCHASE: ______________________________________________

SAVINGS: _____________________________________________________

OTHER: _______________________________________________________

POLICE SERVICE

(itemise where served, dates and nature of duties):

Graduated Police College _________________

UNIFORM DUTIES:
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

INVESTIGATOR (Detective) DUTIES
________________________________________________________________

CURRENT SUPERVISOR(S):
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
PAST SUPERVISORS: (should tally with details of service above)

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

COURSES ATTENDED (since graduation):

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

COMPUTER SKILLS: (level of capabilities and knowledge)

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

COURT / ARRESTS

ARRESTS: BURGLARY (... ... ...), THEFT (... ... ...), RECEIVING (... ... ...)
DRUGS (... ... ...)

DRUG RELATED (Name Type):

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

OTHER SERIOUS CRIME: (Detail):

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

NUMBER OF COURT APPEARANCES: (... ... ...)

ANY INTERESTING CASE DETAILS:

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

COMMENTS FROM PROSECUTIONS / CROWN SOLICITORS:

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________
INTERVIEWER

GENERAL COMMENTS OF INTERVIEWER: ____________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

RECOMMENDED TO ATTEND COURSE YES/ NO

INTERVIEWED BY: ___________________________ RANK: ___ NO: ___
NAME: ____________________________  ____________________________
(SURNAME)  (FORENAMES)

RANK: ____________________________
POLICE NUMBER: _________________

CURRENT POSITION: ____________________________

CONTACT PHONE: (H): _________________ (B): _________________

ASSOCIATION TO APPLICANT: ____________________________

(THIS DOCUMENT IS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT AVAILABLE TO DISCLOSURE)

COMMENTS:

Describe the applicant’s history with the Police, their level of practical experience, self-motivation, and independence.

Describe applicant’s temperament, ability to deal with hostile situations, history of anger or violence.

Describe applicant’s emotional stability, mental health.

Describe applicants use of alcohol or other substances.

Describe whether you think applicant is suitable as an undercover agent for the Undercover programme and outline why or why not.
FAMILY INTERVIEW
(WIFE / HUSBAND / PARTNER)

NAME: ____________________________
(SURNAME) (FORENAMES)

RELATIONSHIP: ____________________________

CONTACT PHONE: (H): ____________ (B): ____________

ADDRESS: ______________________________________
____________________________________________________

(This document is confidential and not available to disclosure)

COMMENTS:

Describe the applicant's self-motivation, and independence, and other skills.

Describe the applicant's temperament, ability to deal with hostile situations, history of anger or violence.

Describe the applicant's emotional stability, mental health.

Describe the applicant's use of alcohol or other substances.

Describe whether you support involvement with undercover programme as an undercover agent.
PREVIOUS SUPERVISOR

NAME:  
(SURNAME)  (FORENAMES)

RANK:  
POLICE NUMBER:

CURRENT POSITION:  

CONTACT PHONE:  (H):  (B):

ASSOCIATION TO APPLICANT:  

(THIS DOCUMENT IS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT AVAILABLE TO DISCLOSURE)

COMMENTS:

Describe the applicant’s history with the Police, their level of practical experience, self-motivation, and independence.

Describe applicant’s temperament, ability to deal with hostile situations, history of anger or violence.

Describe applicant’s emotional stability, mental health.

Describe applicants use of alcohol or other substances.

Describe whether you think applicant is suitable as an undercover agent for the Undercover programme and outline why or why not.
DISTRICT MANAGER
(Comments from Commissioned Officer and / or District Commander as to suitability of applicant)

JOB SHEET

___________________________________________

___________________________________________

___________________________________________

___________________________________________

___________________________________________

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___________________________________________

MEMBER:  NUMBER:
UNDERCOVER UNIT REVIEW
Follow-up inquiries into applicants character and background.

JOB SHEET

Recommendation for Suitability:

Suitable for Training: □ O/c Undercover Unit
Not Suitable: □

MEMBER: ______________________  NUMBER: ______________________
Appendix G  Application Form - Handler

(Security Classification)

UNDERCOVER PROGRAMME
Handler Application Form

APPLICANT: ...........................................................................  
(SURNAME)  
(FORENAMES)

POLICE. NO.:  .........................

CHECK LIST:

1. Handler Application Form  Yes / No
2. Police Referee  Yes / No
3. Family Interview  Yes / No
4. Previous Supervisor form  Yes / No
5. Psychological Profile questionnaire  Yes / No
6. Police Welfare Checks  Yes / No
7. Personal File checks  -  Yes / No
PERSONAL DETAILS

NAME: ________________________________ (SURNAME) ________________________________ (FORENAMES)

RANK: ________________________________ POLICE NO: ________________________________

ADDRESS: _______________________________________________________________

PHONE: (H) ____________________________ (W) ____________________________ STATION: ________________________________

AGE: ______________ DOB: ______________ RACE: ______________

MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE / MARRIED / SEPARATED / DIVORCED (when) ____________

GIRLFRIENDS / BOYFRIENDS: (comment on closeness of relationship) ________________________________

PREVIOUSLY LIVED (address and dates): ________________________________

NEXT OF KIN / CLOSE RELATIVES (names, relationship and addresses): ________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________
EMPLOYMENT / SKILLS / TRADES

PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO JOINING POLICE: (include where)


OVERSEAS TRAVEL / INTERESTS

PLACES: DATES:


HOBBIES / INTERESTS:


SPORTS: (include names of clubs)


HEALTH ISSUES

PERSONAL:

SMOKER: YES / NO / REFORMED No. Per day:

ALCOHOL INTAKE: YES / NO / REFORMED

Average Weekly Intake:

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES:


PERSONAL DOCTOR:


PSYCHOLOGIST / PSYCHIATRIST:
FAMILY HISTORY

WIFE / PARTNER

SMOKER: YES / NO / REFORMED
No. per day: _______________________

ALCOHOL INTAKE: YES / NO / REFORMED
Average Weekly Intake: _______________________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: _______________________
______________________
______________________

FAMILY DOCTOR: _______________________

CHILDREN

NAME: ___________ AGE: ___________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: _______________________
______________________
______________________

FAMILY DOCTOR: _______________________

CHILDREN

NAME: ___________ AGE: ___________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: _______________________
______________________
______________________

FAMILY DOCTOR: _______________________

CHILDREN

NAME: ___________ AGE: ___________

HEALTH PROBLEMS / ALLERGIES: _______________________
______________________

FAMILY DOCTOR: _______________________
LEAVE LEVELS

ANNUAL LEAVE: (days) _______

FITNESS

CURRENT FITNESS CERTIFICATE: _____________________________________________
(New one required if more than three months old)

FINANCIAL SITUATION

PROPERTY OWNED: ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

VEHICLES OWNED: ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

DEBTS (state amounts)

CREDIT CARDS: ___________________________________________________________

HIRE PURCHASE: __________________________________________________________

SAVINGS: _______________________________________________________________

OTHER: __________________________________________________________________

POLICE SERVICE

(itemise where served, dates and nature of duties):

Graduated Police College _________________

UNIFORM DUTIES:
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

INVESTIGATOR (Detective) DUTIES
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

CURRENT SUPERVISOR(S): ________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

UNDERCOVER POLICY MANUAL
PAST SUPERVISORS: (should tally with details of service above)


COURSES ATTENDED: (since graduation)


COMPUTER SKILLS: (level of capabilities and knowledge of any computer accounting skills)


COURT / ARRESTS

ARRESTS: BURGLARY (... ... ...), THEFT (... ... ...), RECEIVING (... ... ...)
DRUGS (... ... ...)

DRUG RELATED (Name Type):


OTHER SERIOUS CRIME: (Detail):


NUMBER OF COURT APPEARANCES: (... ... ...)

ANY INTERESTING CASE DETAILS:


COMMENTS FROM PROSECUTIONS / CROWN SOLICITORS:


INTERVIEWER

GENERAL COMMENTS OF INTERVIEWER: ____________________________

______________________________________________________________

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______________________________________________________________

INTERVIEWED BY: ___________________________  RANK: ___  NO: ___

RECOMMENDED TO ATTEND COURSE  YES/ NO
### Comments:

Describe the applicant's history with the Police, their level of practical experience, self-motivation, leadership, independence and problem solving skills.

Describe applicant's temperament, ability to deal with hostile situations, history of anger or violence.

Describe applicant's emotional stability, mental health.

Describe applicants use of alcohol or other substances.

Describe whether you think applicant is suitable as a handler for the Undercover programme and outline why or why not.
NAME: ____________________________
(SURNAME) (FORENAMES)

RELATIONSHIP: ____________________________

CONTACT PHONE: (H): ___________ (B): ___________

ADDRESS: ______________________________________

__________________________________________________

(THIS DOCUMENT IS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT AVAILABLE TO DISCLOSURE)

COMMENTS:

Describe the applicant's history with the Police, their level of practical experience, self-motivation, leadership, independence and problem solving skills.

Describe applicant's temperament, ability to deal with hostile situations, history of anger or violence.

Describe applicant's emotional stability, mental health.

Describe applicants use of alcohol or other substances.

Describe whether you support involvement with undercover programme/ willingness to share home/lifestyle with an undercover agent.
## PREVIOUS SUPERVISOR

**NAME:**

(SURNAME) (FORENAMES)

**RANK:**

**POLICE NUMBER:**

**CURRENT POSITION:**

______________________________

**CONTACT PHONE:** (H): (B):

**ASSOCIATION TO APPLICANT:**

______________________________

---

(This document is confidential and not available to disclosure)

### COMMENTS:

1. Describe the applicant's history with the Police, their level of practical experience, self-motivation, and independence.

2. Describe applicant's temperament, ability to deal with hostile situations, history of anger or violence.

3. Describe applicant's emotional stability, mental health.

4. Describe applicants use of alcohol or other substances.

5. Describe whether you think applicant is suitable as an undercover agent for the Undercover programme and outline why or why not.
DISTRRICT MANAGER

(Comments from Commissioned Officer and / or District Commander as to suitability of applicant)

JOB SHEET

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________
UNDERCOVER UNIT REVIEW
Follow-up inquiries into applicants character and background.

JOB SHEET

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MEMBER: ________________________________
NUMBER: ________________________________

Recommendation for Suitability:

Suitable for Training: □
O/c Undercover Unit
Not Suitable: □

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FOREWORD

Regional Centre for East Asia and the Pacific

RATIONALE FOR ENFORCEMENT TRAINING IN MOU COUNTRIES

Introduction

Various UNDCP projects have provision for the delivery of law enforcement training to police and other agencies in MOU countries. Unless there is effective co-ordination and control in this type of assistance there is distinct possibility of duplication and/or wastage through unstructured, disjointed, inappropriate or inadequate teaching. It is therefore considered desirable to specify the levels of training that are contemplated within UNDCP project documents and to impose standards to be observed within certain subject areas. For the most part, this can be achieved by prescribing model-training packages for specific topics or subject groupings.

General Concept

Professional and efficient law enforcement depends on the knowledge, skills and initiative of the officers involved. Knowledge and skill are largely imparted through training.

Officers deployed to drug enforcement duty should be adequately prepared for that work and receive training appropriate to their duties. They should be regularly up-dated on enforcement issues and suitably briefed for specific operations. A training needs analysis should be conducted to determine the precise training requirements of personnel assigned to particular areas of enforcement. This must be based on an assessment of the skills and abilities necessary in those work divisions and the design of training curricula within enforcement departments will be largely dictated by the department’s role in the national drug enforcement structure. Designing curricula is a specialised discipline and UNDCP can offer assistance to personnel engaged in such tasks.

Levels of Training

UNDCP drug law enforcement training will focus on four levels:
- Basic Training
- Supervisor Training
- Management and Command Training
• Specialist Training

Basic Training

Basic drug enforcement training can normally be delivered within agencies but there should be a standard course syllabus based on the knowledge and skills necessary for officers of each particular department. With greater or lesser emphasis according to the role of the officer’s department, it is generally agreed that a basic level drug investigator should:

• Have a good working knowledge of the drug laws of his/her country
• Know the nature of evidence and understand what can constitute evidence in drug cases
• Know the character of drugs and be able to recognise drugs in various forms
• Know the character of precursor chemicals and be able to recognise them
• Know when to refer a matter to an officer better able to deal with it
• Be able to recognise irregular or suspicious behaviour and, where appropriate, investigate it
• Be able to recognize forged, counterfeit, and other suspicious documents
• Be able to conduct a full and proper interview of a witness or person with information
• Be able to conduct a full and proper interview of a suspect
• Be able to read the body language of persons being questioned or observed
• Be able to apply for warrants or other authority to search and/or arrest, where appropriate
• Be able to conduct a competent search of people, baggage, cargo, premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft
• Be able to use drug field testing kits
• Be able to operate drug detector equipment used by his/her agency
• Be able to handle exhibits properly and competently
• Be able to cultivate sources of information and perform basic intelligence functions
• Be able to accurately report observations and events
• Be able to conduct a basic crime scene examination
• Be able to take fingerprint and footprint impressions of persons under investigation
• Be able to compile a dossier of documents for forwarding to the prosecutor
• Be able to competently testify in court
• Be able to work with citizen groups, NGOs and officials from other units or departments
• Be able to wisely exercise the powers and authority entrusted in him/her.

Supervisor Training

Supervisor training can also normally be delivered within agencies pursuant to a syllabus based on the knowledge and skills necessary for that department’s officers.

As with basic training, and again with greater or lesser emphasis according to the anti-drug functions of the officer's department, it is possible to identify in general terms the skills and knowledge required of a drug enforcement supervisor. He or she should be able to:

• Do all those things that subordinates can do
• Plan, organise, direct and lead team or group activities
• Check documents submitted for forwarding for prosecution to ensure that all required papers are present or accounted for
• Co-ordinate the functions of officials from different units or departments
• Consistently demonstrate good qualities of leadership and people management
• Recognise situations where a controlled delivery may be employed to advantage and be able to propose a case for higher consideration
• Take charge of a crime scene and allocate investigatory functions to staff
• Solve problems
• Form well-reasoned risk assessments
• Make sound decisions
• Eloquently express himself/herself to other people - in speech and in writing
• Logically debate issues with other people and at public meetings
• Motivate subordinates, citizen groups and other people
• Prepare accurate profiles of drug dealers and couriers
• Assess the weight of evidence in given cases
• In appropriate circumstances, authorize or obtain authority to search people and/or places for evidence of offences

• Adopt or approve the adoption of investigative strategies, operational tactics and suppression activities appropriate to circumstances

• Prepare submissions for higher authority on matters pertaining to drug enforcement, financial administration and the deployment of resources

• Suitably respond to questions from the media on enforcement activities.

**Management and Command Training**

Dependent upon the capacities and facilities of the national agencies involved, this training may be either conducted within the department or selected officers can be sent to outside training courses or other forms of tuition. The required skills are based on perceptions [canvassed at regional workshops and seminars] that officers with senior command and management responsibilities in drug enforcement should be able to:

• Effectively and efficiently manage and administer the resources under their control

• Know the capacity of subordinates and utilise their skills to best advantage

• Be aware of the existence and development of specialist techniques available for deployment

• Formulate enforcement strategies and tactics appropriate to particular situations

• Plan and direct anti-drug activities at command level

• Understand the concepts of enforcement mutual assistance and know the procedures for requesting and providing assistance to other jurisdictions in given circumstances.

• Approve, arrange and co-ordinate a controlled delivery of drugs or other commodity

• Organise facilities and resources to best effect

• Personally lead major operations

• Co-ordinate with other departments at senior level

• Exercise proper financial controls

• Devise methods of identifying, stamping out and minimising scope for internal corruption and/or other unethical conduct

• Demonstrate good judgement in all things and present a fitting image in the media
• Exercise with proper prudence any special powers invested in him/her for the suppression and or investigation of crime.

Specialist Training

Specialist training can be delivered within or outside national enforcement agencies. UNDCP assistance in this regard must only be given in those areas of expertise as are acceptable within the jurisdictions concerned. It is not intended to provide training in activities, which do not have legal approval in the country involved [such as telephone tapping and the use of concealed listening devices.] Topics in this category could include:

• Surveillance [including the use of electronic devices]
• Modern investigative techniques
• Communications interception
• Other technical support activity
• Advanced intelligence analysis
• Asset tracing and seizure
• Money laundering
• Undercover activities
• Controlled deliveries
• Managing informants
• Witness protection schemes

Curriculum Construction

Once the levels of knowledge and skill required in the respective agencies have been identified, the process may then begin of designing curricula by which the training can be delivered.

As mentioned earlier, curriculum design is a specialised discipline and careful thought must be applied to the means of delivery most appropriate to the position of the personnel receiving instruction. The amount of time devoted to any particular topic will be dictated by its relevance to the officer’s duty.

Besides tuition in functions relative to the responsibilities of the officer’s department, modern enforcement training should also include subjects on human rights, organisational values, interpersonal relationships, human dignity and accountability. Ways of avoiding prejudice, hypocrisy, stereotyping, misguided parochialism and other bad practice should also be covered. So, too, should instruction in the proper exercise of enforcement powers - including the use of force - and sufficient time should be allowed for meaningful discussion on the range of ethical

**Delivery of Training**

Training may be delivered by way of:

- Class-room based courses of instruction
- On-the-job training
- Training workshops, seminars and sessions
- Coaching and mentoring
- CD Rom interactive training
- Sponsoring attendance at regional educational institutions [including ILEA, Bangkok]
- Study tours and
- Funding attendance at selected overseas courses.

**Regional Projects with Major Law Enforcement Training Components**

Projects with substantial enforcement training components are delivered to MOU countries from the UNDCP Regional Centre, Bangkok. Currently, there are five such projects in hand. They are the CD Rom Basic Training Project, the Cross-Border Co-operation Project, the Prosecutorial and Judicial Training Project, the Intelligence Project and the Enforcement Operational Procedures Project. The first two are largely concerned with improving skills for interdicting drugs and precursor chemicals at the distribution/delivery stage. The next provides knowledge and professional skills for prosecutors and judges engaged in drug crime work and the latter two are mainly aimed at developing enforcement techniques and strategies for identifying and gathering evidence against key figures in the regional drugs trade.

All five encourage the development of internal co-ordination, international co-operation, professional competence and personal commitment. Most projects have provision to employ consultants with expertise in relevant areas and, under the guidance of the co-ordinator, to produce training materials which have specific or general application.

**Progressive Drug Enforcement Training**

The concept of progressive training is that tuition is delivered at times and at a pace consistent with the employment of individuals in drug enforcement work. Within enforcement agencies, officers newly moving to a post with drug enforcement functions would normally undertake basic training to provide the necessary grounding for their new role. Those advancing in rank, position or experience could receive supervisor level tuition - delivered in the format most suitable to their situations.

Officers taking up mid-level management or command responsibilities should be instructed at the management level - again, training being delivered in the manner most appropriate to their particular circumstances.
Enforcement Training Arranged by Country Offices

Where country offices have projects, which involve the delivery of training to law enforcement personnel within that country, such training should fit within the overall UNDCP regional enforcement training plan and the policy outlined herein. It is essential that all training be appropriate to the level of persons being trained, that it be consistent with national situations, that it comply with the laws of the jurisdiction involved, that it recognise human rights and UN principles, that it form part of an incremental training initiative and that it be delivered by competent people.

To ensure uniformity and a co-ordinated organisational approach, it is desirable that MOU country offices planning to arrange law enforcement training submit proposals to the Regional Centre, Bangkok, for the consideration of the enforcement professionals located there.

Sponsoring Students to Attend ILEA Training Courses

An International Law Enforcement Academy based in Bangkok offers training courses on selected enforcement topics for students from most countries in the region. That training generally fits well with UNDCP objectives and UNDCP funds could be properly be expended in sending persons to ILEA conducted courses where the training is consistent with the terms of this document.

Training Review Committee

In order to ensure that law enforcement training designed [or otherwise intended for delivery] within MOU countries is consistent, relevant and appropriate, it may be necessary in the near future to create a Training Review Committee to examine all training proposals, syllabi or materials.

It would be the function of such a Committee to approve or reject proposals and no UNDCP training would be delivered or received in law enforcement topics unless it had been approved by the Training Review Committee and no UNDCP funds would be expended on sending people to training that has not been so approved.

It is envisaged that such a Training Review Committee would comprise people with enforcement training experience who may or may not be from within UNDCP and that, perhaps, three such people would constitute a meeting of the Committee.

Model Training Packages

Training packages to be produced in the present series of Projects B65 and C46 are as follows:

I  Basic Intelligence
II  Controlled Delivery
III Undercover Work
IV  Surveillance
V   Mutual Assistance
VI  Asset Seizure
VII Evidence Collection & Presentation
VIII Command & Leadership
IX Advanced Intelligence Analysis

In each case, the training notes will be based on a model Policy and Guidelines document which it is suggested each country adopt [with suitable modifications to fit with law and organisation structures] for its enforcement agencies.

Future funding may allow for the development of more packages covering a wider range of topics but the present series will be confined to those listed above.

Confidentiality

Because the material contained in the training notes includes details of operational enforcement procedures, it is necessary to restrict their distribution to law enforcement agencies only.

Regional Centre Co-operation and Assistance

The functions of drug law enforcement are substantially the same world-wide and problems confronted in one jurisdiction are invariably similar to those faced in other places. Sharing information, providing details of successful strategies, receiving students for training from other jurisdictions, adopting substantially the same procedures, granting mutual assistance and providing other operational co-operation can all contribute to a consolidated global offensive against a common problem. There have long been calls for communities and countries to stand united against drugs. Similar emphasis should be placed on law enforcement agencies also standing together to present a united front against those who profit from the production and distribution of such illicit substances. To that end, the UNDCP Regional Centre, Bangkok, is willing to co-operate with any agency wishing to improve its training in the fight against the drug menace and will be pleased to share expertise with them.

Comments Invited

The UNDCP Regional Centre, Bangkok, will be happy to receive comments on how training packages might be improved. Such advice should be sent to the Co-ordinator, Projects B65 and C46, at the address on the letterhead.
HOW TO USE THE MANUAL

Manual Structure

This manual comprises three volumes.

1. **Undercover Policy Manual**
   This volume covers policy relating to undercover operations.

2. **Undercover Procedure Manual**
   This volume is the partner to the Policy Manual. It provides information about specialist services and procedures that officers will use in the course of an undercover operation.

3. **Undercover Training Manual**
   This volume contains some training material, relating to undercover operations. Not all details of undercover training are contained in this manual, as the nature of undercover policing essentially involves specialised and covert policing techniques. These techniques are highly protected and the success of worldwide undercover programmes, relies on secrecy and confidentiality.

Each volume begins with a table of contents and ends with an index. The index is specific to that volume - topics that do not appear in the volume do not appear in its index.

Each chapter is divided into several sections. These sections are headed according to the content of the topic.

Policy

This deals with policy issues of undercover operations and represents the best practice gleaned from years of experience. It will prove invaluable to those involved in undercover operations.

Procedures

This gives the ‘how to’. Although the instructions are approximate in chronological order, they are there for reference and are not meant to be in strict time line.

Cross References

Please note: If an introduction states that the chapter must be read in conjunction with another chapter or volume, it is necessary to read both chapters in order to gain a full understanding of the topic.
GENERAL

Undercover Policing

A properly trained and well-managed undercover agent is one of the most feared and effective weapons that the police can use in the war against crime.

To obtain the best results and to use resources efficiently, undercover operations should be used, not in isolation, but as part of the whole investigative process.

Undercover policing is a planned investigative and surveillance process in which police officers use disguises and subterfuges to gain evidence and intelligence against criminal offenders who have become resistant to traditional policing methods.

It is public knowledge that the police conduct undercover operations and, like anything secret, Undercover Operations are a source of considerable curiosity. The integrity and continued viability of undercover operations can be maintained only by ensuring that all officers observe strict confidentiality.

Although this manual is for trained undercover agents, the general principles apply to any undercover deployments using police officers.

This Procedure Manual sets out procedures for conducting the deployment of undercover agents. The standards herein are to be adopted in six countries that have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United Nations Drug Control (UNDCP). The countries are Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.


This Undercover Procedure Manual is a live document, which will be subject to periodic updating and a comprehensive review. Suggestions for inclusion or amendment may be sent to the Project Coordinator, UNDCP, Regional Centre, Bangkok.
SECURITY

General Security

It is public knowledge that the police conduct undercover operations. As with anything secret, these operations are a source of curiosity to other police officers and the public.

Releasing information on any aspects of undercover operations conflict with the principle, that the safety and security of undercover agents is of paramount importance. Any piece of information disclosed may seriously compromise operational security.

The integrity of undercover operations and their continued viability therefore require strict confidentiality by all police officers.

All product gained from undercover deployments will be evaluated, kept securely and only disseminated in accordance with an approved code of practice for the recording and dissemination of intelligence material.

Disclosure of Methodology & Manuals

The product of undercover operations may be used in evidence.

The methods used in undercover operations, together with any product gained, and are potentially disclosable in the event of these proceedings.

Law enforcement agencies should take all reasonable steps to protect the methodology employed in undercover operations through applications for public interest immunity, even in cases where the product is intended for use in evidence.

Ultimately, whether information should be disclosed depends on the circumstances of each case, bearing in mind that prosecutions stemming from undercover operations often involve a greater need for confidentiality.

Security Classification of Documents

The use of protected markings on case papers, documents and policies should be adopted. Standard markings are :-

- Restricted
- Confidential
- Secret
- Top Secret

Documents should be stored and disseminated appropriate to their security classification. Care must be taken to avoid over-classification.
Documents should be regularly reviewed and assessed to determine whether the initial classification still applies.

Consideration should be given to reducing the marking at an appropriate time. For example, at the outset of an undercover operation all material will be highly classified to protect the undercover agent and the operation. However, after the arrest and prosecution many of the papers could be declassified to ‘restricted’ as this information is now within the public domain.

Undercover training, methodology and these instructional manuals should be protected at all times to ensure that this specialist covert technique remains ‘secret’ and the ongoing safety of deployed undercover agents worldwide is ensured.

HEALTH & WELFARE PROTOCOLS

Health

The health and welfare of any undercover agent must take precedence over any operational requirements. All officers involved in undercover operations must monitor the undercover agents welfare and immediately take any action necessary for their safety and security.

Upon Application

Application for undercover duties is voluntary and must be accompanied by a supervisor’s comment in support.

Applicants must complete a form detailing any medical, physical or psychological treatment they have received since joining the Police. They must also certify that they are not currently receiving any medical or psychological treatment nor had any alcohol or drug abuse/dependency problems in the past.

An interview and background enquiries in the applicant’s district are to be carried out by a member experienced in undercover policing. This will focus on establishing the existence of concerns amongst colleagues of the applicant’s physical and mental health, problems with use of alcohol or drugs, relationship stability and attitudes to police work.

In order to identify any officer who may have an existing drug problem, all applicants should be drug tested prior to attending a Undercover Training Course.

Agents Deeds

To clarify the conditions under which an officer is to be deployed on undercover duties, the law enforcement agency administration and their
respective staff association have agreed the terms, and conditions covering the following:

- The fact that the undercover agent has volunteered to participate in undercover policing;
- Any benefits accruing to the undercover agent as a result of involvement in undercover policing;
- The obligations and responsibilities of the undercover administrators to the undercover agent and the undercover agent’s health and welfare, including a comprehensive list of the health and welfare protocols which will be followed,
- The responsibilities and obligations of the undercover agent.

A signed acknowledgment by the undercover agent of acceptance of these terms and conditions should be required prior to deployment. This document is called an Agent Deed, and a suggested example is attached, refer Appendix A, page 115.

**Pre Selection**

Psychological assessment and interviews of a prospective undercover agent will be carried by a health professional.

A health analysis test should be done to establish a baseline fitness level for the applicant so that the physical education officer will know the level of fitness to aim for after the undercover deployment has been completed.

**Training**

Trainees should undergo psychological assessments and other observations by a health professional/psychologist.

Health education should be delivered by health professionals which will include, but not be restricted to, the following issues:

- General health problems and health promotion,
- Harm reduction in the use of alcohol and other drugs,
- Health risks associated with the use of cannabis,
- Relationship problems,
- Management of anxiety and stress,
- Psychological reactions to the experience of undercover work.

An officer of at least Assistant Commissioner level should address trainees on ethics and welfare.

Trainees will be under continuous scrutiny from the administration, coaching, and health team. This scrutiny will be documented and trainees will also be verbally appraised. Classroom scenario and additional realism training will be closely monitored.
Approved drug avoidance training will be delivered.

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**During Deployment**

At intervals of not more than three months, and more frequently if required:

- Specialist medical and psychological assessment will occur.

- Psychological advice will be given to the operational team, and to the headquarters team regarding the undercover agent's and handler's suitability to continue with the operation.

- An assessment of the general health and welfare of the undercover agent will take place.

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**Termination**

Upon termination of a long-term undercover operation involving a 'termination phase' the undercover agent may be accompanied by a close friend or family member as “confidant”.

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**Debriefing**

Soon after termination, usually within one to two weeks, the undercover agent will undergo:

- Full medical examination.

- Psychological assessment (handler included) with a health professional/psychologist.

- Full written debriefing (handler included) on all aspects of undercover, selection, training and operation(s).

- Interview with a Senior/Chief Medical Officer (Police).

- Provide lectures to various courses/units where appropriate.

- Debrief (handler included) with Undercover Unit staff

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**Temporary Return to Work**

Approximately one to two weeks after debrief the undercover agent will spend five to ten weeks in a normal policing role (under the officer’s former NCO where possible).

On completion of this period, the undercover agent will participate in a further session of psychological debriefing.

During the return to work, the Undercover Unit should organise a health analysis test for the undercover agent to enable a remedial program to be drawn up by the physical education officer.
Normal Return to Work and Follow Up

The undercover agent may return to the district of his or her origin. Strong grounds will be required before posting a member to another district, because of the possible lack of a supportive environment/peers in that situation.

The Staff Welfare Officer will be advised (through the Undercover Unit) and instructed to contact the officer on arrival in the district.

A first-line supervisor will be nominated to oversee the officer’s readjustment to normal duty, and provide a report after six months.

A mentor experienced in undercover policing will monitor and provide support to the former undercover agent.

Psychological assessments with a health professional/psychologist should occur, as a minimum, at six monthly intervals for a term of three years.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Introduction to Risks

The risks attached to the deployment of undercover agents will generally be higher than those attaining to other covert/intrusive investigative techniques and they must be carefully considered. There is a requirement to carry out a risk assessment in respect of each application and to review it at each application to renew an authorisation.

No deployment of an undercover agent will be authorised without an adequate risk assessment and where required completion of a risk management plan.

The following guide to risk assessments is prepared to explain in more depth the requirements for completion of the risk assessment process, prior to gaining authorisation to deploy an undercover agent.

Risk assessment is a continuing process and any changes in risks to the undercover agent or the operation itself must be reported to the Operation Commander and the Undercover Unit.

Risks to consider are :-

Ethical Risks

Ethical risks concern proportionality and necessity (justification) :-

Proportionality
The degree of intrusion effected by the deployment must be proportional to the suspected offences and likely to be of substantial value to the investigation which may only concern:

- the interests of national security;
- the prevention or detection of serious crime;
- the maintenance of public order or community safety;
- a significant public interest.

**Necessity**

The proposed deployment must be necessary because the results desired from the use of the activity cannot reasonably be achieved by the use of other less intrusive means which may not be feasible, sufficiently reliable or practicable.

However, it is not necessary for all other means to have been tried and failed but that in all the circumstances such other means would not be practicable or would be unlikely to achieve what the action seeks to achieve within a reasonable time or to the necessary evidential standard.

**Character and standing of any individuals concerned**

In considering the issue of 'proportionality' it is also necessary to take into account the character and standing of the target. Justification for the deployment requires that there be assessed, current, information that the individual is suspected of committing or about to commit offences. Factors that help to assess the character and standing of a suspect include:

- the individual's previous convictions;
- the individual has previously been suspected of criminal activity and been investigated.

**Collateral Intrusion**

Ethical risks also include collateral intrusion - unnecessary intrusiveness to people other than targets - to which applicants and authorising officers must pay particular attention.

*Is the use of the technique tightly focussed on the target?*

Invasions of the privacy of individuals other than those to be targeted should be avoided where possible. In general, the greater the degree of intrusion to be effected, the stronger the justification should be in terms of the seriousness of the offence and the character of the suspect.
Personal Risks

Personal risks to targets, officers of the public and officers must be considered:

Risk of injury to officers, targets, or other unconnected persons during the investigation:

Officers carrying out covert techniques should be appropriately trained, especially officers who are likely to find themselves in vulnerable situations. Risks to mental health, or psychological damage must not be forgotten. Equipment being used may adversely affect people or other equipment, for example cars, or domestic appliances. The ability to conduct proper research/reconnaissance before the operation will be a significant factor in the management of risk, as will assessment of potential danger from the need on technical grounds to bring in third parties to facilitate the operation.

Advice on the management of technical risks should be obtained from Technical Officers.

History of the target's using violent or intimidatory tactics:

Such actions may dissuade some witnesses from giving evidence or assistance, especially if they live or work in an area frequented by the target.

Operational Risks

Operational risks include the risk and implications of compromise:

Exposure of the technique would be fatal to an investigation:

Targets may curtail their criminal activity or subsequently use more disciplined counter measures.

Exposure of the technique would adversely affect future use:

Exposure may result from operational failure or disclosure in court proceedings. Sensitive techniques require greater security precautions in planning their use.

The covert activity will stay within the limits recognised by law:

The use of the technique will not breach legislation or other due process.

Damage to local community relations or a high level of media interest is likely to result from exposure of the technique:

Use of some techniques may cause tension and interest in certain areas or communities, for which planning may be needed.

Risk Assessment Conclusion

Where the risks are deemed to be significant, a risk management plan will be needed. Risk assessment and management are included in the
application forms, these are attached to the Undercover Policy Manual, refer to Appendix A and Appendix C.

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**PLANNING & COMMAND**

**Definition**

The planning and command cycle is a series of stages by which the police make an appreciation of an incident or situation, form and implement a plan to deal with it, and subsequently evaluate that process.

**Planning**

**The Planning and Command Cycle**

The planning and command cycle has eight stages. In military terminology they are called:

- Aim
- Factors
- Courses
- Plan
- Orders, Instructions and briefings
- Leading
- Debriefing
- Recommendations for future operations.

**The Stages of the Cycle**

- The Appreciation
- Aim
- Factors
- Courses
- Outline Plan
- Orders, Instructions & Briefings
- Leading
- Debriefing
- Recommendations

Points to note:

The aim defines the goal of the operation and is the most important part of the appreciation. There must be only one aim and it must be clear, concise and precise; the simpler the better. Aims must begin with “To”.

**Orders**

‘Orders’ are the directions used by the Operation Commander to convey the Plan to those who will execute it. An order is a direction about how to
do something. It is used within a command structure by a Commander who has a specific task to achieve. It comprises a clearly defined task, and the method of achieving it.

Instructions

Orders and Instructions must be:

- Accurate
- Brief
- Clear and simple
- Capable of execution

Briefings

A briefing is a general overview of an operation, given by the Operation Commander to all those involved in it. While it is often impractical to give Orders to all of the people involved in a large operation, it can be helpful to assemble all staff for a briefing.

Generally, briefings are needed only in large operations. Their purpose is to inform all staff involved by:

- Explaining relevant policy
- Clarifying points at issue
- Allowing input from specialist sections such as Criminal Intelligence or Legal
- Answering questions.
Operation Orders

Covering Sheet

The covering sheet must include:

- The name of the operation
- The security classification for the Operation Order
- The Operation Order number. The first order is number one. A subsequent order, which will supersede the first, becomes number two, and so on
- The copy number. Each written order must be numbered and assigned to a specific member
- The distribution list

Situation

The situation includes:

- General information, the background, a summary of the situation and the security classification for the operation.
- The group to be policed, and what is known about them.
- The police resources, including the numbers deployed (by rank) and attachments such as the Ambulance Service.
- Assumptions, These fill any gaps in the knowledge of what the conditions are, or will probably be the list of primary targets.

Mission

This is a clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished. It always begins; “To .......” The mission, unless the Outline Plan is substantially changed, will be the same as the aim of the appreciation.

Execution

This explains how to accomplish the mission. It includes:

- A general outline, giving a broad statement on how the operation will be carried out
- Phases. Small operations usually consist of only one phase. Using more than one phase is a valuable method of defining breaks in an operation. For example, in a VIP operation, extending over several days, a phase for each day or each significant break or change in resources would ensure clarity in the Operation Orders. Do not create phases where you can satisfactorily deal with a situation in a single phase
- Undercover Agent
- Penetration
- Cover
- Accommodation
- Cover Aids
- Enhancement
- Co-ordinating instructions.
- Handlers Course
- Pre Selection
- Undercover Training Course

**Administration and Logistics**
This section outlines the support functions, such as:

- Handler
- Budget

**Command Signals**
This section outlines the ‘control’ arrangements. These include:

- The name of the O/C and 2 I/C, and where the Headquarters are located.
- Supervisor
- Handler

**Signature**
The Operation Commander must sign the orders.

**Distribution List**
This is a list of the members receiving the Operation Orders, together with their copy numbers. It is often placed at the front for easy access, but can be attached as part of the appendices.

**Appendices & Appendixes**
Include:

- Command chart
- Security instructions
- Statistics
- Target Profiles
  - Primary
  - Secondary
- Penetration Plans
- Budget

**Orders Groups**
The Orders must be simple, brief, chronological and in the SMEAC format. Each segment, such as ‘Situation’, ‘Mission’, or ‘Execution’ must be introduced with its title and further broken down as appropriate.

The Commander must talk slowly enough for officers to absorb the information and to take notes.

**The Presentation:**
The speaker must:

- Conduct a roll call and ensure that everyone is correctly seated.
• Explain that orders for the operation will be given and that there will be no interruptions. Questions will be dealt with afterwards.
• If there are no written orders, instruct the members to take sufficient notes to enable them to prepare their own orders.

A Copy of the Orders, together with any maps, plans or photographs, is then distributed. They are best explained during the ‘Situation’ segment of the Orders.

The commander can then give the Orders. He or she must:

• Be confident and natural.
• Be correctly dressed, either in uniform or plain clothes.
• Control the orders Group.
• Effectively communicate the intentions of the Operation Plan to the Venue, Group or Section Commanders.
• Clarify misunderstandings, but tolerate no argument. The Commander must not justify the Operation Orders.
• Refrain from criticism.

**TRAINING COURSES**

All officers deployed as undercover agents or as handlers should be trained to the standards required, and on courses approved by the respective law enforcement agency. Officers trained solely as test purchasers should not be deployed as undercover agents.

**Courses**

The recommended courses are :-

• Pre-Selection Course
• Handler Course
• Undercover Training Course

**Pre Selection**

A pre selection course is conducted by the Undercover Unit, using experienced handlers and undercover agents in an assessment and instructional role.

Prospective undercover agents selected for the Pre-Selection Course are those who have successfully completed initial screening by the Police District, a Medical Adviser, and a Welfare Officer.

The main purpose of the course is to select suitable undercover agent applicants to attend the Undercover Training Course.
The advantages to this pre training assessment are:

- Better ability to assess applicants strengths and weaknesses
- Opportunity for applicant to learn relevant Law in learning environment
- Opportunity for applicant to return to police district with increased knowledge and skills irrelevant of whether they progress to the undercover training environment
- Opportunity to assess whether applicant is suitable to progress to training, suitable for district based deployments (test purchases) at this stage of their career, or unsuitable for this type of duty
- Applicant will gain much better appreciation of what is involved in an undercover operation, therefore making a better informed decision as to whether they wish to be involved
- With more focussed assessment, training can also be more focussed on the practicalities of being an undercover agent
- Long-term cost efficiency through increased general training and increased number of trained undercover agents at conclusion of training

**Handler Course**

The primary aim of the handler’s course is to confirm District selections of handlers by testing the participants’ suitability to manage undercover agents. The prospective handlers should also be assessed by a health professional.

The course content includes training in planning, agent cover, the penetration of target groups, and preparation of budgets. A special emphasis is placed on undercover agent welfare and experience from previous operations. This enables handlers to appreciate the considerable responsibility involved in managing an undercover agent.

The course enables members contemplating being involved in undercover operations to consider a wider range of factors before being able to prepare and submit undercover operation plans.

This course will focus on teaching handlers how to prepare an ‘appreciation’ outlining all the factors in a crime problem, all the options available to address the crime problem, and what risk assessments are required.

The course should run for five days, and at the conclusion, three categories of personnel will be identified:
• Those who can submit an appreciation along with an operational plan and can run a long term undercover agent

• Those who would be suitable for co-ordinating short term ‘District Deployments’ (i.e. Test Purchases)

• Those who should not be involved in Undercover Policing

Undercover Training Course

The undercover training course should be held at a covert location to determine which of the prospective applicants will be deployed as undercover agents.

Training Course Content

The undercover training course should be comprehensive, run over a period of two weeks and include training in :-

• The law.
• Ethics and policy.
• Stress management, health and welfare issues.
• Occupational health and safety issues.
• Criminal behaviour.
• Criminal etiquette.
• Drug identification.
• Drug avoidance techniques.

Objectives

The objective of an undercover training course is to enable undercover agents and handlers, as a team, to :-

• Identify unknown offenders involved in crime
• Identify the continued course of business of criminal enterprise
• Provide quality sustainable evidence on serious criminal offenders
• Provide evidential backing for asset seizure and proceeds of crime action
• Apprehend offenders where traditional methods of policing have proven inefficient of unsuccessful
• Provide quality current intelligence on criminals and their activities
• Provide quality intelligence that can reduce the incidence and effects of crime
Aims

Undercover training courses should attain these aims:

UNDERCOVER AGENTS

Assessment
- Increased knowledge of law
- Increased knowledge of covert policing strategies
- Increased knowledge of policy and procedure

Training
- Self motivation techniques
- Increased Knowledge of drugs/ drug use/ drug prices
- Improve interpersonal skills
- Improve ability to communicate with criminal community
- Enhance problem solving techniques
- Improved policing techniques through enhanced knowledge of criminal behaviour

HANDLERS

Training
- Increased Knowledge of drugs/ drug use/ drug prices
- Improve interpersonal skills
- Enhance problem solving techniques
- Staff management / supervision skills
- Financial control
- Problem solving techniques
- Motivation techniques
- Operational planning

SUPERVISORS

Training
- Increased Knowledge of drugs/ drug use/ drug prices
- Improve interpersonal skills
- Enhance problem solving techniques
- Staff management/ supervision skills
- Financial control
- Problem solving techniques
- Motivation techniques
- Operational planning

COVER & BACK STOPPING
Cover

For an undercover operation to succeed, the undercover agent has to be accepted by their respective targets both physically in appearance and in the character they are purporting to be. The assumed identity that the undercover agent adopts is called the 'Cover Story', or 'Cover'.

It is important from the outset of a covert investigation that a suitable, acceptable and comfortable cover story is formulated. This cover story must reflect upon the individual undercover agent concerned and the specific inquiry that is being conducted.

Each law enforcement agencies may be constrained by particular laws and regulations when compiling 'cover' for their undercover agents, included are some general guiding principles that may give some direction to the compilation of successful 'cover'.

Creating an Assumed Identity

The undercover agent must readily identify with the character that he or she is purporting to be. The easiest way in which this can be achieved, is for the individual to adopt a role or lifestyle that can be related to through personal experience or practical knowledge.

Adopting a lifestyle which the undercover agent is both knowledgeable and familiar with will lessen the chance of the undercover agent breaking from the invented cover story and role character. For instance, an undercover agent should not purport to be a professional or trades person unless that undercover agent has an intimate knowledge of that particular trade or profession. This knowledge should extend to knowing phraseology, technical words and general topics concerning that particular occupation so that the undercover agent would be able to satisfy the target of his or her bona fide.

If an undercover agent is to be cast into a role which requires an intimate knowledge of a particular trade, then the preparation and research phase should be addressed, prior to the covert investigation commencing.

It is generally not advisable to formulate a cover story that has a history of prison sentences. If the proposed targets have in fact served time in prison, they will have an intimate knowledge of prison routines, prison codes and also be known to other persons who served prison sentences with them.

An effective cover story must be :-
- Simple
- Believable
- Sustainable
Situations have arisen in the past where poor planning and preparation in the creation of a convincing cover story has resulted in the undercover agent being exposed and consequently investigations failing.

If the investigation is worthy of an undercover agent's involvement, then the responsibility lies with the undercover personnel to formulate a worthy and credible cover story to befit the operational objectives.

The actual creation of the assumed identity is not a complicated process, however time and consideration relating to specifics is advised. These specifics include name, date of birth, address, occupation and criminal history.

Name

The selection of a name should be restricted to one that the undercover agent is comfortable with and which the undercover agent believes that he/she will answer to readily. The undercover agent must remember that it is quite possible that he/she may inadvertently meet up with a target when they are off duty and they must be prepared to answer to their assumed name at a moments notice. Some undercover agents use their own christian name with an assumed surname. Other undercover agents use both an assumed christian and surname and use their real christian name as their second christian name. Undercover agents who have an unusual christian name should consider using an assumed christian name.

The undercover agent must also be able to readily sign his assumed name with confidence.

Date of Birth

The selection of a date of birth is not critical, however one must remember that if you change your date of birth, it would be advisable to remember what star sign you now fall under.

Occupation

The selection of an occupation has already been partly addressed and can be the hardest part of a cover story to backstop and maintain. For instance, if you are going to purport to be a labourer, you will need calluses on your hands to support your story. The selection of an occupation will depend on the nature of the operation being undertaken. Occupations must reflect the appearance, style, class, vocabulary and knowledge of the undercover agent. Furthermore the occupation must suit the operation and target. The target must feel comfortable with the occupation purported.

Address

The selection of an address is also very important. A safe selection is to pick a block of flats with more than 10 flats in the block without stating what flat you live at. You could state that this is your girlfriend/boyfriends address and that you mostly sleep there. This covers bills/services not being in your name.
In most instances, when engaged in criminal activities in covert investigations, addresses are not revealed between target and undercover agent. However, some targets are cautious and may require that you reveal your address. Therefore you must be able to provide an address that will pass scrutiny or persuasively argue why you should not provide such details.

The most important point to consider with your cover story is that you should never divulge more information than what is required and you should NEVER give details that have not been backstopped. Remember that if a target begins to ask probing questions about your identity it may be because he is suspicious. Any specifics that you give can be checked and verified quite easily by targets. For instance, if you state that you work for a particular company, it is very easy for the target to ring that company and inquire about you.

Documentation

Again each law enforcement agency may be constrained by particular laws and regulations when compiling cover documentation for their undercover agents.

An assumed identity can be supported in numerous ways such as drivers licence, library card, medical card, video membership, gymnasium membership, business cards etc. It can be as simple as supplying your covert name when depositing dry cleaning and keeping the receipt with your covert name in your wallet, and as complicated as obtaining a false passport.

Through preparation and planning, an undercover agent can be equipped in a relatively short time period with relevant documentation and articles to support their individual assumed identity.

It is to be noted that all requests for assumed identification such as drivers licences and other official documents should be directed officially to the Officer in Charge, of the Undercover Unit in your district.

Techniques

Practice who you have assumed and are purporting to be. (signatures, answering to adopted names in conversation, telephones etc.)

Know your specific personal particulars well. (Prepare and plan for diversion of questions if non-secured background material is inquired about or requested.)

Avoid revealing too much detail of your cover story if it is not essentially required. This enables you in the future to utilise these resources at other times.

Remember and consider before taking a certain course of action to ask yourself "What would a real person do or say in this situation?"
Remember that your cover story and assumed identity is only as secure as you have made it. It is not as comparable in scrutiny to your own real identity.

Adapt your character and cover story to suit the level of criminality and class of target.

Maintain your own security with your assumed identity particulars and don't aimlessly interact with others about it unless it is necessary.

Consider your options of backstopping and corroborative resources. (i.e. references, personal contacts, phone numbers etc.)

Consider anti-surveillance measures after contact with targets to maintain the security of your cover story. Refer to these techniques in the surveillance chapter, page 59.

Avoid over consumption of alcohol and be aware of your capabilities when socialising with targets.

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**Back Stopping**

The term, "backstopping" refers to services available to undercover agents when planning and executing their involvement in covert investigations. The degree and composition of specific "backstopping" varies dependent on each individual undercover agent's needs and the requirements of the investigation at hand.

In short the overall aim and objective regarding successful "backstopping" is to equip an undercover agent with a sustainable library of material, references and identification which for all intents and purposes will convince the targeted individuals that the undercover agent(s) are in fact who they purport to be.

The level of "backstopping" which is committed to a covert operation should be of a standard which will withstand intense scrutiny.

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**Individual Backstopping**

The need for cover stories to be realistic and convincing is essential. Incorporated in this field and possibly best described as an extension of it is the individual agent's own personal backstopping activities. The individual backstopping format is not regulated nor is it confined to specific situations or geographical locations. What it consists of is simply meeting the undercover agents needs and requirements for the type of character and personality, which they intend to assume.

Undercover agents must enhance their own cover stories and identities by spending time formulating and creating them from the start. One of the easiest examples of this is where an undercover agent starts frequenting a hotel from time to time in an area where they in their true identity and occupation are unknown. The undercover agent continues to frequent this
hotel for a period of time with the sole intention of getting to know people, but more importantly having people getting to know them. Some people may ask when would they get the time to do that. The answer is that if you are genuinely interested and committed to this format of policing you will make the time or in some circumstances the time will be made for you.

Hotels are mentioned as a matter of course and as a result of practical experience, but the most important thing to remember is that any place, premise or location which exists is available for you to explore and use as a means of backstopping yourself.

**Undercover Unit Assistance**

Law enforcement agencies should instigate and use Undercover Units to conduct undercover operations. An Undercover Unit should have the facilities and the resources to assist undercover agents in the form of organised and structured backstopping. The Undercover Unit should be responsible for creating and supplying a number of false identifications for officers who require such assistance due to their specialised involvement in covert investigations.

However it is to be emphasised that the creation and distribution of any form of identity or documentation is recorded, monitored and expected to be returned or retrieved when the need for its use is no longer required. The scrutiny and monitoring of these items is essential, to maintain accountability and furthermore professionalism, concerning the numerous utilities and various government departments or private sector agencies of which structured liaisons have been arranged.

Without the assistance of co-operating outside agencies, we would be very restricted in what aspects of individual backstopping identification we would be able to acquire and offer to undercover agents.

It is acknowledged that some officers may try to use a professional contact, or someone that they know at a bank or government department, to get a favour done. It is this uncontrolled release and creation of identification, which if not created and prepared in the correct and adopted manner may not withstand scrutiny if, checked by a target in an on-going investigation.

The actual creation of the identity and the accompanying physical material is useless to the user if the total combined package is not backstopped and regarded as being a sound and useable commodity when assessing its effectiveness in the proposed undercover operation.

**Specific Types of Backstopping**

The actual list of types of backstopping available to the individual undercover agent is endless, and due to this it is not necessary or intended to record them in this manual. The most important aspect to remember concerning the specific types of backstopping available is that the
requirements needed in an investigation can and will be acquired and forwarded to the individual undercover agent(s).

Some investigations due to sensitivity require more backstopping than others. Of course on the other hand, some types of investigations involving undercover agents require very minimal or no backstopping whatsoever. Due to the varying degrees of covert investigations and subsequent undercover agent involvement in it the degree of backstopping varies accordingly and is created and supplied to fit the situation or intended path the undercover agent(s) investigation will take.

It is also acknowledged that the list of backstopping requirements originally requested may, at a later stage need to be further enhanced to incorporate other aspects of an operation, which were not catered for in the first instance. Through recognition further backstopping material can be acquired with minimal delay and forwarded to the individual undercover agent(s).

From the outset, the liaison between the handler/undercover agent and investigators must be cordial. The handler and undercover agent must be fully aware of the Investigators expectations of them, regarding the inquiry at hand. Full understanding and co-operation in this field will enable the handler and undercover agent to equip themselves with the necessary backstopping for the specific investigation that they are to proceed into.

Conclusion

As stated at the outset backstopping is a resource to be utilised and implemented by officers in the pursuit of achieving the objectives in a covert investigation. The time spent in acquiring and creating the various types of backstopping material and access to it is an arduous task. For this reason, and more importantly the undercover agents own security, the specifics or intricate detail of these items or services available should be kept secure. It is not necessary to tell others about the types of options that are available or which in fact you are in possession of.

ILLICIT DRUGS

Drug Knowledge

An undercover agent deployed into a ‘drug environment’, will require knowledge about the nature and health effects of illicit drugs. They will also require comprehensive information about how to identify illicit drugs, their street names, the methods of use, the short-term effects, the signs of intoxication at various dosage levels, the long-term health effects and their dependence potential.

The emphasis of each law enforcement agency, should be to keep current in the rapidly changing field of illicit drugs and their effects. This will
provide Undercover Units and undercover agents with essential knowledge of these various illicit drugs.

General Effects of Drugs

The general effects of illicit drugs on the human body are consistent amongst most countries.

Physical tolerance and physical dependence - are characteristics of drug addiction. Physical tolerance develops in the body, making it necessary to take increasingly larger doses to achieve the same degree of intoxication previously felt with less of the drug. Physical dependence causes pain (known as withdrawal symptoms), if the drug is not replaced in the addict's body. Withdrawal symptoms can last from three to ten days after the last dose of the drug was taken. Although the symptoms can be violent and painful, they rarely result in death.

Emotional Dependence - usually develops so that the drug is necessary for the individual to maintain a psychological feeling of well being. Drugs alter consciousness, sensation or mood. The addict experiences a controlling desire to continue taking them and to obtain them by any means.

All drugs are not physically addictive. Marijuana and the hallucinogens are not physically addictive, but their use can cause a psychological dependency. There is no withdrawal syndrome when their use is discontinued. However, chronic use and association with users and peddlers of illegal drugs often leads to the use of drugs of addiction.

General Recognition of Drug Users

Recognition of Dependence - may rely on some of a number of indicators. The most significant signs which may, when supplemented by further objective evidence, indicate drug dependence are:

1. A statement by the individual that he is an addict or user.
2. The possession of drugs without adequate medical explanation.
3. A tendency on the part of the suspect to hide his drugs.
4. The presence of needle marks in the form of black and blue spots resembling tattooing. These may indicate subcutaneous (under skin) injection, and may appear on the arms or legs or even on the backs of hands. Fresh needle punctures, sometimes topped by minute scabs or crusts, are specially significant.
5. The presence of elongated scars over the veins, especially those of the forearms, the insteps or lower legs, or on the backs of hands. However, such marks without other evidence may have a medical explanation unrelated to drug dependency.
6. The presence of boil-like abscesses over the veins or near the sites where veins approach the surface.

7. An appearance of drowsiness, sleepiness or lethargy, especially if accompanied by a tendency to scratch the body as if itching. This could indicate a slight overdose of an opiate or synthetic equivalent.

8. The tendency to develop withdrawal symptoms if isolated completely and observed constantly for a period of 12 to 24 hours.

9. Wide fluctuations in the size of the pupils of the eyes, with the pupils reaching a maximum of constriction soon after the suspect may have taken an injection.

10. The possession of equipment for smoking opium or crude heroin. If freshly used, opium smoking equipment will have a characteristic odour.

11. The possession of hypodermic equipment. But remember that a diabetic must give himself regular injections of insulin.

12. A tendency for the suspect to sit looking into space, this may indicate the use of heroin or barbiturates, or both.

13. The possession of a "cooking" spoon with its handle bent backwards, or a cooker made from a metal bottle top with wire twisted around it for a handle. They are blackened on the underside from being held over a lighted match or cigarette lighter.

14. A knowledge of the jargon of the drug using strata of society. Addicts who obtain their drugs from legitimate sources by fraud would probably never learn this slang, most users would, the undercover agent will need to know and respond to it.

15. A tendency for the suspect to isolate himself at regular intervals (about four to five hours apart) in order to take hypodermic injections.

16. An obvious discrepancy between the amount of money a suspect earns and the amount he spends for the necessities of life. With no normal expenses for necessities being obvious, he may be spending his money on drugs.

17. The tendency for a person who has previously been reliable to resort to theft, embezzlement, forgery, prostitution, etc. This could indicate a need for money to support a drug habit.

18. Sometimes barbiturate abusers exhibit the same signs as a person intoxicated with alcohol, with one exception, there is no smell of alcohol.
Drug Jargon

Use of Drug Jargon

One of the most important facets of undercover policing is the use of the appropriate "codes" or "jargon" that have been invented and used by persons involved in criminal activity.

Just as Police Officers have developed a collection of words and phrases peculiar to their type of work, so too have the criminal fraternity, especially those individuals involved in the use and trafficking of various drugs.

Members attempting to pass themselves off as belonging to the "underworld" or "drug scene" must possess an in depth knowledge of the vernacular (slang or jargon) used by the persons they will be dealing with in their day to day contacts.

It is equally important that an undercover agent and the target are speaking the same language i.e. that they both understand what each means when using slang, codes and jargon.

One of the major tasks for the undercover agent when dealing with targets is to establish what is meant by certain words and phrases. If they are using codes or jargon to describe the amounts of drugs being trafficked or to describe a particular form of criminal activity, confirmation of the true meaning of those words is necessary in order to support a successful prosecution at a later date.

To complicate the problem many criminal groups have developed their own peculiar jargon used and understood only by those people involved directly in that particular criminal activity.

Glossary of Drug Jargon

It is therefore impossible to produce a document listing every type of "jargon" used by criminals.

A list of frequently used, drug orientated jargon should be compiled by each individual country or law enforcement agency, which will act as a guide for undercover agents involved in covert drug operations. This glossary will be required for instruction at an Undercover Training Course.

Avoiding Drug Use

Use of Illicit drugs

The potential use of illicit drugs by undercover agents is a situation which the undercover agent will encounter at some stage during his/her career. The following paragraphs have been included with a view to enlightening undercover agents of the dangers of using illicit drugs during an operation and also to give them avenues to utilise to avoid drug use.
For full instructions on policy relating to 'use of illicit drugs', refer to the Undercover Policy Manual.

Health & Safety

In any undercover operation, the safety of the undercover agent is always of paramount concern. Undercover agents are already placing themselves in situations that are potentially dangerous and as such, need to be mentally and physically alert. Illicit drugs can and do have a debilitating effect on the body.

Placing undercover agents in situations whereby the undercover agent is required to contemplate the usage of powder drugs should never arise, or never be in issue.

Cannabis and its derivatives, cannabis oil and hashish, are drugs that are most commonly used by criminals and people in drug scenes. Because criminals and their associates make extensive social use of these drugs, there will, in some situations, be inevitable pressures on undercover agents to be seen to use them also.

Undercover agents who are placed in situations where they are pressured to use cannabis or cannabis derivatives have the following options. The circumstances and level of scrutiny will dictate the approach taken in each case.

Avoidance This means total abstinence - refusing or declining all offers. Where declining to use is possible, it is strongly preferred.

Simulation Feigning use, without actually inhaling.

Cannabis usage causes the heart rate to increase with an increase in blood pressure. The long term consequences of its usage are still not fully known, but even short term usage can cause the user to experience feelings of fear, anxiety, irritability, weakness and confusion. Medical tests have proven that its use is carcinogenic (cancer producing). The undercover agent is already under enough pressure and suffering enough stress and anxiety without having to be subjected to further pressures. The unacceptable possibility of an undercover agent becoming addicted to the drug because of his usage during an operation is another concern that should be considered. Cannabis is psychologically addictive.

The use of other illicit drugs e.g. amphetamines, cocaine, ecstasy and L.S.D., despite being acceptable in some social circles, produce much more dire health risks, and are not to be used. These drugs can be both physically and psychologically addictive and cause serious health problems.

Legality

Each law enforcement agency will have their own legislation for dealing with the legal aspects of the usage/possession/trafficking of illicit drugs.
Police officers must abide by this legislation, and in most cases have no additional powers enabling them to use/possess/traffic illicit drugs

The community expects the Police to investigate and prosecute persons involved in the usage/possession/trafficking of illicit drugs. They would be most concerned if Police members were in fact using these drugs in order to arrest offenders.

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**Moral**

As members of the police force we must observe and uphold the law. We must refrain from engaging in acts that would bring discredit upon ourselves and the Police. This includes using drugs. The community expects that police officers will act morally and responsibly when performing their duties. They will not tolerate failures to observe commonly held morals and laws. Morals are commonly accepted community standards that distinguish between right and wrong. Our morals must reflect the morals standards adopted by the majority of the law-abiding community.

When undercover agents work amongst drug addicts, drug dealers, thieves etc obviously the collective moral standards of these people are not the same as the majority of the community. If undercover agents work in this environment for protracted periods of time, they and their handlers must ensure that the substandard morals of the target group does not adversely affect the undercover agent.

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**General Methods for Avoiding Use**

Undercover agents should remember that using illicit drugs should never be contemplated in order only to further their credibility during an operation. Your health and safety are too important.

Many drug traffickers themselves do not use drugs.

A collection of suggested methods for avoidance of drug use should be compiled, and used by undercover agents, to avoid the use of illicit drugs. By thorough briefing and preparation most risks of drug use can be overcome. Strategies must be explored so that they can be employed when such instances occur.

The only circumstance that would be deemed acceptable for undercover agents to use illicit drugs, is where there is a clear, immediate threat to the life of the undercover agent. Should an undercover agent use an illicit drug, the circumstances leading to their decision will be thoroughly examined.

Handlers must be informed of drug use at the first opportunity. For full instructions on policy relating to ‘reporting drug use’, refer to the Undercover Policy Manual, and to page 55 of this manual.

The most common incidences where drug use becomes an issue occur when:-
- undercover agents meet socially with suspects at parties, night clubs

- undercover agents are believed by suspects to be drug users

- targets decide to test undercover agents (see Methods of Dissuading Suspicion, page 79); and

- targets 'lace' an undercover agents drink in order to take advantage of them mentally, physically or sexually.

It is often clear to undercover agents and handlers which operations pose risks in relation to offers to use drugs, and attempts to covertly cause undercover agents to consume drugs. This must be taken into account in planning phases so that all precautions can be explored.

For example; if it is suspected that the undercover agent will be offered cannabis during a meeting the handler and undercover agent must plan strategies in advance. Consider a strategy that can be implemented prior to the offer.

If an undercover agent carries an asthma 'puffer' the target may not offer cannabis to smoke or if he does a refusal to use cannabis should be readily accepted.

If a target is considered the type that may try to take advantage of an undercover agent by secreting things in food or drink, extreme caution must be taken. Often the relationship between target and undercover agent will signal the risk of this happening. If a target indicated sexual attraction to an undercover agent then they are at risk. Consideration should be given to ensuring all meetings are held in public, drinks and food are not consumed if prepared or handled by the target and the undercover agent is under constant observation.

Simple precautions must be taken when attending nightclubs, hotels etc.

- Never leave a drink unattended

- Do not accept a drink from unknown persons

- Attempt to purchase all your own drinks directly from the bar

- If you are in a 'shout' with a target, attempt to observe the continuity of drinks between bar and yourself

- If a target is buying drinks and you cannot observe him order a clear drink e.g. water, gin and tonic, vodka and lemonade
• If you still believe that your drink is laced consider pretending to drink a small amount then complain to the target that it tastes funny and then ask him to taste it. If he tastes it still maintain that it tastes funny and refuse to drink it. If he refuses to drink it you must not drink it.

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**Drug Use Policy**

The Undercover Policy Manual outlines the full policy for the use of illicit drugs, and the reporting of illicit drugs. Refer to, “Basic Principles: Reporting Drug Use” and “Reporting, Recording & Dissemination of Product: Reporting Drug Use.”

Also refer to “reporting drug use” on page 55, of this manual.

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**BRIEFING & DEBRIEFING UNDERCOVER AGENTS**

**Briefing Agents**

Briefing undercover agents in relation to any covert investigation is one of the most important roles of the Handler. The briefings should be concise, clear and leave no doubt in the eyes of the undercover agent what is required of him on each and every time he has a meeting or contact with a criminal target.

Handlers need to include in their briefing the following:

• A ‘list’ of objectives for the undercover agent

• The location for a de-brief after the meeting with the target

• An agreement on signals to be used by the undercover agent during the meeting

• A maximum or cut-off time for the meeting

• A maximum time before the undercover agent needs to contact the handler

• Parameters for the meeting i.e. Whether he can travel with the target, enter buildings with the target, or how much money he can agree to pay for drugs, guns, etc.

**List of Objectives**

There should be a list of objectives to be achieved by the undercover agent during a meeting with a target. This list could include (but not limited to), such things as:-

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• Admissions from the target re crimes committed
• Collection of exhibits from the target, i.e. Guns, drugs
• Reconnaissance of the target address for subsequent use by investigators during a search of the premises. i.e. Alarms, method of door openings
• Identification of target associates and addresses or vehicles
• The locations of hiding places used by the target

For the undercover agent's benefit the list should be kept as simple as possible.

Participants to Briefing
Where possible the briefing between the handler and the undercover agent should be carried out with no other persons present and with as little interruption as possible. This is important as this should be the last time that instructions are given to the undercover agent before a meeting and as such he will have the objectives of that meeting fresh in his mind.

The handler should avoid, where possible, other investigators being in a position whereby they are giving other instructions to the undercover agent. The handler should be the only person to give all instructions to the undercover agent as to the objectives sought.

Communications
It is vitally important that the undercover agent has a clear understanding of what signals or forms of communication will be used throughout a meeting with a target. There will be occasions when a surveillance unit will be working with the undercover agent on the target. A simple signal by the undercover agent which would indicate, such things as the target has the drugs with him, or the target is armed or the undercover agent has been told to move to another location, etc. will be of great assistance to them and the investigators alike.

On other occasions, conversations between undercover agents and targets can be monitored via listening devices and as long as the device is working well, the Handler will have a very good idea of what is happening. Unfortunately on many occasions the technical equipment may not work well and unless the handler has planned for alternative forms of communication, i.e. visual signals, pre-arranged phone calls or time parameters, he will have no idea of what is happening.

Time Parameters
From a handler's point of view, minimum contact times must be adhered to by the undercover agent if that undercover agent is performing a task which cannot be adequately covered by surveillance or listening device. In these situations, the handler has little or no idea of what is happening until the meeting is completed.
If the meeting is a lengthy one, unless the Handler has previously arranged some form of contact with the undercover agent to indicate all is well, he will have no idea something has gone wrong until it is too late. This contact may simply be via mobile phone and a prearranged conversation or a simple visual signal, i.e. undercover agent opening car boot or exiting the target address to get something left in their car.

**Alternative Plans**

Where possible, prior to each meeting, the handler and the undercover agent should attempt to identify all the possible anticipated scenarios that could occur during the meeting with the target. As each of the anticipated scenarios is discussed, a solution or course of action by the undercover agent should also be discussed and set in place. At each meeting the scenarios and courses of action will change and will be dependent on what parameters and flexibility, the undercover agent has to work with.

It is incumbent upon a handler to attempt to anticipate the likely scenarios that will occur during an undercover agent/target meeting and assist the undercover agent in planning his responses to these changing scenarios.

**Conclusion**

On many if not the majority of occasions where an undercover agent fails to act according to plan, the handler will be at fault. Most undercover agents will try their hardest to meet their objective, however if they do not properly understand their instructions they can not be blamed for failing to comply with them. Whilst they too have a responsibility to ensure they understand their instructions, the handler is in charge and has the ultimate responsibility.

It is therefore imperative that the briefing be conducted appropriately.

**Debriefing Agents**

At the conclusion of any meeting or contact with the target of an operation the handler should 'debrief' the undercover agent and it is suggested that the following matters be discussed:

- Discuss meeting in logical chronological order from start to finish

- Record via notes a concise and accurate summary of the meeting/contact

- Raise important matters that may require immediate attention on the part of the investigators

- Detail the information obtained and the answers in response to the specific 'objectives' discussed at pre meeting briefing

- Discuss general opinion as to the demeanor and mood of the meeting. Whether or not the target appeared comfortable or worried by the
presence of the undercover agent. Raise any concerns that the target may have

- Notify of any interest shown by the target towards other persons and/or vehicles for example if the target believes that he is under physical surveillance

- Notify of any intention by the target to look for technical surveillance devices for example the electronic sweeping of premises and/or vehicles

- Discuss the next anticipated meeting/contact with the target and what the target expects from the undercover agent on that occasion, for example what amount of product will be purchased and when

- Any other matters that the undercover agent considers may enhance or impede the overall objectives of the investigation

- Hand over any exhibits/items purchased or other relevant material obtained during the meeting, paying particular attention to necessary evidential requirements

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### Debriefing - Handler to Investigators

Handlers will vary in their opinions as to whether investigators should be present during the initial ‘hot’ de-brief of an undercover agent. This will be dependent on the nature of the investigation and at times the quality of the investigator himself.

On some occasions it is advisable that the lead investigator be present during the debrief of the undercover agent. This negates the need for double handling of information and gives the investigator the opportunity to receive the intelligence/evidence first hand thereby ensuring the information is as accurate as possible.

Many investigators will make no effort to take notes of this debriefing session instead relying on subsequent evidential statements. This is to their disadvantage as the debrief is their opportunity to question the undercover agent in detail.

There will be times when it is inadvisable for the investigator to meet personally with undercover agent after a meeting has taken place with a target. Despite anti-surveillance conducted by undercover agents there is still the possibility of targets or target associates successfully following an undercover agent to a debrief meeting with investigators. This would obviously result in exposure of the undercover agent.

Long term infiltration operations may also justify keeping the undercover agent away from the investigators. The very nature of these types of investigations presents greater risk to undercover agent security. Undercover agents will be virtually living with their targets and handlers’
must be especially careful in meeting with the undercover agent in these circumstances.

If Handlers opt to have the investigator present during debriefs, they should consider having one investigator nominated for this responsibility. This not only allows a good working relationship to develop between the Handler, Undercover agent and Investigator but also reduces the risk of breaches of security, (inadvertent or intentional). There is no need for every member of a particular office to become familiar with the undercover agent and his description.

Conclusion

At the conclusion of the debrief the undercover agent should be given the opportunity to comment on what they believe they can achieve on the next meeting with the target. The handler will often have his/her own strategy for future meetings in mind and needs to hear from the undercover agent firsthand as to what is realistically achievable.

The handler has the responsibility of ensuring that the investigations demands do not exceed the undercover agent’s ability.

It is imperative that the handler ascertains the parameters of the investigation. At the conclusion of a debrief, the handler should be able to give an investigator a very clear idea of what potential strategies for future meetings are available to him, with recommendations as to which is most suitable.

OPERATIONAL REVIEWS & REPORTING

Operational Reviewing or De-briefing is possibly, the most important practical application that can be found in "operational" areas for a law enforcement agency. For full instructions on policy relating to 'reviews', refer to the Undercover Policy Manual.

Defined

De-briefing can be broadly described as:

"A structured conference to identify problems and experiences in respect to a situation, and to identify how similar situations might be handled in the future."

General

Generally, it is suggested that without good planning and follow up action, a de-brief is often largely self serving. Chairmanship of the de-brief is also a skill worthy of mention as it can be particularly difficult in a large de-brief.
A review or de-brief is not confined to a command critique only, and should not necessarily take place only at the end of the operation. Operations should be reviewed regularly with a view to identifying and solving problems that may exist during the running of the undercover operation.

Apart from identifying problems that occur, a review should also highlight those areas that are being handled well. Discussion along these lines should attempt to identify why particular parts of the operation are successful. This should provide information that should guarantee that similar success can be achieved in the future.

Self-criticism should be encouraged and criticism in general is permissible providing the end result is constructive. Participants should be encouraged to criticise, and also provide ideas as to how to improve or solve the area subject to criticism. In this way, the end result should be of a constructive nature.

**Timing of Reviews**

Undercover operations should have structured reviews, and following the guidelines of the Undercover Policy Manual these are held:

- Weekly

Further to the weekly reviews, at six weekly intervals:

The following table outlines the basic review time frames, although there is scope for minor variance as there is 52 weeks per year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>Actual Calendar Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Six weeks</td>
<td>Six Weeks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Six weeks</td>
<td>3 Months (12 weeks)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Six weeks</td>
<td>6 Months (24 weeks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six weeks</td>
<td>9 Months (36 weeks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six weeks</td>
<td>12 Months (48 weeks)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

There are also reviews:

- Post Selection & Training
- Post Operation

**General Principles**

The following are general principles that should be considered when conducting any review or de-brief, some of these principles are relevant to the operational reviews used in undercover operations.
Not all areas would be covered at each stage, such as the weekly review, but these guiding principles are mentioned as they will apply to various phases of undercover reviews:

1. Planning
   - Decide the aim of the de-brief, i.e. what are you trying to achieve?
   - Consider the time and space available for low level de-briefs
   - Decide the level of representation at the de-brief
   - Decide whether to hold an "immediate" or "delayed" de-brief
   - Warn the participants of the aim, the time limit to be imposed on each speaker, and decide on the number of points each speaker will be permitted to make

2. Conduct
   - Choose an impartial but assertive chairman
   - Strictly comply to the rules laid down for the de-briefing
   - Encourage self criticism and praise
   - Have each participant detail the most important thing he/she learned on the exercise or operation (not necessarily in his own area)

3. Summary
   - Chairman should summarise the de-briefing
   - The Commander should be invited to give a short personal summary following the Chairman's summary
   - Participants should be given the opportunity to discuss the points raised by the Commander (do not allow discussion on the summary by the Chairman)

4. Production and Distribution
   - Ensure that you select a good operational secretary to record the minutes manually (this should ensure that only the main points are recorded)
   - The minutes should be distributed for comment before the final version is distributed
• Directions for corrective action and praise for things well done must be attached to the minutes

5. Follow-up Action

• Follow-up checks and action must be detailed when minutes are distributed and must be enforced

6. Conclusion

• A de-briefing should never be allowed to become a "witch-hunt", nor should it become a platform for persons or groups of persons to expound their own virtues. The general principle of a de-brief should be to discover "what went wrong" rather than "who went wrong"

Deliberately attempt to, keep the aim in mind throughout, and disallow any personal criticism.

Constructive Criticism

Destructive criticism is one of the most harmful of all human behaviors. It lowers self-esteem, creates poor self-image, and undermines the individual performance in everything he or she attempts.

Destructive criticism shakes the individuals self-confidence so that he or she feels inferior, tenses up and makes mistakes whenever he of she attempts anything for which he or she has been criticised in the past. The individual may give up trying at all and simply avoid the area of endeavor altogether.

Destructive criticism makes the individual feel incompetent and inadequate. He or she feels angry and defensive and wants to strike back or escape. Performance nosedives. All sorts of negative consequences occur.

Often people make the mistake of thinking they are giving “constructive criticism” when they are really just tearing the other person down - and calling it ‘constructive’ to rationalise their behavior.

True constructive criticism leaves the person feeling better and more capable of doing a better job in the future. If criticism does not improve performance, by increasing the individuals feelings or self-esteem and self-efficacy, then it has been merely a destructive act of self expression carried out against someone who is not in a position to resist.

Destructive criticism lies at the root of many personality problems and of much hostility between individuals. It leaves a trail of broken spirits, demoralisation, anger, resentment, self-doubt and a host of negative emotions.
The whole purpose of criticism, if you must give it, is “performance improvement”. It is to help the other person to be better as a result. Constructive criticism should not be carried out for revenge. It is not a vehicle to express your displeasure or anger.

The following are seven steps that will ensure that what you are giving is “constructive feedback” rather than destructive criticism.

1. Protect the individuals self-esteem at all costs.
2. Focus on the future, not the past.
3. Focus on the behavior or the performance not the person.
4. Use “I” messages to retain ownership of your feelings.
5. Get clear agreement on what is to change, and when and by how much.
6. Offer to help.
7. Assume that the other person wants to do a good job.

Be calm, patient, supportive, sensitive, clear and constructive rather than angry or destructive. Build the other person up rather than tearing him or her down. There is probably no faster way for you to build self-esteem and self-efficacy in others than by immediately ceasing all destructive criticism.

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**Weekly Reviews & Reports**

A review is conducted by the handler every week. It is the Handler's responsibility to complete this summary.

In general, the purpose of the review is to justify continued deployment, evaluate the product obtained, reassess risks, ensure the operation is within recognised legal limits, and that there is nothing to warrant the attention of the authorising officer.

The handler must forward a weekly report to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit.

A suggested form for a weekly summary is attached in Appendix B, page 121.

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**Six Weekly Reviews & Reports**

A one-day meeting is held every six weeks. It is the handler's responsibility to arrange and facilitate it.

In general the purpose of the review is to establish the continuing justification for the deployment of the undercover agent and whether
changes have occurred in the perceived risks. Significant changes in circumstances must be brought to the attention of the authorising officer.

The handler must completed and forward a six weekly report to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit.

The weekly report will be based on the weekly reviews, it must also include the following:

- Details of the undercover agent’s health and welfare
- A general summary of offenders
- The plans for the week ahead
- Any problems encountered
- Any matters requiring attention
- A summary of intelligence gained
- Any comments by the undercover agent
- Any purchases made, and their cost

The venue should be suitable for both the operational and social purposes of the review. It should allow complete privacy.

A suggested example of a ‘Six Weekly Report’ is attached in Appendix C, page 122.

3/6/9/12 Monthly Reviews & Reports

A one-day meeting is held every alternative six weeks. These are at the 3/6/9 and 12 month stages of an operation.

The venue should be suitable for both the operational and social purposes of the meeting. It should allow complete privacy.

The review follows the same format as the six weekly review, but with added emphasis on:

- Assessing the undercover agent’s general health and well being
- Psychologically assessing the undercover agents
- Providing medical support
- Identifying problems and implement remedies
- Providing encouragement and support
- Reviewing expenditure

Renewal:

If an application to renew the authorisation is to be sought, prior to the review the handler must forward a report to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit. This will always be in writing and will confirm that the grounds for the original application are still applicable, this must be completed prior to the 3/6/9/12 monthly reviews.
The 3/6/9/12 monthly reports will be based on the weekly reviews and the previous six weekly review, and is a review/de-brief document not a renewal application.

For reference the suggested form for the ‘3/6/9/12 Monthly Reports’ follows the same format as the ‘Six Weekly Report’ and is attached in Appendix D, page 124. This is different from the ‘application for renewal’ which is referred to in the Undercover Policy Manual, and required for a renewal of an undercover operation.

Operational Debrief

A post operation debrief must be held at some suitable time after an operation, regardless of whether any arrests have been made or whether the operation was considered to be successful. A debrief should not be delayed until the court cases are finalised.

The operational debrief reflects on all aspects of the total operation. For a format for de-briefing, see reviewing operations, page 48.

A suggested ‘operational debrief agenda’ is attached in Appendix E, page 126.

A full operational report must be submitted covering all aspects of the operational debrief. This must contain:-

- A summary of results
- Information on the undercover agent’s performance
- A schedule of expenditure

On the completion of the court hearings, the handler must complete a further report and forward it to the Operation Commander, via the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit. The report must contain:-

- A schedule of offenders, including a summary of the charges and sentences received
- A list of the assets seized as a result of the operation
- An assessment of the quality of the undercover agent’s evidence
- Any problems encountered during the court cases
- Any comments by the Prosecution Section
- Any adverse comments by Judges
- Any recommendations in relation to preparing cases and presenting evidence for undercover operations
- Details of the agent’s health and welfare

Selection, Training and Operational Reviews

At the end of the involvement of undercover policing, the re-integration process begins. The undercover agent and handler review the selection, the training and the operation(s) itself.
This is when an undercover agent has completed their term of duty as an undercover agent and is returning to mainstream policing.

The review has three main objectives:

- to prepare the undercover agent for return to general duties
- to conduct a full debrief on the selection, training, and deployment process, and to highlight areas in undercover operations that require change or reinforcement
- to provide a basis for independent evaluation by completing a full financial and operational debrief

Refer to reviews and de-briefs, page 48 of this manual.

This process is similar to the post operation debrief, refer to a suggested ‘operational debrief agenda’, attached in Appendix E, page 126.

Reporting Drug Use

This section should be read in conjunction with the Undercover Policy Manual, “Basic Principles: Reporting Drug Use” and “Reporting, Recording & Dissemination of Product: Reporting Drug Use.”

When cannabis and cannabis derivatives have been used in ‘simulation’, the handler must:

- Fully debrief the undercover agent
- Review the incident to ensure that the undercover agent acted appropriately in the circumstances, and within policy
- Advise the supervisor and, within 72 hours, submit a report, which fully outlines the circumstances
- Hold the originals of the undercover agent’s statement or daily notes and a copy of the handler’s report on file
- Submit a copy of the undercover agent’s statement or daily notes and the original of the handler’s report to the Officer in Charge, Undercover Unit

This reporting procedure should also be used for any illicit or controlled drug use.

Conclusion
Reviews and debriefs properly conducted, accurately documented, and circulated appropriately, can provide important guidance for undercover policing in the future.

# Notes & Diaries

## Daily Notes

The purpose of the undercover agents daily notes is to provide a detailed and accurate account of events and of their movements during the undercover deployment. Remember that there are other public and organisational records, such as telephone records, which the defence may be able to use to find discrepancies that could impact on the undercover agent’s credibility.

The undercover agents pseudonym (cover name) or unique Undercover Identity Number should be used on any documentation which may be disclosed in court proceedings in order to prevent the identification of the officer.

For security reasons, it is of paramount importance that the undercover agent keeps the daily notes in a secure place and gives them to the handler as soon as possible. The handler must retain and secure them, while the supervisor is responsible for monitoring access to them and disseminating the information they contain.

The daily notes should be used in the same way as an officer’s notebook. The undercover agent can use them to refresh his or her memory for court and to negate possible defences. Defence counsel may request access to the notes.

The undercover agent should complete daily notes in every 24-hour period.

## Guide to Notes

If using lined paper rule a margin down the side of the page.

Use full descriptions, and put descriptions in tabulated format rather than in the narrative.

**Male**

25 years
Caucasian
188 cm
Black Hair, etc....

Use spare lines to give a better layout and use paragraphs to separate body of text.
Do not use the pages of your Daily Notes as note paper.

When you complete Daily Notes as you go through the day, and contemporaneously with the events, try to keep them on one piece of paper (i.e. no gaps etc)

State the facts do not use terms like 'I presumed' and 'I decided to'.

Daily notes should be written in the “first person”. For example when the undercover agent is quoting a conversation it will be in this format :-

I Said Text here
He Said Text here

I Said Text here
He Said Text here

Remember more is better than less

A suggested example of a ‘Daily Note’ layout is attached in Appendix F, page 128.

Handlers Responsibilities

The handler is responsible for :-

• Ensuring that the notes contain accurate, relevant and up-to-date information recorded in sufficient detail

• Identifying persons, vehicles and addresses from the information contained in the notes

• Disseminating intelligence and completing any inquiries arising from the notes

• Maintaining an indexed folder of the notes, for easy reference

Handlers Diary

Handlers are required to maintain a daily diary, which is used in much the same way as a police notebook. Because the handler will refer to this diary while giving evidence in court, it should contain a full record of events.

The diary must be neat and accurate, and project a professional image of how the undercover agent was managed. It should be headed up with the day, date and time, and cover the handler’s daily routine and any matter of relevance to the operation.

Events should be entered as they occur, with no gaps left. The entries must include details of :-

• Contact with the undercover agent, and instructions given
• Contact with the supervisor, and instructions received

• Any evidential transactions

• Exhibit movements

• Any inquiries made

• Any reported drug use, simulation or drug avoidance by the undercover agent

• The undercover agent’s physical and mental condition after using alcohol or cannabis

• The reasons for using his or her private vehicle, and the vehicle mileage

• The number of rest and recreation days taken by the undercover agent.

Evidential Statements

The details of any incident likely to be used as evidence in any criminal proceedings must be recorded in a Statement, whether charges are expected to be laid or not. Daily Notes and Reports must not be used for this purpose.

The undercover agents pseudonym (cover name) or unique Undercover Identity Number should be used on any statements which may be disclosed in court proceedings in order to prevent the identification of the officer.

The Statement must be in legible handwriting, and set out in logical and chronological order. It must contain :-

• All details necessary for proving the charge

• Any details that might negate possible defences; for example, the state of the lighting, or where each of the accused were seated during the events

• All relevant conversation. This must be an accurate record of events, and recorded in the first person; for example :-

  I said
  He said

• A full, detailed and accurate description of any exhibits purchased, and the fact that the exhibit was handed to the handler.
The Statement must include details that show how soon after the event it was made. Be prepared to prove this, so that the Statement can be accepted by the court as being made contemporaneously with the event.

The Statement must be signed by the undercover agent and, preferably, witnessed by the handler so that the handler can give independent testimony about the undercover agent’s physical and mental condition. This can become an issue if the undercover agent had been drinking, or had to avoid or simulate cannabis. If the defence claims that the undercover agent was not in a condition to accurately record the full details of events, the handler will be able to negate this claim.

The original Statement must be kept in a secure area, preferably a fireproof safe. A working copy can be made.

The original Statement must be kept in a secure area, preferably a fireproof safe. A working copy should be made for reference.

For the suggested format of an ‘evidential statement’, refer to Appendix G, page 129.

**SURVEILLANCE**

Undercover agents should be familiar with both the principles of anti-surveillance and counter surveillance.

**Anti Surveillance**

Anti-surveillance can be defined as:

‘The actions of an individual carried out in order to detect surveillance of their activities’

It also includes those tactics which that person may use to evade surveillance, should it be suspected or have been detected.

It enables an individual to identify surveillance operatives, vehicles and tactics with the ultimate intention of discrediting the surveillance agency; police, government or private sector.

The methods used depend upon the individual’s background, skill levels and objectives. Methods can be listed under the headings, overt and covert.

**Overt**

As the title infers, the methods would be obvious to the undercover agent.
Overt methods carried out on foot might include random confrontation or acknowledgement of other people. Rapid and inexplicable changes of direction and speed would also fit this category.

Overt anti-surveillance when driving a motor vehicle might include repeatedly circling roundabouts, or again, sudden and inexplicable changes of direction and speed. (Please also see the section for Covert - Mobile).

Such activities might suggest that the individual possesses a paranoia in respect to surveillance. They are also likely to provide confusion, for both the individual under surveillance and the surveillance operative.

It is often the case that, for all the challenges and changes of direction, the perceived aim in not achieved. The individual carrying out the ploys may be none the wiser as to whether surveillance is being carried out or not. The likelihood of actually identifying the surveillance operatives is also minimal, provided operatives continue to behave naturally when confronted with these actions.

An experienced surveillance operative’s skills in observing, assessing and reacting to human behaviour are vital in making crucial judgements.

Decisions based on the actions of the individual will have to be made to determine whether the subject is conducting overt anti-surveillance, or merely lost.

Such judgements can be made when properly equipped with accurate intelligence and clearly defined objectives. Due consideration of limiting factors, such as the subject’s known unfamiliarity with an area or route, will result in the application of the appropriate tactics.

Is overt anti-surveillance productive?

**Covert – Foot**

Covert anti-surveillance can be extremely productive for the individual performing it.

Historically it has been developed and employed by British and foreign government agencies. It has also become the norm for some politically motivated organisations.

High echelon criminals are increasingly becoming aware of its value.

An individual’s background, skills and objectives play a major part in its successful application.

The objectives remain the same - to identify, evade and discredit.

The results can be dangerous in the extreme!
When carried out effectively a surveillance team can be lured through a series of ‘traps’ and ‘funnels’. At worst, these traps may not be identified at all. At best, identification may occur too late.

In either event, the surveillance operative may be exposed to extreme danger.

Successful covert anti-surveillance will be the product of as much operational preparation and planning as any good surveillance operation.

It should be remembered that the methods have been developed, enhanced, performed and perfected over many years by highly trained and motivated members of many organisations. This expertise has resulted in the identification and discrediting of organisations and undercover agents. In some cases, those undercover agents have not survived the experience.

A significant additional factor is that the preparators’ expertise has often ensured their freedom.

The planning of a successful anti-surveillance route takes consideration of many elements. To be effective the route should be logical, pre-determined and timed. It should contain a series of traps and funnels. These provide the means whereby a subject may check on any followers without revealing that fact to the follower.

Listed below are some situations that provide covert anti-surveillance opportunities on a route to be taken on foot :-

- Lifts;
- Stairs;
- Mirrors;
- Subways;
- Escalators;
- Alleyways;
- Footbridges;
- Open spaces;
- Public Toilets;
- Pedestrian areas;
- Telephone kiosks;
- Department stores;
- Reflective surfaces;
- Pedestrian Crossings;

The thematic or logical aspect of the route assists in concealing its true purpose. This is a favourite ploy of intelligence operatives from the Eastern Bloc countries. For example, museums, churches or bookshops all provide a reason for a pre-determined route with ample cover at each point. Consideration may also be given to locations where it is natural to write down material. In these instances details could be recorded of descriptions of persons suspected by the undercover agent.
It is important to realise that it is the intention of the undercover agent to create a plausible reason for undertaking the journey. Having achieved this, it is then hoped that those conducting the surveillance will not suspect anti-surveillance and thus become easier to remember, recognise and describe.

The predetermination and timing of a route allows for a natural progression through it. Detailed planning will consider the length of time the route will take, and the time of day at which it is to be traveled.

The time of year and prevailing weather conditions may also provide a useful resource for the preparator.

A well-trained and prepared subject might walk in an easterly direction before noon and in a westerly direction in the afternoon.

Such a route could disadvantage a follower simply because bright sunlight would affect a surveillance operative’s vision.

Remember that the surveillance aware subject will not need to carry out reciprocal routes, or use unnatural behaviour.

Common sense will play an important part in the subject’s route and behaviour. They will not become fixated with any one person or any particular vehicle.

The subject will have good powers of observation. They will look for anything out of the ordinary, so it is imperative that the surveillance team use good tactics and props. It is important, however, that surveillance operatives do not allow their props to become the trigger for future identification.

The subject will invariably use natural eye contact on passers-by or people who are close to them. They will be seeking to establish facial or anxiety reaction. They will not discount people who speak to them.

---

**Covert – Mobile**

The planning and preparation required for covert anti-surveillance routes carried out on foot apply equally to a route traveled by motor vehicle. Listed below are some examples of mobile anti-surveillance opportunities:

- Cul de sacs;
- Traffic lights;
- Circular route;
- Lane Changes;
- Petrol stations;
- Speed adjustment;
- Long straight roads;
• Apparent engine failure;
• Areas of variable traffic density.

The same rules of Theme, Predetermination, Planning and Timing as relate to a successful anti-surveillance route on foot, also apply.

The subject may vary their driving speed, but it will be subtle and appear natural. The subject will also possibly display a limited driving ability in order to facilitate occasions where surveillance operatives will reveal themselves.

The subject will have a good recognition of vehicle types. However, they will not look for surveillance at all times. They will be selective, ensuring that the occasion affords them the maximum advantages in recognition.

Similarly, the subject will drive through ‘funnels’ in busy and quiet areas, and will not discount vehicles that overtake them. Long straight roads will be used to give them clear views to the rear. They will avoid using the hours of darkness.

Anti-surveillance is a common occurrence:

• Prior to committing an offence;
• Entering a familiar area;
• Prior to meeting an associate;
• When leaving home;
• When something unnatural has occurred.

This statement may appear obvious, but consider your own locality, knowledge and behaviour.

Have you ever noticed an unfamiliar car or pedestrian in the vicinity of your home? What was it about the circumstance that attracted your attention?

Tactics and Trigger Points

The surveillance operative must be constantly aware of the possibility of anti-surveillance. Built in to the armoury of the operative should be a series of natural tactics and a thorough knowledge of potential trigger points to evade the detection of their surveillance.

The below questions and circumstances should be used by the undercover agent as a checklist to formulate pre-determined tactical awareness and methods/actions which will reduce the risk of compromise.

Evidence Retrieval

Has the object been left there for a purpose? Is it a dead-letter-box? If I retrieve it, who may be alerted by its’ disappearance? In all circumstances the risk involved should be measured against the primary or ultimate objective of the surveillance operation.
Can the retrieval be done covertly? If so, would it be better to note the contents, and leave the material undisturbed. Is it possible to arrange retrieval in a more innocent fashion at a later stage, to minimise compromise?

Is it covert and natural to observe the use of an automatic telling machine? What are the objectives? Consider 'marking' the machine in order to obtain information at a later date.

Consider the options available when the subject makes a telephone call. What is the ultimate objective? Note the exact time and location of the telephone call and consider closing up to gain intelligence. If vacant telephone booths are nearby, is it covert to wait by the occupied one?

Consider the implications of 'marking' the telephone call, and the retrieval of intelligence later on.

Would it be natural to place yourself in a position to look at any digital display, payment method or the number being dialed. Can you listen to the conversation? What is the demeanour of the subject?

---

**Approach to Buildings**

Is it possible to enter before the subject? Consider why the building is there, and the business within. Is it potentially hostile? Cover stories and props will assist greatly in reducing risk. A prop may also serve to act a trigger to identify you at a later stage.

Be aware of any potential innocent challenge by security staff or residents. Ensure that all radio equipment (including ear-piece) is concealed, and unobtrusive. Does the operational objective require the undercover agent to go into the building?

Ensure that ‘lift-off’ plotting procedures are completed swiftly in order to minimise the potential of loss, should entry into the building be considered inappropriate.

By asking yourself the question “what is the subject doing here?” potential compromise can be avoided and more realistic objectives can be set.

In all circumstances, the advantages and disadvantages must be measured against the likelihood of compromise, anti-surveillance and the operational objectives.

Having decided on entry to a building with an appropriate cover story, live the story. Do not be intimidated. Be confident and do not overact or be discreet. Your actions, whilst not seen by the subject, may be under scrutiny by others. Always ensure that you have an extraction method available before entry.
On the approach to lifts or escalators, consideration should be given to the risk factor of entering with the subject. Are there other methods of obtaining the intelligence that is required, and what type of building is it?

Having decided to enter the lift a polite enquiry concerning which floor the subject requires may obtain the intelligence. Do not be surprised, if the subject controls the lift buttons and asks you the same question. Be ready with a plausible answer.

In any building, the undercover agent will need support and teamwork. The same principles as above apply to the team plotted outside in relation to how natural they are behaving, and how easy they are to remember or recognise.

Avoid compromise with the subject or any hostile associates. Remain passive. Also avoid compromise with people in authority such as police officers, security guards, store detectives, traffic wardens, car park attendants, janitors and receptionists.

Do not be guilty by association with other members of the surveillance team, unless it is by the use of a specific tactic i.e. a prearranged natural meeting, courting couple etc.

If confrontation does become inevitable however, be prepared, anticipate the threat, and try to obtain the psychological ‘high’ ground by use of a plausible cover story and natural behaviour.

Teamwork, provided it is done naturally and planned beforehand, will reduce the risk of compromise and surprise. Spontaneous assistance, if prior cover stories are well known, will also assist and can be achieved by communication and awareness of the situation by all members of the team.

---

**Public Transport**

With a taxi, is it covert to overhear the destination? Can you hear the driver using the radio? Consider other methods of obtaining the destination, such as the taxi company or confidential sources. Can you trust the source approached? What resources are available, and if mobile surveillance is not, then consideration to the objectives may result in ‘living to fight another day’ and abandoning the operation.

**Remember**

If your next action will show out, then pull out.

The requirement to get on a bus with the subject should also be considered, bearing in mind the operational objectives (possibility of a meeting etc), and the risk factor of compromise. Consideration can be given to boarding the bus at a later request, or even with intelligence, at a request prior to the subject.
Mobile Surveillance
Trigger Points

- Damage to vehicle;
- Uncommon models;
- The same model as the subject, or subject’s previous model;
- Conspicuous colours;
- Easy to remember registration configurations;
- Aerial systems;
- Internal radio equipment;
- Police-type documentation, such as log books, map books and forms;
- Changes of clothing in the vehicle, hold-alls and fast food cartons, general untidiness in relatively new vehicles;
- Brake lights illuminated on apparently empty or parked vehicles;
- Passenger configuration, or unnatural numbers contained in vehicle.
- Driver does not fit the vehicle in appearance for the time of day and location;
- Slamming of doors;
- Reversing lights at night;
- Radio noise;
- Sudden braking or acceleration;
- Sudden movement and follow, close to subject’s sensitive areas, such as home address;
- Mirroring the actions of the subject;
- Vehicle ‘chadding’ in order to obtain the eyeball, or mistrust of commentary;
- Excessive speed in built-up areas.

The list is perhaps endless, but it is obvious that surveillance operatives can prepare themselves for many potential ‘traps’ by awareness and knowledge. The overall factors involve being natural, and having good cover stories to explain their presence, and the presence of their vehicles.

It is important that undercover agents give in depth consideration to the techniques and practices of anti-surveillance.

In the surveillance world, the requirement for natural behaviour is paramount especially when dealing with, or performing, covert anti-surveillance.

Counter Surveillance

Counter surveillance can be defined as:

‘Any method employed by a third party to detect whether or not another individual is under surveillance, with or without that individuals knowledge’.

The advantage of counter surveillance is that a group or organisation utilises several members simply to ascertain the existence of a surveillance operation. The ultimate aim of this exercise may be to identify undercover agents or to discredit the agency involved.

RESTRICTED
The fact that these methods are employed by an organisation will create an extra challenge for those detailed to deal with them.

As with anti-surveillance, counter surveillance, may be used by criminal and law enforcement organisations alike. Indeed it is the very system that we use to protect our undercover agents and informants.

**Overt**

This is obviously extremely easy to see, and therefore easy to avoid. The type of location usually dictates the use of this tactic, in that attempts are made by the criminal fraternity, or organisation, to openly advertise the fact that surveillance, or police officers are not welcome.

In certain areas of the country, radio frequency scanners are openly used. Hostile groups of people may also congregate at certain road vantage points and openly question or study the vehicles that pass by.

Any unnatural occurrences or obvious police activity is then communicated to the so-called leaders of the group or organisation, either for money, favours or recognition.

It may well be that it is not suspected that anyone in particular is under hostile surveillance. However, there is an outward attempt by the groups or organisations to create a no-go area in order to facilitate their unlawful activities.

**Covert**

We will address the implications of an unlawful organisation using the techniques against a law enforcement agency, since the same principles and preparation can be applied when planning to protect our own undercover agents.

Counter surveillance techniques are the result of years of experience and application. History tell us that the methods have been used with success in many countries for many years by many different organisations.

In its simplest form counter surveillance is performed when an organisation seeks to ascertain if one of its members is the subject of surveillance.

The member concerned will be instructed to travel a prescribed route. Pre-determined ‘checkpoints’ along that route will provide cover for other members of the group to note the activities and events surrounding their colleague. Cameras and video recorders are often used to assist in this respect.

These group members may have a plan to remain in situ in their covert position, or even may engage in a system of checking the route between them and the next checkpoint, after the member has traveled through.
There will inevitably be a pre-arranged signal that can be given to the member so that the route can be abandoned at any time. This could be as a result of confirmation of surveillance, and imminent danger to the member.

In the context of counter surveillance, this role is known as 'the spotter'.

A spotter may also be used to walk or drive around the route in the opposite direction, in order to look for signs of surveillance and surveillance operatives.

At the completion of such a route, the spotters gather to analyse their findings. Activities, vehicles and descriptions are compared. Conclusions are made. Such conclusions can have far reaching effects.

What will the spotter be looking for?

If we accept the premise that in the world of surveillance ‘natural behaviour is paramount’ then it follows that attention will be paid to any event or activity which is unnatural or which disturbs the environment. Obviously, the organisation will be completely familiar with the environment and route chosen.

Give some thought to your own background and knowledge of occupational behaviour.

What are the tell-tale signs which indicate that a person is a police officer?

Think about posture, positioning and eye contact?

Having entered a bar, is there a tendency to ‘scan’ the premises and then pay attention to every person who enters subsequently?

When in a car, what is revealed by the driving style or even the position of the hands on a steering wheel?

Certain unconscious traits can advertise your training and occupation.

In the world of surveillance, such advertisement can produce a profoundly negative effect.

Police officers are trained to observe. Those who strive to become effective surveillance operatives perform this vital skill successfully when they have mastered the techniques of maintaining observation in a natural and covert manner.

The ability to study and reflect upon human behaviour, or ‘people watch’, is a valuable asset when called upon to assess and react accordingly to what is being observed.
As long as crime and criminality continues to thrive and develop, so too must the fight against it. The need to gather intelligence and evidence at first hand has never been so important. The deployment of officers in an ‘undercover’ role provides this opportunity.

The sophistication of today’s high echelon criminal is such that these undercover agents require highly sophisticated methods of protection.

Counter surveillance provides the means by which the safety of an undercover agent can be ensured.

The circumstances of the undercover agent’s deployment and the counter surveillance surrounding it should be treated with the utmost secrecy. Only those persons who need to know should know of the operation.

A thoroughly professional approach at the planning stage is essential.

The necessary reconnaissance and route planning should be carried out by the experienced surveillance operatives who are to perform the counter surveillance role after consultation with the undercover agent.

Routes, staffing, vehicles and methodology will vary according to the nature and area of the operation.

Consideration should be given to tasking the collection of all intelligence material, and researching all evidence to determine the identity of the persons surveilling your undercover agent. Contained in the planning for the operation should be the ability to assess, evaluate, compare and then communicate the results of the operation to those affected.

Consideration may also be given to performing surveillance on an identified target once the counter surveillance operation has been aborted. The obvious benefits of this will include personal identification, and may even result in the identification of the other organisation.

Although the timing may not be at your dictation, thorough planning must take place to ensure that the limiting factors do not outweigh the viability of the exercise. Always plan so that all factors are in your favour.

Other than providing the details of the area of operation, meeting place etc, the undercover agent should not be tasked with route planning. It is quite likely that many other things will be occupying the undercover agents mind. Consultation and briefing, however, are essential.

Due consideration given to Intelligence, Objectives and Limiting Factors, plus the professionalism of the whole team, will achieve the desired result ‘the safety of your colleague’.

As with all surveillance, it may be difficult to detect professional counter surveillance. It is because of this very fact, that undercover agents should always act as if there may be counter surveillance.
Technical Surveillance & Technical Support

Technical Support Units (TSU) will advise upon the appropriate equipment to be used. Only equipment specified by a law enforcement agency TSU should be used. Such equipment will have been evaluated for suitability and the quality of performance.

Officers who have received appropriate instruction in the fitting or use of such equipment should only carry out the fitting and use of this equipment. Security may be comprised by low standards.

USE OF INFORMANTS

Introduction

Due to the fact that each country has their own policy and procedures for dealing with criminal informants, the standard operating procedures relating to criminal informants is not contained within this undercover procedure manual or the undercover policy manual.

When using criminal informants in respect of undercover operations there are a number of general guiding principles that may apply to a number of countries.

The following is a introductory guideline, this will endeavour to minimise the risk of danger and pitfalls connected with criminal informants as they are often used during undercover operations. These principles will acquaint officers with an overview towards the handling and control of the Criminal Informant.

Police officers will constantly come into contact with criminal informants. Experience has shown that criminal informants can at times be dangerous and vindictive. It is necessary for officers to be mindful of this situation at all times when dealing with informants for their own protection and the reputation of the law enforcement agency.

Informants can include persons from every walk of life but for this Undercover Procedure Manual, it concentrates on the criminal informant, as this class of person creates the greatest problems for the police officer. Officers will realise that each informant is unique and needs to be handled differently. Persons engaged as informants for the purpose of assisting in a criminal investigation are seldom selected at random. They are often recruited directly from the criminal environment, which is the very focus of investigative attention. As such they are criminals themselves. Some
may indeed be skilled in treachery, and rarely do they have traits of virtue and honesty.

When the criminal informant is properly controlled, they provide information that improves police efficiency. Reliable informants keep people from being harmed, evidence from being destroyed, and potentially explosive and dangerous crimes from taking place. Using reliable informants is cost-effective to a law enforcement agency.

Criminal Informants provide intelligence, insight and information.

**Types of Informants**

Informants can be categorised as follows:

(a) Public citizens;

(b) The criminal element; and

(c) Members of the police.

Groups (a) and (b) may be divided into the following categories:

- The occasional informant - this person will provide information when contacted but will not inform on a regular basis. i.e. Bank manager, neighbour etc.

- Arrested informant - this person will provide information about criminal associates in order to escape prosecution or reduce the charges against him

- Regular or constant informant - this person is usually a member of the criminal element or a close associate of criminals.

- Special informant - this is a person who goes beyond merely providing information, he will actually penetrate an organisation.

**Developing Informants**

Every person arrested or spoken to by the police is a potential informant.

Often officers come across information that is of no value to them, so it is disregarded. Officers should be encouraged to pass this information on to the appropriate section of law enforcement that can best act upon it, and be prepared if appropriate to also pass on the informant to other officers. Police officers must obtain the trust and confidence of each other to achieve this objective. Members have in the past been reluctant to share or pass on quality informants, this practice is outdated and is no longer in the best interests of law enforcement.

Other police officers often have the information that you require, this can be overlooked by investigators. When acting on information received from other officers, ensure you notify them of the results and be willing to
assist these persons wherever possible. All police officers must be prepared to build rapport with fellow officers in attempts to not only develop informants but obtain an information flow.

When seeking informants through the business community, members should be mindful of the regulations under which many of them work. Be aware that on occasions the disclosure of information is contrary to their regulations. Treat this information with the confidentiality in which it is given.

It is essential that you build up trust with your informant. Your word must be your bond. Do not promise anything you cannot deliver. If your informant is giving you information for reward, ensure that the amount you agree upon is the amount the law enforcement agency is prepared to pay. Pay only on results.

Informants who assist in a criminal investigation should be carefully instructed about their role and their responsibilities. Particular attention should be accorded the boundaries of permissible conduct. A bright line should be drawn between that conduct which is acceptable, and that which is not.

Motivation To Inform

When dealing with informants, it is essential that the investigator determines the motives of the informant. Once this has been achieved, the investigator is in a better position to evaluate the information given and the worth of the informant. If the motives of the informant are not clear, then persevere until you ascertain the reason. Ask the informant directly if necessary.

Understand the motivation and you will get a good idea as to whether you have a good informant.

The following are suggested questions the investigator should attempt to find the answers to when interviewing an informant or potential informant:-

1. What is his/ her motivation
2. How intelligent is the informant
3. How does he/ she know about the crime
4. Has the informant been reliable in the past
5. Does he/ she have a personal interest
6. Does he/ she have direct knowledge relative to the information
7. Does he/ she have access to additional related information
8. Does he/she have reason to be vengeful toward the suspect

9. Does he/she have experience enough to report the information accurately

10. Is he/she withholding some of the information

11. Has he/she fabricated information in the past

12. Is he/she willing to testify in court

13. Is the informant presently informing to another member or law enforcement agency

If most of the above questions can be answered, the investigator should be able to objectively evaluate the informant and the information.

Some of the basic motives behind a criminal informant's behavior:

- Financial gain - this person's motives are mercenary and generally their information is reliable as this is their business. This person should be treated with caution, recognising that the informant who sells information to one side may also sell it to the other

- Fear - this is for self-preservation which could be brought about by fear of the law or its enforcers or of their criminal associates

- Revenge - this is with the desire for retaliation against an associate who has harmed him/her in some way, such as the falling out over a woman

- Perverse :-
  - Criminals who give information about rivals for the purpose of eliminating competition
  - Criminals who give worthless information while attempting to find out how much the police know about their activities
  - Criminals who deliberately give false information in order to draw suspicion away from themselves

- Gratitude - this often arises when an investigator has done something to assist the informant or his family

- Self-importance - is often a petty offender who draws pleasure or self-aggrandisement from spreading news to an interested listener. He is often on an "ego trip" and can act like a "frustrated policeman", but on occasions gives valuable information
RESTRICTED

- Reform - this occurs occasionally when a criminal who is repentant decides to make restitution. He can be extremely valuable if handled properly.

- Reduced incarceration - one of the most common expectations amongst criminal informants is to seek a reduction prison sentence, or avoid prosecution altogether.

Techniques for developing informants are limited only by the investigator's imagination.

Corruption

Why is it necessary to mention corruption in the field of informant's? Simply because this area of police work is where police members have so often crossed over the line. Associating with criminals constitutes usually breaches Police regulations of discipline. But officers are encouraged to cultivate informants from criminal groups. Such instructions may appear to be contrary and confusing.

When police associate with a criminal in an attempt to glean information, they move into a grey area where, at times, they can find themselves in most difficult situations. A police officer detected in the company of a criminal, may have a reasonable explanation such as informant association. Any other explanation may be viewed with suspicion. Corruption of police officers and attempts at corruption will always remain a problem for law enforcement.

Treachery

Experienced detectives and police officers are not immune from the treacherous acts by cunning criminals.

It should be noted that one should say nothing to an informant that one would not wish to read in the newspapers or hear in open court. Indeed, "co-operating" witnesses have been known to act as double agents, disclosing the identities and tactics of undercover officers.

Handling Criminal Informants

Each officer must rely on his or her experience when dealing with the criminal informant. Officers must be aware that they are answerable if they misdirect or do not control the actions of their informants.

Remember that the criminal informant is a criminal whose services you would not employ if you had an alternative.

The following are a number of identified areas where officers through lack of judgement or experience create problems when dealing with criminal informants.

Stockholm Syndrome :-
The most effective and productive recruiters and handlers of informants are those members who can convince an informant that they genuinely care for that informant. These members will show empathy and compassion for the informant and will assist him/her where they can. Refer to the chapter outlining the 'Stockholm Syndrome', page 97.

There is no problem with this unless of course this affects the member's judgement and he places the informant's desires before his/her duty. A handler's relationship with an informant must be purely PROFESSIONAL. It must be remembered that these informants are criminals and generally only inform because they want something for themselves.

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**Disclosing Police Methodology**

Members should not include their informants in tactical discussions whilst planning their objectives. An informant may say "the drugs will be there at 6pm tonight, how are you going to handle it?" In this scenario minimal details should be supplied to the informant.

Naturally, when arranging to remove your informant from a scenario he/she needs to be involved in discussions to protect his identity and that of any undercover agent [cover story] deployed. The informant should not be part of arranging police strategies and tactics, informants tend to develop a "detective complex" and are desirous of participating as much as possible.

Informants should be given information on a 'need to know' basis. If they do not need to know, do not tell them.

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**Exaggerating Their Worth**

Worldwide experience indicates that it is rare for informants to be accurate on all occasions. Any informant in excess of a 70% accuracy factor would be most rare, yet members often claim their informant is 100% on all occasions. The value of the information supplied tends to be exaggerated by Police officers, often in an attempt to obtain further use of limited resources or simply to keep a job alive. This is not necessarily an act of lying to superiors, but embellishing the informant’s worth.

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**Informant vs. Information**

The informant may have a proven track record as a reliable source and then an instance may arise where completely incorrect information is supplied. This lowers the informant's status of reliability. Often the informant is simply passing on material they have heard from another source as opposed to gleaning out the information themselves. There is a subtle difference. An informant may say to you, "I don't know if this is true but this is what I heard and I am passing it on for what it is worth."

Note the difference in the scenario when the informant says, "I have been to the house, I have seen the drugs on the table." In the latter you are testing the informant’s veracity, in the first instance he is simply a vehicle for passing information.
Investigators should be inquisitive. Investigators do not ask pertinent questions or probe sufficiently into the matter. This failure to ask searching questions is because members do not wish to offend a potential or current informant by attacking the credibility of the informant.

This does not mean that he will necessarily divulge his own criminality to you, but on matters that he is informing you about he should not be bashful or reticent. There should not be any questions that you cannot put to the informant concerning the inquiry.

Failure to pursue prospective informants with sufficient vigour. When searching premises seeking stolen property, or drugs, officers often do not bother with minor matters, for example, a few Indian hemp seeds in a matchbox or similar, especially if they have failed to locate whatever was their initial objective. Criminals tend to ridicule officers, with comments such as, “You are not going to worry about that are you?”. Such minor matters are a great bargaining lever, regardless of whether there are charges laid or not. Experience indicates that criminals, even those with convictions, will prefer to co-operate if there is a chance they can escape prosecution.

Anonymous Informants

Failure to consider anonymous informants is often readily overlooked. Officers tend to take the approach that if a person cannot be bothered giving his name, then we cannot be bothered reacting to the information. This has proved to be a mistake as anonymous informants have proved at times to supply valuable information and the investigator should take into account their reasons for anonymity.

Never overlook the value of anonymous information.

Guarding Information

Jealously guarding information received. Often seen on information reports is wording to the effect that information is not to be disseminated as it may risk exposure of the informant’s identity. In many cases this is not true. What is the use of gathering information that cannot be used. Supervisors should carefully scrutinise information reports with such comments.

Meeting Informants

Many investigators believe they should meet informants in hotels, where criminals frequent and associate. Criminal informants and police are easily detected if seen together in such establishments.

Coffee shops are more discreet than hotels and are a better and more secure location to meet an informant. There may be a necessity to hire a motel room or similar to obtain absolute privacy. Always consider your options and remember greater co-operation and better results will flow from an atmosphere where the informant feels relaxed.
The same principle applies to meeting informants at police stations. This merely jeopardises the informant’s security as he/she may be seen entering or leaving the police station by those criminals they are informing against and will then need to explain their visit to the police station.

**Mistakes by Informants**

Declaring themselves as informants. Informants can not keep secrets, if they could then they probably would not be informants. Police officers put a lot of time and effort into protecting the identity of their informant from the courts, and most importantly from other criminals. Some informants have been known to say, "If you get on the wrong side of me, I'll give you up to the cops." This is often the result of ego and reflects back to the informant’s motivation, which must be continually reviewed by investigators.

Due to a keen desire to help, informants will make arrangements prior to checking with the officer. This removes the flexibility of prepared cover stories. Informant's should be constantly reminded not to make decisions prior to checking with their handler. This is a constant problem, especially in the drug field. This is a problem that the officer may contribute to, by not properly instructing the informant in the first instance.

Undercover agents often face difficulties when an informant has given a different name and cover story to a drug dealer, prior to discussing the same with the handler or undercover agent. Such action causes unnecessary stress on the undercover agent, especially in a covert role.

Getting too close to the criminal group. In this area officers are confronted by enormous problems. It involves concocting scenarios to remove the suspicion from the informant as being the actual person responsible for those being arrested, or for a large amount of drugs being seized. It involves great skill and ingenuity in developing new ideas to protect the identity of the informant. This difficult task is complicated when the informant is either part of the criminal group or is very close to the criminal network.

**Evidence Given By Informants**

Jurors are rightly suspect of a testimony by a criminal informant whose credibility may be doubtful. Their usefulness as crown witnesses thus has limits. Informants are often co-offenders and as such, the court must warn juries about the reliability of co-offender evidence.

**Disclosure of Informant’s Identity**

The Courts usually are cognizant of the fact the police generally will not disclose the identity of their informants, or answer any questions that could tend to identify him/her. There are numerous decisions in support of this long-standing principle, and each country will have different case law and procedures to deal with this aspect.

**Informant Privilege**
Informants regularly assist investigators by introducing undercover agents to a target and this can be a point of contention at subsequent court proceedings. The accused will be very interested in discovering or confirming the identity of the informant.

The claim of privilege relating to informants is usually based on the ‘public interest immunity’ i.e. it would not be in the public interest to disclose such details. This public interest must be weighed against the public interest in the right of the accused to have a fair trial.

Some courts have determined that the identity of an informant may be disclosed only where it is shown that disclosure will enable the innocence of the accused to be demonstrated. This does not mean however, that officers have an automatic right to refuse to disclose the identity of the informant.

It is not sufficient to merely claim privilege. There must be evidence in support of the claim for privilege, which should be made on the basis that the disclosure of the identity of an informant will place his or her life or health in jeopardy.

There are a number of circumstances, which may develop in court hearings that may require a police officer to claim the public interest immunity regarding disclosure of an informant’s identity. Members must carefully consider the evidence they will give prior to being cross examined.

Members must also be very wary of questions, which by way of elimination of possibilities, may lead to a conclusion being drawn as to who the informant may be. This occurs when defence counsel ask questions around the periphery of the informant issue and by way of elimination pinpoint who the informant was.

It is imperative that in all cases where an informant was involved, advice should be sought from the prosecutor well in advance of that member giving evidence. This will give the prosecutor an opportunity to object to a particular line of questioning and will also enable him or her to research and prepare submissions for use in legal argument that may develop.

Registration

Law enforcement agencies should have an Informant Management Policy, which formalises the registration of informants. The registration procedure and definitions pertaining to the procedure should be contained within that policy.

Handlers of undercover agents are generally not required to register informants, as this is the responsibility of the investigator requesting the use of the undercover agent. Handlers do however need to ensure that any informants they use at the request of investigators, are properly registered, prior to the deployment of an undercover agent with that informant.
Conclusion

Time and patience is the key to handling the criminal informant. The investigator should never lose the position of being in charge. Officers should remember there is no informant worth compromising your reputation or your career for. Never promise something you can not deliver and always seek approval before you promise the payment of any form of reward.

If officers remain honest and forthright in their dealings with criminal informants, there is no reason why they cannot meet and discuss matters with them at any suitable time and location. Remember what and who you are dealing with and comply with policy, instructions and recording procedures. If in any doubt always consult your supervisor for advice and guidance.

DISSUADING SUSPICION

Types of Suspicion

There are three basic types of suspicion which undercover agents are likely to come across in the performance of their duties.

- Inquisitory Suspicion
- Exclamatory Suspicion
- Cold Shoulder

All three types of suspicion can be encountered in a variety of ways and all three demand distinct responses if the undercover agent is to retain his credibility.

Inquisitory Suspicion

This is by far the most common type of suspicion the undercover agent is likely to encounter. Although it is difficult to quantify suspicion, it is probably safe to say that 80% of all confrontations by targets fall into this category. Instances of inquisitory suspicion usually come in the form of a direct question or statement to the undercover agent. On occasion, though, undercover agents have experienced inquisitory suspicion in the form of a kind of test.

The target appears to want to simply satisfy himself that you are not a threat. In many cases, targets who pose inquisitory suspicion ask similar questions of unfamiliar people occupying familiar territory. In fact, the undercover agent is not being singled out and is receiving the same treatment as everyone else.

The target is often satisfied with no more than the undercover agent's denial of his identity. This is not necessarily done in a direct way, of course, but the effect is the same.
Targets often use this type of suspicion to impress one another. Almost all targets want to be seen as being street wise and in order to demonstrate their ability in this area they treat everyone with suspicion which is intended to be obvious.

In all cases, the undercover agent should assume that a target who demonstrates inquisitory suspicion is looking for a reaction. If the reaction is the right one, the undercover agent has gone some distance to establishing himself as bona fide in the eyes of the target.

In most cases, the appropriate reaction to inquisitory suspicion is to display a disregard for the query. This may range from actually pretending the query or comment was not heard, to brushing it off and deflecting.

Surprise is a very effective response to inquisitory suspicion. This may be followed with a display of disregard.

Emotional hurt is another equally effective response to this type of suspicion and is easily followed with something else.

In all cases, the undercover agent should listen to the query or comment to learn something of why the suspicion is being levied. The information obtained in this way may help determine conclusively which type of suspicion is being encountered, and is sometimes valuable in formulating a response.

Undercover agents must have a prepared retort which will be ready for use in the event he becomes the subject of suspicion. These retorts (or comebacks) are varied and actually form part of an undercover agent’s cover story.

Regardless of the method of role play used to initially respond to inquisitory suspicion, a rule of thumb is to downplay the entire confrontation.

In summary, an undercover agent may follow this sequence of action, and role plays when encountering inquisitory suspicion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>disregard</th>
<th>be hurt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>show surprise</td>
<td>deflect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>listen (throughout)</td>
<td>use prepared retort</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Exclamatory Suspicion**

Exclamatory suspicion and inquisitory suspicion are similar, but not identical. Exclamatory suspicion is usually identifiable by the manner in which it is encountered, and it is generally this issue that separates both types.
While inquisitory suspicion is usually observed as a query of some kind, exclamatory suspicion most often appears as a direct challenge. This difference is probably due to the fact that in most cases inquisitorial suspicion is more indicative of cautious curiosity than outright doubt about an undercover agent's cover story. Exclamatory suspicion, on the other hand, is more likely to indicate some real doubt on the target's part, and therefore must be treated more seriously.

A good overall response, and one which is easy to maintain even during a change of tactics, is that of indignation. Whenever an undercover agent encounters a direct challenge to his cover story, the response should be in kind. Role playing indignation allows the undercover agent to set the stage for further, perhaps more direct, role play tactics.

Depending on the directness of the challenge, it may be necessary to role play anger. This is not to suggest that undercover agents become violent or threatening; there are many ways to appear angry without encouraging the kind of problems which could result from a deliberate threat, or worse, violence.

As with inquisitory suspicion, undercover agents must have a prepared retort for use in direct response to the challenge.

In all cases, but especially when encountering exclamatory suspicion, undercover agents should have a reference to vouch for their credibility.

Throughout, the undercover agents must be firm and make effort to retain control. While this is true when encountering any type of suspicion, exclamatory suspicion more easily results in the undercover agent's loss of control of the situation.

Generally, undercover agents should refrain from volunteering cover story details. Dealing with exclamatory suspicion, however, may require the effective disclosure of certain cover story facts as a means of further dissuading suspicion.

Undercover agents should be especially alert to conversational shifts and use them to deflect suspicions.

At all times during an encounter with exclamatory suspicion, undercover agents must guard against the very likely possibility of "overtalking".

This not only serves to increase any suspicion already existing but makes it more difficult to retain credibility during the use of the role play tactics discussed above.

In summary, then, an undercover agent facing exclamatory suspicion would do well to use the following sequence of responses:-

- role play indignation
- role play anger (if necessary)
Cold Shoulder

This type of suspicion is the simplest and at the same time the most serious of the three types. The term, "cold shoulder" is used in this case to indicate that an undercover agent who encounters this kind of suspicion will probably be completely avoided by targets. In most cases, cold shoulder suspicion results from targets positively identifying an undercover agent as a police officer, either from personal knowledge, or through determining his true identity in some way.

There is little or nothing to be gained from the use of dissuasion tactics at the time the suspicion is encountered; any action taken must surely be seen as being after the fact. This is partly because cold shoulder suspicion does represent a physical threat to the undercover agent, and partly because the kind of dissuasion techniques most likely to work in this case are good only when used separate from the incident. An undercover agent generally becomes aware of cold shoulder suspicion in one of two ways:

- He is told 'outright' by targets or target's associates that he has no credibility in the target area
- He is identified as a police officer or informant

The latter presents the greatest risk of physical harm. He is completely avoided by target(s), even to the point of being ostracised.

Once suspicion has been determined to be of this type, (and it is usually easily identifiable), the undercover agent must remove himself from the scene as soon as possible, after which the next course of action will be determined. If the undercover agent has been positively identified (i.e. a target knows him as a police officer) either the operation must be terminated or the undercover agent replaced and a new operational plan instigated.

If, on the other hand, cold shoulder suspicion has resulted from targets' observation and deduction (for instance, a target may have been arrested on a previous undercover operation and has been able to draw some very telling parallels) the operation may be salvageable. Some suggested means of doing this are:

An overt act may be of benefit. Covert teams can arrange to have their undercover agents arrested in view of targets. If necessary, the undercover agent can actually be lodged with, or in view of, a target.

Covert teams can arrange for the undercover agent to use props which might enhance credibility. Best results are obtained when the prop
supports a facet of the cover story, which has already been presented to the targets. For example, an undercover agent can offer videos and televisions for sale purporting them to be stolen. Similarly, targets can be within view to see a mock drug deal take place between two undercover agents.

In rare cases, undercover agents may find it beneficial to confront the source of cold shoulder suspicion. This may be best suited to a situation where one particular target seems to have come to the conclusion that the undercover agent is a police officer. If, and only if, the covert team can determine that the target has not substantiated the suspicion through independent means, it may be advantageous for the undercover agent to approach the target directly and confront him or her with a challenge to the accusation, (or innuendo, as the case may be). This method must be used with caution, and carried out under controlled conditions, as both the undercover agents' safety and the legality of the action may be at stake. Under no circumstances should an undercover agent directly threaten a target with bodily harm.

This method of dissuading cold shoulder suspicion is most often used in the case of the purchase of fake or ‘rip’ drugs (or other contraband) by an undercover agent. While the act in itself may not cause targets to become immediately suspicious, the undercover agent’s reaction to the incident (or lack of it) often results in cold shoulder suspicion.

NEGOTIATION

The Art of Negotiation

The definition of negotiation is described by the Oxford Dictionary as, "Confer (with another) with view to compromise or agreement. Arrange (affair), bring about (desired result), by negotiating."

Negotiation is, the use of information and power to effect behaviour within a web of tension.

The art of being a successful undercover agent is the ability to negotiate.

Every covert role undertaken by an undercover agent will involve negotiation. No matter how effective they are at gaining a target’s confidence, how convincing their cover story is, or how well armed they are with false documentation to support that story, their success as an undercover agent is ultimately measured by the ability to negotiate. This ability will ensure the objectives of the undercover operation will be achieved.

The role of the undercover agent is more than just fitting in, he or she must also be able to feed out. In every operation involving an undercover
agent objectives must be set. The success or failure of the venture can be measured in light of the objectives achieved. Objectives for an undercover could be determined as follows:

- Obtain information and intelligence
- Obtain evidence, admissible and relevant for a prosecution
- Determine if a crime is being planned or committed
- Identify individuals involved in criminal activity
- Prove association between conspirators
- Methods of distribution & source of supply

Successful negotiation lies in finding out what the other side really wants and showing them a way to get it; whilst you still get what you want. This is achieved by building trust, gaining commitment and managing opposition. Use this trust to obtain information and evidence.

Opposition can come in two forms: opposition to your ideas and 'visceral opposition', that is the target hates you. If the target opposes your ideas a compromise can still be reached through negotiation. With the visceral opponent it does not matter how reasonable or logical your arguments are, you will continue to strike opposition, simply because he does not like you. The surest way of turning somebody into a visceral opponent is to have them lose face in public or with their peers.

The negotiation skills of undercover agents are among the most critical elements contributing to their operational success, as well as their personal safety and survival.

Studies carried out in America have found that in the majority of cases in which undercover agents have been killed or injured, they have participated in negotiations with their assailant and agreed to many of the conditions that have contributed to their victimisation.

Successful undercover agents must possess a variety of skills and talents. They must be able to put forward their own agenda, as contained in the operational plan, and maintain their position in spite of the stress and pressure placed on them by the very nature of their undercover role. They can not allow themselves to be unduly influenced by the assertive and manipulative personalities of the targets with whom they are interacting.

It is vital that the assertive personalities of an undercover agent be supported by a well developed understanding of the principles of effective negotiating.

A comparison can be drawn between the negotiating skills required of a hostage negotiator and those of an undercover agent. Both are attempting
to reach an agreement with a criminal who poses a significant threat to the life and well being of an innocent party.

In the first instance, the innocent hostage is a third party who may or may not participate in the actual dynamics of the negotiation. In the case of the undercover agent, the innocent party is the undercover agent himself and while the threats may not be as direct they are nonetheless real.

The activities being negotiated are criminal in nature and generally involve large amounts of money and/or drugs. The underlying premise whether stated or implied is that any failure on the part of the undercover agent to act in good (criminal) faith will be met with maximum retaliation on the part of the target. Furthermore, any weakness displayed by the undercover agent will likewise be utilised by the target. Perceiving this weakness, the target would be more likely to contemplate a straight rip-off.

A dealer or trafficker may have many potential customers, he may have the product, but his market is limited to criminals who he can never totally trust. The product is no good to him unless he can convert it into ready cash. The trafficker is therefore torn between greed and self-preservation.

In many instances these two competing needs will be compounded by drug abuse, thus resulting in an extreme need for money and extreme paranoia.

The undercover agent, together with his handler, should discuss the targets specific needs. What does he want from this negotiation? What are his short term or immediate needs and what his long term or intimate needs might be. For example, his short-term needs might be trust. He wants to have the self-confidence that he trusts the person he is doing business with. He might want immediate cash, thus he would be less inclined to deal on credit. One of his long term needs might be that he does not want to chase around after customers but wants a purchaser who is willing to buy large amounts of his produce on a regular basis.

An undercover agent can use the long and short term needs of the target to his own advantage by causing the dealer to compromise his safety and security (i.e. control of location) by focusing more on the long term needs. The undercover agent could suggest that this immediate purchase is nothing more than a sample for larger and more regular purchases in the future.

By focusing on the future, the undercover agent can create a rationale for expressing concern over the location and circumstances of all transactions including the current one, and in this way, tempting the trafficker to agree to a mutual location.

Once this mutual location has been agreed upon and a transaction has occurred with no undue interference, the trafficker would be hard pressed to justify a change of venue. This is referred to as the power of precedent.
Time considerations are always a major part of every undercover drug transaction. The trafficker considers himself to be under severe time constraints by virtue of the fact that the longer he is in possession of the drug, the greater his chances of being discovered by either other criminals or police. In any negotiation, there is a tendency for each party to perceive the other as being under fewer organisational pressures, time constraints and restrictive deadlines.

The undercover agent should attempt to emphasise and draw attention to those time restraints that favour his goals, rather than that of the dealer. For example, the undercover agent may have an airline ticket with a return flight already booked, thus indicating that he is only available for a certain period of time. In this way the dealer is forced into a schedule of the undercover agent's choosing and since it is imaginary, the undercover agent can change it or not, depending on what suits him. The airline ticket serves to reinforce the time constraint through the power of legitimacy.

Often there is pressure on the undercover agent from management and/or the undercover agents' peers to rush or push the negotiation along. This pressure may be unspoken or verbalised directly in terms of time limits. This pushing for a conclusion before a target's trust has been gained will only foster doubt and suspicion. Drug traffickers are continually cautious about anything relating to a new purchaser either real or imagined.

Nothing builds confidence more between a target and an undercover agent, than the passage of time, even to the extent of shutting a negotiation down and walking away.

Negotiating an illegal drug transaction has many similarities with other high stakes buyer/seller negotiations. The undercover agent will improve his position if he can create competition for his business - he should, if possible, let the target know he has other sources of supply who are competing for his business. He should indicate however, that there are conditions with which he is not satisfied concerning these "other sources of supply" since if they were perfect, it would make no sense to be negotiating with the target.

The undercover agent should indirectly let the target know the difficulties he (the undercover agent) experienced in previous purchases, i.e. going to locations that he was not satisfied with and being ripped off. In this way the undercover agent is telling the target that in a non threatening, non confrontational manner, his needs in regard to the ultimate location and circumstances of the deal. The target will understand the undercover agent's reason for concern and thus, should not insist on identical conditions.

To conduct a successful undercover operation, good negotiation skills are vital. No matter what the product or what the price, the bottom line is that the undercover agent is really dealing for his life.
Power of Negotiation

Power for our purposes is defined as: “The ability to exercise control over people, events, situations and oneself.”

Power is not restricted to the power you actually have, but includes the power that others perceive you to have.

Examples of power utilised by undercover agents:

1. Power of Precedent

   Setting the ground rules of how, when and where meetings or transactions will occur from the outset will assist control of future transactions. For example: arranging small deals or sample buys in a manner that suits you will enable you to have a greater say in how larger transactions will occur. "We both agreed that was the best way to go last time".

2. Power of Legitimacy

   If it's in writing it must be true. This is the attitude of many people and therefore false documentation confirms identity. For example: producing a covert licence confirms that is who you say you are. Use it to your advantage and challenge it when used against you. The Power of Legitimacy is not restricted to documentation but also includes ‘props’. For example if you use the cover story of being a single parent, a car seat, toys and similar paraphernalia in your vehicle will verify what you have said.

3. Power of Knowledge of Needs

   Negotiating is about satisfying needs. If you can establish what someone's needs are, you can predict, with reasonable certainty, what will happen in any interaction. For example: a need for security or safety; a need for cash; a need for an on-going or continued relationship; a need for drugs. Winning a negotiation means finding out what the other side really wants, showing them a way to get it, while you still get what you want.

4. Power of Competition

   Creating a fictitious competitor will increase your power to negotiate. Ensure that the competitor does not satisfy all of your needs. For example the quantity available or the quality of drugs is not as good as that which your target can supply. This is why you prefer to deal with the target. This will assist in negotiations if your target wants to keep your business.

5. Power of Expertise

   Your field of expertise may assist in forming a rapport or meeting your target's needs. For example your target may be selling drugs from
work, a panel beating shop. If you are a mechanic or panel beater by trade, you could use this expertise to attempt a cold start or build rapport through an informant introduction.

6. Power of Investment

The importance of getting the other person to invest time, money, or energy in a situation. If you commence a negotiation and come to an impasse on one aspect, for example, where to do the deal. Leave this issue and come to an agreement on all other aspects, i.e. price, who does the deal, time etc. Once everything else has been determined, return to the impasse. At this stage you are more likely to convince the other side to agree with you, having sent an investment on the other aspects.

7. The Power of Rewarding

Significant negotiation will only occur if a person is convinced that you can and might help them. This perception of power is used during most covert operations. For example in offences of attempting to procure murder, the undercover agent offers to help the target by killing for payment.

8. The Power of Identification

You will maximise your negotiating ability if you get others to identify with you. A target will identify with you if he believes you are who and what you are purporting to be. This is where your cover story, backstopping and ability to role play convinces the target that you are a drug dealer, car thief, murderer etc.

9. The Power of Morality

All persons have some form of moral code. If you can establish the level of morality of a person, then you can use this to your advantage during negotiations.

10. The Power of Commitment

People support that which they help create. When you are negotiating it is important to let the other person have some input or at least let him believe that he has some input. Guide the person in the direction you want to go and let him make the actual suggestion. For example, if you are aware that the target prefers to deal in nightclubs, tell him during your first meeting that you dislike nightclubs and late nights. This way he may suggest an alternative venue and time that is more suitable to you and your support crew.

11. The Power of Persuasive Capacity
To persuade you must have the other people understand what you are saying. To persuade anybody you must show the immediate relevance and value of what you are saying in terms of meeting their needs and desires. Whilst negotiating the price you are willing to pay for drugs, you can use profit margins, quantities, quality and other suppliers as a form of persuasion.

12. The Power of Persistence

Determination and persistence, short of the point of angering the target, will achieve results. For example, the target initially refuses to meet with you. Continuing to appear with the informant and allowing the target to see you on a regular basis may be all the persistence required.

13. The Power of Risk Taking

Risk taking involves mixing courage with common sense. This is an area that handlers should brief undercover agents on clearly and with a view to possible scenarios prior to deployment. The undercover agent should not take any unnecessary risks and must stay within the boundaries agreed to with the handler.


Once you have built up a rapport with a target you are more likely to get a positive response if you ask for something for yourself, rather than some imaginary ‘them’. For example use I would appreciate it if you ..., instead of ‘they’ want you to.

15. The Power of Attitude.

Arguably the most important. Care, but do not care too much. This attitude has the benefit of, giving you more energy, reducing stress and a chance of better results. Remember as an undercover agent your attitude should reflect your cover story.

16. Power of Time

Time is about deadlines and using them to your advantage. Nothing builds confidence more between a target and an undercover agent than the passage of time. Even to the extent of shutting a negotiation down and walking away.

17. Power of Information

Information is gaining knowledge so that you can identify the needs of the person you are negotiating with. The more information you have about a target the better you can negotiate. Generally, you have to give information prior to receiving it. Do not be overly hesitant in
offering information. Ensure that this information can be backstopped if necessary and is in line with your cover story.

**COMMUNICATION SKILLS**

It is well known that people communicate on two separate channels: the verbal and the non-verbal. From the time children are old enough to see and hear, they have been taught to interpret and react to both of these channels. Even the youngest children respond equally to the word "no" or to a firm horizontal shake of the head accompanied by a glaring eye. In the past, these two channels were assumed to parallel one another and virtually all of the training in communication was centred around mastering the spoken word. Only quite recently has any thought been given to the non-verbal channel as a separate and distinct communication system.

Surprisingly enough, it now appears that from 60% to 75% of the social meaning derived from face-to-face communication is actually based on information received through the non-verbal channel. Moreover, many of our decisions about people appear to be based almost exclusively upon non-verbal cues. This is true even when the verbal information presented would dictate another more "logical" conclusion.

Due to the nature of the non-verbal channel, and the fact that it operates at an extremely low level of conscious awareness, this form of communication has great significance for the undercover agent.

Law enforcement officers must learn to handle and control all types of individuals and groups under a great variety of situations. While not usually taught in the classroom, the necessary procedures and communication methods which seem to work best are nevertheless usually mastered quite early in their careers. When carefully examined it becomes obvious that much of the officers ability to control people is accomplished through such things as:

- Tone of voice
- Stance
- The use of the eyes
- Hand signals and other forms of non verbal communication

Unfortunately, these systems are very quickly internalised and, as indicated, operate outside the conscious level of awareness. For an undercover agent, these non-verbal behaviours can thus be either a major stumbling block or a ticket to success depending upon the extent to which they are utilised and/or controlled.
In studying non-verbal communication, perhaps the most important things to remember are that:

- All behaviour is caused
- Everyone is constantly transmitting information on the non-verbal channel
- The non-verbal system cannot be completely turned off

There are believed to be seven major categories of a person's demeanor which can be observed and interpreted. These seven areas are:

1. PROXEMICS - space - distance between individuals
2. CHRONOMICS - the various concepts of time
3. KINESICS - the use of the body and its features
4. PHYSICAL APPEARANCE
5. HEPATICS - touch
6. PARALANGUAGE - voice, tone, inflection etc.
7. ARTEFACTS - use of the environment and objects within it

In real life, of course, all of the above are operating at the same time within a given context or situation. It is this combination of behaviour, appearance and the particular context which conveys the information.

One way of studying non-verbal communications is to group all actions into three separate attitudes or interactive styles. These are affection, involvement and control. The following are examples of how gestures, voice and touch can combine to reflect these attitudes.

1. **AFFECTION**

   Gestures which project positive affection or liking an individual:

   - Smiles - soft facial expression
   - Use of inside of hand for touching
   - Non-authoritative tone of voice
   - Reduced body space
   - Frequent eye contact
   - Hands open
2. INVOLVEMENT

Gestures which suggest an individual is attentive and involved in a subject or situation :-

- Arm positions resting on upper thighs or in front of body
- Arms held somewhat wide apart
- Palms up
- Body leaning forward
- High or low number of gestures per minute, depending on personality
- Alert-attentiveness

3. CONTROL

Gestures which project an image of control, influence or confidence :-

- Straight stance
- Staring eye contact
- Towering over other person
- Authoritative tone of voice
- Clothing - conservative (blue)
- Use of tips of fingers for touching

As long as all the systems are saying the same thing an individual is pretty much accepted at face value - the non-verbal messages can be said to be augmenting the verbal messages. However, when one or more of the systems send a conflicting message there is said to be a leakage. This contradictory or confusing signal is subconsciously noted by sensitive people and they immediately become suspicious even though they might only know something "does not ring true." Some people are specifically trained to control this leakage. They include :-

- Actors
- Diplomats
- Politicians
- Lawyers
- Doctors
- Nurses
- Magicians
- Con-men
- Used car salesmen.

Because leakage may occur in any of the seven non-verbal areas, each must be considered separately.

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Body Language

There has been a great deal written about body language over the past twenty years, since researchers first found that subtle non-verbal cues can act as warning signs to others.
The relevance of body language in undercover work is important when examining the distinctive body language that police acquire or are taught during training and general duties work. A substantial part of the skill of the undercover agent is in shedding this learned behaviour so that they do not give targets these warning signs.

The remainder of these paragraphs concentrate on outlining body language to avoid, rather than body language to adopt, in order to control body language that may give a target the impression of authority or a police background.

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**Positioning**

Police have a tendency to place themselves in a room where they have the opportunity to keep an eye on everyone, and the capacity to sweep the room when there is some unexpected movement or motion. This often means backing into a corner or up against a wall.

Always keeping safety as a consideration, be aware of the way in which you position yourself. You may choose to place yourself in a position where you do not have a wall or corner behind you.

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**Eye Contact**

Direct eye contact is a means of developing in another person a degree of trust for you. Most people avoid direct eye contact when talking with someone else, when they are:

- Frightened of that other person.
- Have something to hide.
- Are from a different level of power or importance.

The rules are quite straightforward.

If you want someone to believe that you are sincere and can be trusted, don't be afraid to look them in the eye. Eye contact establishes rapport and a sense of understanding far more potent than words.

If you want to dominate, or prove to someone that you are powerful, or stronger than them, engage in a staring match with them. The disadvantage of this, is that they may see this as a challenge, and then become hostile.

If it is important for the other person to believe that they are stronger or more powerful than you, avoid staring competitions. If you find yourself locked in a stare with them, look away first. The disadvantage of doing this is that the other person may not learn to trust you.

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**Body Space**

Body space refers to the imaginary envelope in which we move and live.
This envelope exists in front of a person about 60-100 cm. and off to either side 30-60cm. For most people this envelope also exists behind them up to 60cm., and also above their head about 20cm.

When others intrude into this envelope, anxiety levels increase to the stage where a person attempts to escape by moving or becomes agitated and perhaps hostile. Purposefully intruding into someone's body space is a means of asserting dominance and is frequently used as a means on intimidating people. If you want to gain someone's trust and confidence, respect their body space. Do not move any closer unless invited.

Body space is influenced by a number of factors, culture being the most important. People from Mediterranean backgrounds tend to have a smaller envelope, and expect closer contact and intrusion. In addition, when people are drunk their body space tends to contract unless they are an "angry" drunk.

Evidence from research shows that violent criminals have an envelope that is up to three times greater in size than the body space of non-violent criminals. This suggests that if you are dealing with someone who has a violent background, you have to make substantially greater allowance for their body space. You may chose to use this to your advantage, by allowing them to position themselves with their back to a wall or corner.

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**Posture**

The points here are obvious. If you wish to demonstrate in your body language a "trust me - I'm no threat" attitude, try to avoid:

- Folding your arms.
- Rocking or leaning backwards.
- Doing anything to emphasise or exaggerate your height.

If possible, adopt an open and easy stance.

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**Gesture**

Avoid sudden movements and try not to point at the person you are talking to. If you find that you gesture a lot when you are anxious, carry something or keep your hands occupied.

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**STRESS MANAGEMENT**

**Introduction**

What is stress? Stress is a negative behavioural, emotional, and physical state that moves us away from where we want to be in our lives. It is caused by any obstacle in our life that prevents us from being, doing, or having what we want to become, be part of, or possess.
Managing Stress

The following are examples of stress symptoms frequently identified in undercover agents.

Individually, these changes are usually viewed as worrying or troublesome and most people are able to adapt to the and realise that they are a natural by product of this style of work.

It is when an individual presents with five or more of these symptom clusters that the stress of undercover work becomes an important consideration. Steps then need to be taken to deal with the stress in a more effective fashion and review the progress of the operation.

More significant changes are indicated by an asterisk.

- *Physical illnesses - constant or persistent headaches indigestion, substantial weight gain or loss, or other physical changes with no apparent cause
- Persistent and nagging illnesses
- *Changes in attitude towards health, hygiene, physical fitness, appearance or diet
- *Substantial changes (usually an increase) in the consumption of alcohol, either by drinking more or by changing to a stronger drink
- Starting to drink earlier each day, or needing a drink to steady nerves before work
- Not necessarily drinking every day, but uncontrolled drinking binges
- Increased use of prescription drugs, (such as sleeping tablets, tranquilisers, or anti-depressant medication)
- Increased smoking
- Dramatic increases in feelings of exhaustion or overpowering feelings of lethargy, leading to a feeling of chronic tiredness
- Feeling helpless or hopeless, "beaten". Loss of the usual spark or sense of humour
- Unrealistic feelings of isolation or detachment from colleagues, or a real desire to be alone. Not wanting to mix or join in activities with others
- Increased risk-taking behaviour or inappropriate behavior. Most noticeable in spending or driving
RESTRICTED

• *Development of a short fuse or uncharacteristic anger. Loss of the ability to tolerate frustration or disappointment. Being perceived by others as moody or explosive

• *Making or pursuing demands which are unreasonable

• *A complete loss of interest in the office or Department activities (Stockholm)

• *Changes in attitude towards those being investigated and the nature of the alleged offences (Stockholm)

• *Preference to be with the target group more than with colleagues or family (Stockholm)

• *An inability to look forward or imagine the end of the operation (Stockholm)

• Identification with the undercover role as an end in itself rather than as a means for gathering evidence

• Loss of concentration or the capacity to focus on one particular task. Increased forgetfulness

• *Substantial alterations in sleep patterns, not limited to any one particular aspect of the operation but which are long term and unpleasant

• *Rapid and dramatic mood swings, without any initial warning, that lead to rapidly alternating feelings of gloom and doom or elation and euphoria

• Increased absenteeism or inability to meet realistic commitments, simply because they are no longer seen as important or necessary

Monitoring Concerns

Effectiveness as a handler is enhanced by the capacity to accurately monitor the emotional wellbeing of an undercover agent.

Following directly from the signs and symptoms of stress noted previously, the following changes should alert a handler that the wellbeing that an undercover agent may be suffering, either as a result of an operation or from some other area.

More significant changes are indicated by an asterisk.

• *Complaints made about physical problems or persistent minor illness, frail health.*

• *Changes in eating, drinking, smoking, or sleeping habits.*
• *Change in attitude towards physical appearance or keeping fit, poor personal hygiene.*
• *Changes or marked deterioration in sleep patterns*
• *A tendency or desire to remain in role outside the operation*
• *An increased tendency to be careless about where and when meetings are scheduled*
• *An increased tendency to be politely formal and impersonal when meeting with Departmental representatives*
• *Lack of interest in the office or in office activities*
• *Unexplained changes in attitude towards the operation*
• Increased difficulty in handling personal responsibilities outside the operation
• Comments suggesting a desire to try drugs or commit minor offences
• *Cutting corners, particularly where safety is concerned. Excess bravado*

The Stockholm Syndrome

The Stockholm Syndrome has direct relevance for undercover agents, even though it is more commonly associated with sieges and hostages. What is outlined here are the broad elements of the Stockholm Syndrome, how to recognise that it is occurring, and what can be done about it.

The Stockholm Syndrome

On August 23rd, 1573 the Kreditbanken at Normalstorg, Stockholm was the subject of an armed robbery by a recently escaped, convicted criminal named Olsson. After firing several shots into the ceiling, he took hostage three female and one male member of the bank staff.

He demanded that a criminal associate be released from prison to join him, a request which was met by the authorities, and together they remained with the hostages in the vault of the bank for nearly six days and nights. Olsson's demands for safe passage and money were not met by the authorities because of his insistence that the hostages be allowed to accompany their captors in the course of the escape.

During the time that the hostages remained in the vault, authorities negotiating for their release noticed substantial changes in their behaviour and their attitudes to Olsson and his companion. The cluster of changes, which are now looked for and promoted in most lengthy negotiations for
safe release of hostages, have become known as the "Stockholm Syndrome".

There are three clusters of changes that occur in the Stockholm Syndrome. They occur in this order:

- Positive feelings develop in the Hostage for the Hostage Taker.
- Negative feelings develop in the Hostage for the Authorities.
- Positive feelings develop in the Hostage Taker for the Hostage.

To achieve a successful and safe resolution of the situation negotiators encourage and tolerate the first two steps so as to induce the third, and protect the lives of the hostages.

The principles believed to be operating in the formation of the Stockholm Effect can also apply between undercover agents and targets.

The psychological principle of identification is in operation here. Just as the hostage starts to identify (accept, understand, feel sympathy for) the hostage taker, as a means of coping with the situation of being held hostage, so the undercover agent will start to identify with the targets they are in close contact with.

An undercover agent may see criminals in a different context to the generally unattractive normal police context, criminals may help the undercover agent with personal problems, may be seen to help others in need, and to show emotions that make them less like 'the criminal' and more like the undercover agent. They may be seen by undercover agents in a more attractive context than general police because of the closeness of social interaction.

In essence, the Stockholm Syndrome leads to the undercover agent starting to like or admire those he or she is working against, reducing their effectiveness and jeopardising the operation.

Factors which can accelerate this identification are:

- The extent of social interaction necessary for the operation to succeed
- The amount of time spent as an undercover agent in one role
- The individual make-up of the undercover agent
- The support offered to the undercover agent by their handler and the law enforcement agency
- The frequency of contact with the handler
- The amount of direct threat posed by the targets
- The "likeability" (personal charm, charisma) of the targets
Guarding Against the Stockholm Syndrome

Just having regular contact in an undercover role can bring about the formation of the Stockholm Syndrome, without any of the accelerating or contributing factors listed above.

In essence, there is no complete protection against the process of identification characterised by the Stockholm Syndrome. However, there are steps that can be taken to slow down or reduce its effect.

1. Be aware that the Stockholm Syndrome does exist, and that it can effect even the most experienced and confident undercover agent. Undercover agents should monitor their own thoughts and beliefs about the people they are associating with, and if they start to feel confused or unclear, then they need to talk this over with their handler.

2. Undercover agents need to keep a clear focus on the goal of their work, and the target that is to be achieved. They should remind themselves regularly of the reason that they are engaged in this work, and the end result.

3. Set realistic limits on the length of the operation (if possible).

4. Undercover agents should remind themselves of the history of the people they are dealing with. Do not overlook, gloss over, or explain away criminal acts they have engaged in. Undercover agents should remind themselves that they have chosen to adopt a criminal lifestyle, and it is not something that they have been forced into.

5. No matter how friendly they seem, or how easy to get along with, at regular times imagine how targets would react if they knew the real purpose and objectives of the undercover agent.

6. If possible, schedule time away from the operation. Ensure that the undercover agent uses this time constructively.

Warning Signs

There are a number of strong warning signs that should be recognised and acted upon. These include:

- Developing a romantic interest or engaging in sexual relations with one of the targets
- Failing to meet commitments set by the handler that are routine and regularly scheduled, for no particular reason
- Consistently breaking rules or procedure in your dealing with targets
- Wanting to spend extra time associating with targets, that is not necessary for the success of the operation
Traumatic Events

This paragraph outlines the following:

1. Usual reactions to a traumatic event.
2. A listing of signs of adapting or not adapting to such an event.
3. Features that can assist individuals come to terms with their feelings following a traumatic event.

Usual Reactions Following a Traumatic Event

These signs or feelings are most common in the three days following a traumatic event or exposure to a traumatic scene. They can persist for up to four weeks.

They occur as part of the natural process of interpreting the world around you, and reacting to new experiences.

- Changes in appetite
- Alterations in sleep patterns
- Withdrawal from friends or family
- Reliving the event/brooding about the event
- Worry about returning to work or the scene of the event
- Fear about own safety
- Difficulty in concentrating on your job
- Feelings of unreality about the event
- Feelings of shock
- Emotional numbness
- Feelings of horror and outrage

The best indicator of how you are adapting to a traumatic event is your own "gut" feeling, balanced by the impressions of those around you who know you well. It is important to recognise that people react differently - there is no right and wrong way to react - and that it is important to respect these differences.

Signs of Successfully Adapting to a Traumatic Event

- Being able to remember and forget the event at will, so that the event does not dominate your thinking.
- Being able to talk about the event, and your reactions to it, with people you trust.
• Returning to normal work, family and social routines without an
overriding sense of apprehension or dread that you will witness a
similar event.

• Accepting that the event has had, and will have, both positive and
negative influences on you.

• Accepting and dealing with flashbacks of the event

Signs of Difficulty in Adapting to a Traumatic Event

Generally, the ‘usual reactions to a traumatic event’ listed initially tend to
lose their ‘bite’ around two weeks after the event. Some fluctuate
according to other stress in your life at the time. If they persist after four
weeks and continue to cause discomfort or distress, then they need to be
addressed.

Apart from these, some long-term signs that can occur are :

• Persistent illness or susceptibility to minor ailments

• An increase in the instance of alcohol, tobacco or prescription drugs

• Changes in the nature of relationships with family and friends that are
regarded by others as "over protection" or an "over reaction"

• Difficulty in completing routine tasks

• Changes in physical appearance (including loss of personal pride in
appearance)

• Behaviour that is unusual, bizarre, or out of character

Features that Assist Adaptation Following a Traumatic Event

Talking about the event - soon after it occurs (hours, not days). - with
someone you trust. - with those you were with at the time.

A partner or family who are aware of details of the event, and are able to
listen and spend time with the individual when required.

Returning with minimal delay to work and the environment in which the
traumatic event occurred.

 Seeking outside assistance if you believe that you are not coping.

Adopting the attitude that the unpleasant feelings and sensations you are
experiencing are normal, and are part of the process of dealing with the
traumatic event.
# Traumatic Event - Helpful Hints

Trying some of the following hints may help to alleviate the emotional pain associated with a traumatic event.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOR YOURSELF</th>
<th>FOR FAMILY MEMBERS &amp; FRIENDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Try to rest a bit more</td>
<td>Listen carefully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact friends</td>
<td>Spend time with the traumatised person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have someone stay with you for at least a few hours, or periods of a day or so</td>
<td>Offer your assistance and a listening ear, even if they have not asked for help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurring thoughts, dreams or flashbacks are normal - don't try to fight them - they'll decrease over time and become less painful.</td>
<td>Reassure them that they are safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain as normal a schedule as possible.</td>
<td>Help them with everyday tasks like cleaning, cooking, caring for the family, minding the children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat well balanced and regular meals (even when you don't feel like it).</td>
<td>Give them some private time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to keep a reasonable level of activity</td>
<td>Don't take their anger or other feelings personally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against boredom</td>
<td>Don't tell them that they are &quot;lucky it wasn't worse&quot; traumatised people are not consoled by those statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical activity is often helpful</td>
<td>Instead tell them that you are sorry such an event has occurred and you want to understand and assist them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-establish a normal schedule as soon as possible.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express your feelings as they arise.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk to people who love you.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find a good counselor if the feelings become prolonged or too intense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Common frustrations encountered by undercover agents.

Those who have worked in undercover duties for a long time, or worked in one long-term operation, note that there is a number of frustrations peculiar to this style of policing.

The following are common frustrations drawn from operational experiences internationally.

Loneliness (Long-term operations)

The undercover agent may be living and working in a foreign environment, where contact with the handler may be the main link back to his or her real and established world. Feelings of loneliness, isolation and detachment can be common.

The undercover agent in long term operations may find it is necessary to abandon recreational and social activities that in the past have assisted them relax and deal with the pressure of work. Many, by necessity, curtail their involvement with their spouse and families.

Exposure Fear

Every undercover agent suffers from a certain degree of exposure paranoia, fearing that they may have their identity and real purpose revealed.

This is frequently the case at the start of an operation, or where an undercover agent is inexperienced or poorly briefed.

Some undercover agents become imbued with the feeling that they are being set up and are about to become exposed. These feelings of paranoia may be imagined or real, and are best dealt with by talking with their handler who is usually in a better position to judge the immediacy or reality of the perceived threat.

Exposure fear is also most common in undercover agents who have not worked for a while and are attempting to settle back into undercover work.

Remoteness

The undercover agent may feel disconnected from the job and colleagues, almost as if they have put their career on hold.

This can be particularly troubling when they become involved in a long-term operation. As part of their assumed role they may eliminate all social contact with other colleagues. They may feel that they are losing touch with friends in the job, or changes in the law enforcement agency, and are removed from station gossip or changes back at their old station.

Police are by nature highly social, and the removal of this opportunity to freely socialise with other police can be a powerful stressor.
Fear of Failure

This reflects a belief that the operation is not moving quickly enough, or that the undercover agent is not being successful in making enough of the ‘right kinds’ of contacts.

If not dealt with quickly through strong support from a handler or colleague, the undercover agent may start to believe that he or she is not achieving what is easy or expected. From this may follow inordinate risks, or a breakdown in the relationship between the undercover agent and handler.

Again, this is most common when an undercover agent is inexperienced.

Poor Feedback

Most undercover agents value opinion and comments on the information they are gathering or the contacts they are making.

It can be frustrating and disheartening if the perceive that their effort is being swallowed by the investigators without any information being fed back to them.

Overcoming this frustration requires responses from the handler, which is turn assists, the undercover agent to gain confidence. Poor or limited responses, aimed at simply placating an undercover, will often result in the undercover becoming demoralised and losing confidence.

Money Problems

The undercover agent will become frustrated if those responsible for money and resources consistently fail to back them up or meet their commitments.

This is particularly the case where an undercover agent has tied their credibility as an individual with their capacity to provide something to a target, and is then forced to back down. Even money or resources arriving late can cause considerable problems.

Handler Efficiency

The experienced undercover agent will soon realise whether their handler is efficient and ‘switched on’.

Where a handler is lazy, inefficient or simply not interested in the welfare of the undercover agent, the effectiveness of the operation and the safety of the undercover agent can be compromised. Of equal importance, the relationship between the undercover agent and handler will suffer irreparable harm.

Cover Doubt

If the undercover agent believes or knows that their cover is inadequate or fits poorly with their personality, this may lead to loss of confidence and effectiveness. At the same time, the undercover agent may be constantly rearranging their cover to deal with inconsistencies, and may not have the
energy or opportunity to concentrate on other matters. A good comfortable cover becomes essential.

Orientation Doubt

If the undercover agent has been poorly briefed, he or she will have a tendency to feel like a fish out of water no matter how good their other skills and qualities.

Poorly briefed undercover agents will lose faith in their capacity to succeed, and tend to err too much on the side of caution.

Challenge to Loyalty

This occurs most frequently, where an undercover agent is involved in a long term operation and those targets they are dealing with become quite meaningful to them. This is discussed in more detail in the chapter outlining the Stockholm Syndrome, refer to page 97.

Temptation to Use Drugs

Through constant exposure to illicit drugs, the undercover agent may become familiar with handling or having them available and may succumb to the temptation to experiment.

This is often seen in conjunction with challenges to loyalty.

Role Merging

This occurs as the result of playing a role for a considerable amount of time, to the extent that elements of the role become assimilated into the undercover agent's personality.

A mild example of this would be an undercover agent who picks up a habit that is expected in their undercover role, but cannot shake that habit outside the role.

Where this can be more disturbing is when the undercover agent finds that they are thinking or adopting beliefs they know are incompatible with the way they used to feel. An example of this is an undercover agent associating with criminals who loathe and mistrust police finding that they are starting to think in the same manner. (This is also linked to the Stockholm Syndrome).

Adverse Community Attitudes

This frustration occurs when an undercover agent adopts a role that is at odds with a commonly accepted community view or belief.

Chronic Tiredness or Fatigue (Long-term operations)

This frustration comes about when an undercover agent attempts to relax or turn off in the middle of a long job, only to find that rather than being able to relax they spend most of the time sleeping or attempting to regain their strength.
Non-Recognition of Effort

Here, the undercover agent may start to believe or perceive that the law enforcement agency is not giving them adequate compensation for working in this field.

Often this is a valid criticism, colleagues may be given promotional opportunities or the chance to continue with their career while the undercover agent remains motionless. However this feeling is accelerated when an undercover agent is fatigued or worn down by other frustrations.

This feeling is also accelerated when the undercover agent perceives they are simply being used as a tool by others.

Return to Uniform Policing (Long -term operations)

There is a large body of evidence to suggest that one of the most frustrating times for an undercover agent can be their return to uniform duties. They move back into routine, are removed from an exciting lifestyle and have less control over their working environment.

For this reason, a careful and planned transition back to uniform policing becomes essential.

Characteristics of Successful Undercover Agents

It is difficult to determine or list exactly what characteristics a successful undercover agent must possess.

Experience has shown a mixture of the following qualities to be essential.

Intelligence: the ability to assess a situation or individual quickly and make appropriate decisions based on observation, training and intuition.

Personality: the ability to mix and deal with others from a wide range of backgrounds, and to adopt mannerisms or characteristics while retaining own individuality and ideals.

Self-confidence: confidence in own skills and abilities without placing self or others in unnecessary danger.

In addition the following characteristics are considered highly desirable in those engaged in undercover duties.

- Integrity
- Self-reliance
- Mental alertness
- Good Judgement
• Resourcefulness
• Initiative
• Energy
• Courage
• Retentive memory
• Ability to report accurately and speedily

There are other qualities linked to life experience, training or lifestyle which, when combined with the above characteristics, can greatly enhance an undercover agent's effectiveness. These include:

• Cultural background: knowledge of customs and habits, languages and accents, appearance.
• Special talents and hobbies: i.e. musician, drinker, driver, technical skills or expertise.
• Police experience: particularly in surveillance or intelligence gathering capacity.
• Language: jargon or street language, technical language.
• Trade, profession or occupational background: particularly contacts in these areas.
• Knowledge of criminal methods.

IMPROVING MEMORY

Memory is largely an automatic process with wide variations in individual ability to accurately recall events.

It is possible to adopt a number of techniques, which will increase your capacity to recall specific information as well as your ability to recall events.

While memory is an automatic process, those people with good memories tend to put greater effort and concentration into the process of ordering material that goes into memory, and retrieving material that is required.

Techniques

Most techniques to improve memory focus on the following broad principles:
At the time of the event:

- Concentrate.
- Introduce order into the material that is to be retained
- Introduce structure into the material that is to be retained
- Repeat and over-learn
- Link senses

At the time of desired recall:

- Use a standard process for recall
- Link different senses
- Use extended imagery
- Use pre-learned memory cues
- Use structured debriefing and recall cues

The following paragraphs cover a variety of techniques which when used properly will improve your memory and enhance your capacity to recall events.

-------------------------------

Gathering Techniques

Concentrate

You can improve your memory by making an active decision to concentrate and expend energy on those things you wish to remember.

By concentrating on the event at hand, you actively invest energy in the process, which allows information to be more easily recalled at a later date.

Where you do not concentrate or invest energy, information is usually retained within short-term memory, which has limited storage space and decays rapidly. By concentrating on what you wish to be able to recall later, you assist in moving that information into a long-term storage area with practically unlimited space.

-------------------------------

Mental Notes

Information is best retained and later recalled when it is noticed in a calm and deliberate fashion in the form of mental notes.

For this reason, do not place pressure on yourself to try to make a mental note of everything all at once. If possible, allow yourself to settle into a situation and feel more comfortable, dealing with the immediate needs of
the situation before starting the process of actively making mental notes about an event.

If you try to make mental notes too quickly, you will confuse and overload yourself. Where you have the opportunity, make mental notes in a slow and deliberate fashion.

---

**Introduce Order**

Introduce order into your method of gathering information.

To do this, prior to the event have a clear idea of the information that it is:

- Important for you to recall
- Not important or not necessary for you to recall.

For information that is important for you to recall, have a clear system for gathering that information.

Make your means of gathering this information a deliberate and a conscious process, and rather than trying to gather as much information as possible at one time, notice different features of what you wish to remember one step at a time.

For example, when making mental notes about a person you have been introduced to, start from the top of the person and work your way down. Each aspect of that person becomes a mental note, a feature of that individual which you notice about them which usually distinguishes them from those around them.

When making these notes, try to work to a set sequence.

You will over a period of time develop a set series of aspects of an individual which constitutes your basic set of mental notes about that person. When you have exhausted all of these characteristics, you might look for any other characteristics which particularly set this person aside from others. These can include such things as:-

- Mannerisms
- Mood
- Habits
- Scars
- Gait
- Tattoos
- Stance
- Slang
- Smell

---

**Introduce structure**
Prior to an event, determine with your handler or partner if there are any aspects of the contact that are more important to be able to recall at a later date. You may wish to have an idea of the material to be remembered that is:

- Essential
- Important, but not essential
- Peripheral.

You may even decide to divide up the material that is to be recalled at a later date with your partner, prior to taking part in the contact.

For example, you may feel that you have a better memory for people’s appearance rather than environments or conversation, and you may decide beforehand that this will be the focus of your mental notes. Your partner, on the other hand, will gather information on the environment or the location where the event is taking place.

Doing this does not limit you to your specific area, however, and it will be that your later recall will help to complement and support the information gathered by your partner.

---

**Repeat and Over-learn**

Where there is essential information that you want to recall, repeat that information either to yourself (mentally) or in conversation.

For example, where you wish to really embed someone’s name in your memory, first listen carefully when you are introduced and make a conscious mental note of that name.

Repeat that person’s name, possibly by using it back to that person or someone else in general conversation, or use that name in introducing a person to someone else.

Be aware of information from your other senses.

It is generally believed that of all the senses the sense of smell is the most evocative and leaves the most powerful memory trace.

While making your mental notes about an event allow yourself to be aware of other sensations apart from what you see and hear. Notice what you can smell or feel, along with other sensations such as temperature or the general environment. At a later time, re-creating in your mind these sensations may assist in recall.

---

**Chunk Material in Groups**

Where you have to remember telephone numbers or similar, chunk them into easily remembered groups (i.e. an eight digit telephone number is two groups of four, and is generally more easily remembered that way).
sequence of numbers may also be remembered more easily if you search for a pattern (i.e. numbers getting bigger, smaller, doubling, all even or odd), or an arithmetic association (i.e. all multiples of 3).

Where material such as number plates have to be remembered, turn the letters into a word or an object, or as initials to a name or a popular phrase. The associated numbers may be arranged into a meaningful associations. For example, an arithmetic association, an association between an important number for you (age, birthday) and the number. A visual shorthand for numbers may also be helpful:

1. Pen  
2. Swan  
3. Breasts  
4. Sailboat  
5. Hook  
6. Pipe  
7. Cliff  
8. Hourglass  
9. Musical note  
10. Bat and ball

E.g. Number plate TXF242
The X Files  Two swans swimming around a boat.

Recall Techniques

The following guide is general information for recall techniques.

Immediate Notes

Information decays from memory when that material is not used or reinforced.

At the conclusion of an event, make notes in a rough form of information that will act to stimulate other parts of your memory when you write your notes more formally.

Do not try to juggle or hold this information in your mind, as you will invariably lose material.

Introduce Structure

Having gathered information in a systematic manner, transfer that information back onto paper in a systematic fashion as well.

For example, have a sheet of paper handy for each area where you wish to recall information with an appropriate heading e.g. “description”.

Where you wish to recall as much of the description of an individual as possible, create a stick drawing and in the same sequence that you made
Keep a notebook handy with you to jot down anything additional you recall when away from the operation. Do not rely on your memory to recall information that just pops into your mind, as you will invariably forget that you remembered it in the first place.

Do not force yourself to recall events, just allow information to seep to the surface at its own rate. Starting with even a small piece of information can allow links with other more importance material to occur and come to the surface.

Where you believe there is more information to be remembered it can help to be interviewed by your handler. The aim is to sift through and clarify what has already been recalled as well as fill in any gaps.

The way to do this is as follows:

- Be interviewed in an environment, which is free of any outside disturbances.

- Allow the interviewer to set the agenda for the interview, starting by encouraging you to return in your mind to the scene of the event (lighting, temperature, time of day, circumstances leading up to the event, etc).

- Have the interviewer pace the interview, giving you the opportunity to fill in gaps rather than forcing you to provide answers.

- Have the interviewer encourage the use of techniques such as mental imagery to look for further fine detail.

- Have the interviewer request that you recall the event in reverse order, starting with the last thing that happened and then moving to the first.

- Ensure the interviewer doesn’t edit or criticise the information you produce.

- Have the interviewer guide the interview, without being overly intrusive.
Return to the Scene

In some instances, returning to the scene of the event can stimulate links with material held in memory particularly where there is something distinctive attached to that scene. You do not have to do anything other than return to the scene of the event and experience the surrounding sensations again.

Assisted Recall

Techniques such as hypnosis can be useful where there is incomplete recall of an essential aspect of the event. However hypnosis is an imprecise method, without guarantee of recall and the accuracy of the material produced is sometimes doubtful.

Discuss with your handler whether, if all else has failed, they believe that this techniques may be of assistance.

This technique should only be used where the information to be remembered is important, and all other efforts at recall have been unsuccessful.

Cover Stories

The best cover stories are those, which feel comfortable and have a natural feel because they fit in with your personality, and some of your background and skills.

The essence to learning and recalling a cover story is therefore to feel comfortable with it from the start. Discuss with your handler your cover story, and if there are elements that do not feel comfortable seek to change them.

Choice of your cover story should be a matter of what you feel comfortable with, the requirements of your handler and the demands of the situation. Make sure that you have input to this process.

Once you have your basic cover story, rehearse the details until they become second nature.

Set aside regular rehearsal times when you can review the basic elements. The most effective time to do this appears to be either first thing in the morning or last thing at night, where you can read over or mentally rehearse the most important or fundamental features of your cover.

Have other people quiz you on aspects of your cover story, and have them make you recount various aspects of your history arising from your cover.

Make sure (if possible) that your cover name is natural and does not have any bad associations for you (i.e. something from your history that grates on you mentally).

Even when you feel that you have mastered your cover and worked in it for some time, review your background material regularly.
Do not use your cover when you do not have to.
Appendix A  Agent Deed

AGENT DEED

THIS DEED is made by

__________________________________________________ ("the Promisor")

(print full name)

of ______________________________________________ 

(address in full)

on the __________ day of _________________ 20___

IN FAVOUR OF: THE ‘YOUR COUNTRY’ POLICE ("the Police")

WHEREAS the Promisor is a member of the ‘Your Country’ Police voluntarily involved in ‘Your Country’ Police Undercover Programme and may withdraw at any time.

AND WHEREAS as a result of the foregoing the Promisor will have access to information which is confidential in nature ("the information"). The information includes methods of undercover operation, technology, operational details, and training.

THE PROMISOR HEREBY AGREES

1. CONFIDENTIALITY

1.1 THAT all information so obtained is and shall remain, unless otherwise advised in writing by the Commisioner of the ‘Your Country’ Police, confidential in nature.

1.2 NOT to disclose or cause to be disclosed, or knowingly suffer the disclosure of information which is acquired or produced in connection with the promisor’s involvement in the Police Undercover Programme without prior approval in writing from the Commisioner of the ‘Your Country’ Police.

1.3 THAT a breach of the above conditions shall give rise to a right of action at the suit of the Police against the Promisor.

2. DRUG USE

2.1 WHILST deployed on an undercover operation I may not use any illicit or controlled drug
2.2 THAT I may only use cannabis and cannabis derivatives if I fear that failure to do so will result in the danger of serious bodily harm.

2.3 THAT use of cannabis or cannabis derivatives is prohibited in any other circumstances and that other illicit drugs must not be used.

2.4 THAT if placed in a situation where a technical supply is unavoidable, the same test as to "use", in this deed, applies. Other drugs must not be supplied.

3. BENEFITS AND ENTITLEMENTS

3.1 THAT my entitlements and all benefits accruing to me as negotiated between the Police Administration and the Police Association are as set out in the appendix to this deed.

4. INFORMED CONSENT

4.1 THAT In terms of undercover deployments I understand the following information:

Cannabis Use
Short Term Effects

Cannabis use can cause impaired attention, concentration and short term memory loss for the duration of intoxication. The ability to carry out multi-step tasks may be impaired. Because of perceptual alterations, the user may have difficulty keeping accurate track of time. The effects would be exaggerated if cannabis were combined with alcohol.

Cannabis does not appear to have adverse effects on a healthy, cardiovascular system. It may pose a health risk for those who have hypertension cerebrovascular disease and coronary artery disease.

Long Term Effects

Cannabis use during pregnancy causes impaired foetal development and associated low birth weight similar to the effects of tobacco. It may also increase the risk of birth or childhood abnormalities. (Drugs Advisory Committee et al 1995)

Smoking cannabis heavily is likely to produce symptoms of respiratory diseases such as chronic bronchitis. It increases the risk of lung cancer and cancers of the mouth, throat and upper respiratory tract. Combining use with tobacco use has an addictive effect. (Hall et al 1994). Respiratory cancers require about 15-20 years exposure to cigarette smoke to develop. Far less time is needed for bronchitis to develop as a result of heavy cannabis smoking.

Chronic heavy use of cannabis may cause subtle forms of cognitive impairment involving memory, attention and organisation and integration of complex
information. It is not clear whether this can be reversed by abstaining from cannabis (Hall et al 1994).

Dependency

The development of a cannabis dependence syndrome characterised by an inability to abstain from or to control cannabis use, is one of the potential adverse effects of chronic cannabis use.

The very nature of undercover work is such that it creates suspicion, fear and "paranoia" in agents; the fear of serious bodily harm is common. This in itself is enough to drive the use of cannabis outside strict policy guidelines, so that the undercover agents will feel more secure in his or her identity.

Cannabis is a drug which can cause euphoria and some agents will find its effects a welcome relief from the stresses of undercover work. Associated with this risk there is a further significant risk that because cannabis is a pleasurable drug to use, agents may find it difficult to abstain from using it recreationally after termination.

Despite the delays in its recognition, cannabis dependence is now recognised as an important and significant syndrome requiring specialised assessment and treatment.

The risk of developing the syndrome is probably in the order of:

One chance in 10 among those who ever use the drug; between one in five and one in three who use more than a few times and around one in two among those who become daily users of the drug.

As with all drugs of dependence, persons who use cannabis on a daily basis over periods of weeks to months, are at greatest risk of becoming dependent upon it. (Hall et al).

Undercover agents who use cannabis daily for weeks at a time, may have between a 20% and 50% chance of becoming dependent on cannabis while they are deployed.

The sporadic use of cannabis is not risky; the more frequently cannabis is used the greater the chance of becoming dependent.

The risk of dependence among members of the Police in general, may be lower than the risk among members of the community because of a higher frequency of resilient personality traits among them. However, this advantage may be more than offset among undercover agents by the higher risks of danger and environmental stress which encourages self-medication with cannabis. (Dore and Findlay Jones, 1995)

Undercover agents who continue to use and abuse cannabis after deployment will be at risk of experiencing the following cannabis related problems as reported in Black & Caswell Study, 1990. (For frequent users).
- Memory loss
- Financial problems
- Loss of motivation or energy
- Physical health problems

Even if cannabis is used recreationally without any health problems, the individual social and legal implications are enormous for a serving Police Officer.

Alcohol

Undercover deployments can provide for some agents the opportunity to use alcohol to excess, that is, at a level risky to their health. Recommended safe levels of drinking are as follows:

Safe weekly allowance - not all in one session.
Men: 21 standard units,
Women: 14 standard units

A single drinking session - safe allowance
Men: six standard units
Women: four standard units

One standard drink equals a nip of spirits or a 200ml glass of beer

Short Term Effects

When intoxicated to a level greater than 400 mgms of alcohol per 100 mls of blood, the risk of death through respiratory failure is real.

Over-use of alcohol over a short period can result in concentration and psychomotor skills being deficient, for example, an inability to safely operate equipment or machinery such as motor cars.

Unpleasant reactions can occur with acute intoxication. They are most often reported by inexperienced users of cannabis. One of the most common adverse reactions is the development of anxiety and panic symptoms. Acute anxiety symptoms may include restlessness, a feeling that everything seems unreal, even the user, and a sense of loss of control. The user may develop a fear of dying and become highly suspicious. (Thomas, 1993; Hall, et al 1994).

Intoxication may also be associated with mild levels of suspiciousness and paranoid ideas without a significant anxiety reaction. At higher doses hallucinations may occur, sometimes accompanied by paranoid delusion. These hallucinations usually consist of vision, but occasionally the person hears voices. They are not a common experience for most users. Mild, short-lived depression may follow cannabis use (Thomas 1993).

Long Term Effects
The long term effects of over-use of alcohol can be summarised as follows in that it may cause:

- emotional problems
- anxiety or depression
- social/ lifestyle problems
- nervous system damage, e.g. brain damage
- liver damage

Dependency

There is the ever present risk of both physical and psychological addiction to alcohol.

Psychological/ Physical/ Psychiatric Factors
Undercover deployment may have distressing psychological and physical consequences for you. The principal ones identified in recent research being:

- Major psychiatric disorders, eg, anxiety disorder, major depression, post traumatic stress disorder
- Painful reassessment of personal values
- Paranoid feelings
- Guilt
- Insomnia
- Weight gain
- Risky behaviour

(Dore and Findlay-Jones. 1995)

4.2 THAT the promisor acknowledges that there may be other adverse effects from the use of drugs and alcohol not mentioned in this deed or which have not been identified.

5. AGENT’S RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1 THAT I have fully and truthfully disclosed all medical or psychological conditions for which I have currently or previously received treatment.

5.2 THAT I have not and do not knowingly suffer from any problem arising from the use of alcohol or any licit or illicit drug, or from any traumatic event or events.

5.3 THAT I acknowledge, whilst the ongoing health and welfare of agents is the responsibility of the ‘Your Country’ Police, and that medical and psychological support will be provided throughout deployment and post deployment, my health and welfare is also my personal responsibility. I understand that I have a crucial role to play in this area. I have read and fully understand the Health and Welfare Protocols in the Undercover Policy Manual, and the Undercover Procedure Manual.
5.4 THAT I will follow the procedures and guidelines as specified in the Undercover Policy Manual and the Undercover Procedure Manual.

6. GENERAL

6.1 THAT the provisions of this Deed shall survive and endure for the life of the Promisor and shall also operate and apply in relation to all documents which contain, and other persons who have been informed of, the information.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Promisor has duly executed this Deed on the day and the year first above written.

SIGNED SEALED AND DELIVERED BY:

____________________________
(signature of Promisor)

In the presence of ____________________________
(full name of Witness)

____________________________
(signature of Witness)

____________________________
(address and occupation of Witness)
Appendix B  Weekly Report

UNDERCOVER  WEEKLY SUMMARY

OPERATION:  Name  WEEK ENDING:  date

GENERAL SUMMARY OF OFFENDERS - PURCHASES MADE:

PLANS FOR THIS WEEK

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

MATTERS REQUIRING ATTENTION

INTELLIGENCE GAINED/DRUG INFORMATION

EVIDENTIAL PURCHASES AND COST.

DATE   TYPE OF DRUG

CONTACT WITH UNDERCOVER TRAINERS/COACHES

AGENT COACH   YES / NO
HANDLER COACH  YES / NO

AGENT'S COMMENTS

SIGNED  Handler:  ________________  Agent:  ________________

DATE:  ______  2000
APPENDIX C Six Weekly Report

(Security Classification)
UNDERCOVER
SIX-WEEKLY REPORT

OPERATION: Name
PERIOD: between dates
AGENT: Agent Number
TYPE OF DEPLOYMENT: Long / Short / Evidential / Cover / Intelligence
PENETRATION PROGRESS:
PROSECUTIONS INITIATED AND PENDING:
INTELLIGENCE OF SPECIFIC VALUE TO (intelligence section) AND (drug section):
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED:
SUITABILITY OF AGENT:
AGENT’S HEALTH:
DAYS R AND R TAKEN BY AGENT DURING THIS PERIOD:
FINANCIAL DETAILS
Weekly Budget Assigned:
Cost of Deployment:
Living Expenses:
Extraordinary costs:
Total costs for period:
Weekly average of living costs:
Evidential Expenditure:
VEHICLE:
  Fleet number =
  Start mileage =
  Finish mileage =

  Petrol and oil =
  Repairs:

  WOF expiry date =
  Registration expiry date =

AGENT’S COMMENTS:

Signed: ___________________  ___________________
  Handler                        Undercover Agent

Supervisor’s Comments

Supervisor ___________________

District Commander ________________

Date ________________
OPERATION: Name

PERIOD: between dates

AGENT: Agent Number

TYPE OF DEPLOYMENT: Long / Short / Evidential / Cover / Intelligence

PENETRATION PROGRESS:

PROSECUTIONS INITIATED AND PENDING:

INTELLIGENCE OF SPECIFIC VALUE TO (intelligence section) AND (drug section):

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED:

SUITABILITY OF AGENT:

AGENT’S HEALTH:

DAYS R AND R TAKEN BY AGENT DURING THIS PERIOD:

FINANCIAL DETAILS

Weekly Budget Assigned:
Cost of Deployment:
Living Expenses:
Extraordinary costs:
Total costs for period:
Weekly average of living costs:
Evidential Expenditure:

VEHICLE:
Fleet number =
Start mileage =
Finish mileage =

Petrol and oil =
Repairs:
Certificate of Fitness expiry date =
Registration expiry date =

AGENT’S COMMENTS:

Signed: ___________________  ___________________
Handler  Undercover Agent

Supervisor’s Comments

Supervisor  ___________________

District Commander  ___________________

Date  _______________
POST OPERATION DEBRIEF

DEBRIEF OBJECTIVE

The objective of a debrief is to critically examine in a constructive manner the way in which an operation has been carried out in all its phases.

It is not an opportunity for destructive comment or criticism, nor is it an opportunity or forum for self promotion. What it is, is a forum to constructively examine what has been done, how it was done, what has been learnt from it and how improvements can be implemented.

OPERATION: Name

PERIOD: Between dates

AGENT: Agent Number

The operation ran through various phases during its course and it is proposed to deal with each of these phases in turn and invite comment as we go through.

The phases which will be dealt with are:

1. Original information and intelligence gathering.
2. Operational planning
3. Deployment
4. Undercover Agent Cover
5. Undercover Agent Cover Employment
6. Undercover Agent Accommodation
7. Undercover Agent’s Vehicle
8. Termination Planning
   Execution
9. Operation Security
10 Handler
11 Supervisor
12 District Commander
12 Liaison: Intelligence Unit
13 Surveillance
14 Intelligence Analysis Section
15 Asset Seizure
16 Finance/Logistics
17 General Comments
# APPENDIX F  Undercover Agent Daily Notes

## DRAFT of a DAILY NOTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.30am</td>
<td>This is where you put the text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.30am</td>
<td>This is where you put the next entry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For conversations that are important record them in the 1st person:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I said</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He said</td>
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<td>Town or City</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Day/Month/Year</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
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My full assumed name is First name/Middle name/LAST NAME. I am an undercover agent attached to (which ever unit you are attached to). I am currently deployed in (Town or City) under the control and supervision of (Handlers Name).

At ...............  

Note:  
(The Statement must be in legible handwriting, and set out in logical and chronological order. It must contain all detail outlined in the paragraph on evidential statements, refer page 58).
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**RESTRICTED**
UNDERCOVER TRAINING COURSE

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Syllabus

Lesson Plans

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2. Administration Matters

3. Introductions

4. Handlers Partners Introduction

5. Course Photographs

6. Physical Training

7. Social Function

8. Recording Evidence

9. Drug Use Reporting

10. Law & Agent Provocateur

11. Property Offences

12. Cannabis Drug Knowledge

13. Earnings-Payments

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43. Cover

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FOREWORD

RATIONALE FOR UNDCP ENFORCEMENT TRAINING IN MOU COUNTRIES

Introduction

Various UNDCP projects have provision for the delivery of law enforcement training to police and other agencies in MOU countries. Unless there is effective co-ordination and control in this type of assistance there is distinct possibility of duplication and/or wastage through unstructured, disjointed, inappropriate or inadequate teaching. It is therefore considered desirable to specify the levels of training that are contemplated within UNDCP project documents and to impose standards to be observed within certain subject areas. For the most part, this can be achieved by prescribing model-training packages for specific topics or subject groupings.

General Concept

Professional and efficient law enforcement depends on the knowledge, skills and initiative of the officers involved. Knowledge and skill are largely imparted through training.

Officers deployed to drug enforcement duty should be adequately prepared for that work and receive training appropriate to their duties. They should be regularly up-dated on enforcement issues and suitably briefed for specific operations. A training needs analysis should be conducted to determine the precise training requirements of personnel assigned to particular areas of enforcement. This must be based on an assessment of the skills and abilities necessary in those work divisions and the design of training curricula within enforcement departments will be largely dictated by the department’s role in the national drug enforcement structure. Designing curricula is a specialised discipline and UNDCP can offer assistance to personnel engaged in such tasks.

Levels of Training

UNDCP drug law enforcement training will focus on four levels:

• Basic Training
Basic Training

Basic drug enforcement training can normally be delivered within agencies but there should be a standard course syllabus based on the knowledge and skills necessary for officers of each particular department. With greater or lesser emphasis according to the role of the officer’s department, it is generally agreed that a basic level drug investigator should:

- Have a good working knowledge of the drug laws of his/her country
- Know the nature of evidence and understand what can constitute evidence in drug cases
- Know the character of drugs and be able to recognise drugs in various forms
- Know the character of precursor chemicals and be able to recognise them
- Know when to refer a matter to an officer better able to deal with it
- Be able to recognise irregular or suspicious behaviour and, where appropriate, investigate it
- Be able to recognize forged, counterfeit, and other suspicious documents
- Be able to conduct a full and proper interview of a witness or person with information
- Be able to conduct a full and proper interview of a suspect
- Be able to read the body language of persons being questioned or observed
- Be able to apply for warrants or other authority to search and/or arrest, where appropriate
- Be able to conduct a competent search of people, baggage, cargo, premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft
- Be able to use drug field testing kits
- Be able to operate drug detector equipment used by his/her agency
- Be able to handle exhibits properly and competently
- Be able to cultivate sources of information and perform basic intelligence functions
- Be able to accurately report observations and events
- Be able to conduct a basic crime scene examination
- Be able to take fingerprint and footprint impressions of persons under investigation
- Be able to compile a dossier of documents for forwarding to the prosecutor
- Be able to competently testify in court
- Be able to work with citizen groups, NGOs and officials from other units or departments
- Be able to wisely exercise the powers and authority entrusted in him/her.

**Supervisor Training**

Supervisor training can also normally be delivered within agencies pursuant to a syllabus based on the knowledge and skills necessary for that department’s officers.

As with basic training, and again with greater or lesser emphasis according to the anti-drug functions of the officer’s department, it is possible to identify in general terms the skills and knowledge required of a drug enforcement supervisor. He or she should be able to:

- Do all those things that subordinates can do
- Plan, organise, direct and lead team or group activities
- Check documents submitted for forwarding for prosecution to ensure that all required papers are present or accounted for
- Co-ordinate the functions of officials from different units or departments
- Consistently demonstrate good qualities of leadership and people management
- Recognise situations where a controlled delivery may be employed to advantage and be able to propose a case for higher consideration
- Take charge of a crime scene and allocate investigatory functions to staff
- Solve problems
- Form well-reasoned risk assessments
- Make sound decisions
- Eloquently express himself/herself to other people - in speech and in writing
- Logically debate issues with other people and at public meetings
- Motivate subordinates, citizen groups and other people
- Prepare accurate profiles of drug dealers and couriers
• Assess the weight of evidence in given cases

• In appropriate circumstances, authorize or obtain authority to search people and/or places for evidence of offences

• Adopt or approve the adoption of investigative strategies, operational tactics and suppression activities appropriate to circumstances

• Prepare submissions for higher authority on matters pertaining to drug enforcement, financial administration and the deployment of resources

• Suitably respond to questions from the media on enforcement activities.

**Management and Command Training**

Dependent upon the capacities and facilities of the national agencies involved, this training may be either conducted within the department or selected officers can be sent to outside training courses or other forms of tuition. The required skills are based on perceptions [canvassed at regional workshops and seminars] that officers with senior command and management responsibilities in drug enforcement should be able to:

• Effectively and efficiently manage and administer the resources under their control

• Know the capacity of subordinates and utilise their skills to best advantage

• Be aware of the existence and development of specialist techniques available for deployment

• Formulate enforcement strategies and tactics appropriate to particular situations

• Plan and direct anti-drug activities at command level

• Understand the concepts of enforcement mutual assistance and know the procedures for requesting and providing assistance to other jurisdictions in given circumstances.

• Approve, arrange and co-ordinate a controlled delivery of drugs or other commodity

• Organise facilities and resources to best effect

• Personally lead major operations

• Co-ordinate with other departments at senior level

• Exercise proper financial controls

• Devise methods of identifying, stamping out and minimising scope for internal corruption and/or other unethical conduct
• Demonstrate good judgement in all things and present a fitting image in the media

• Exercise with proper prudence any special powers invested in him/ her for the suppression and or investigation of crime.

Specialist Training

Specialist training can be delivered within or outside national enforcement agencies. UNDCP assistance in this regard must only be given in those areas of expertise as are acceptable within the jurisdictions concerned. It is not intended to provide training in activities, which do not have legal approval in the country involved [such as telephone tapping and the use of concealed listening devices.] Topics in this category could include:

• Surveillance [including the use of electronic devices]
• Modern investigative techniques
• Communications interception
• Other technical support activity
• Advanced intelligence analysis
• Asset tracing and seizure
• Money laundering
• Undercover activities
• Controlled deliveries
• Managing informants
• Witness protection schemes

Curriculum Construction

Once the levels of knowledge and skill required in the respective agencies have been identified, the process may then begin of designing curricula by which the training can be delivered.

As mentioned earlier, curriculum design is a specialised discipline and careful thought must be applied to the means of delivery most appropriate to the position of the personnel receiving instruction. The amount of time devoted to any particular topic will be dictated by its relevance to the officer’s duty.

Besides tuition in functions relative to the responsibilities of the officer’s department, modern enforcement training should also include subjects on human rights, organisational values, interpersonal relationships, human dignity and accountability. Ways of avoiding prejudice, hypocrisy, stereotyping, misguided parochialism and other bad practice should also be covered.
So, too, should instruction in the proper exercise of enforcement powers - including the use of force - and sufficient time should be allowed for meaningful discussion on the range of ethical considerations contained in the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.

**Delivery of Training**

Training may be delivered by way of:

- Class-room based courses of instruction
- On-the-job training
- Training workshops, seminars and sessions
- Coaching and mentoring
- CD Rom interactive training
- Sponsoring attendance at regional educational institutions [including ILEA, Bangkok]
- Study tours and
- Funding attendance at selected overseas courses.

**Regional Projects with Major Law Enforcement Training Components**

Projects with substantial enforcement training components are delivered to MOU countries from the UNDCP Regional Centre, Bangkok. Currently, there are five such projects in hand. They are the CD Rom Basic Training Project, the Cross-Border Co-operation Project, the Prosecutorial and Judicial Training Project, the Intelligence Project and the Enforcement Operational Procedures Project. The first two are largely concerned with improving skills for interdicting drugs and precursor chemicals at the distribution/delivery stage. The next provides knowledge and professional skills for prosecutors and judges engaged in drug crime work and the latter two are mainly aimed at developing enforcement techniques and strategies for identifying and gathering evidence against key figures in the regional drugs trade.

All five encourage the development of internal co-ordination, international co-operation, professional competence and personal commitment. Most projects have provision to employ consultants with expertise in relevant areas and, under the guidance of the co-ordinator, to produce training materials which have specific or general application.

**Progressive Drug Enforcement Training**

The concept of progressive training is that tuition is delivered at times and at a pace consistent with the employment of individuals in drug enforcement work. Within enforcement agencies, officers newly moving to a post with drug enforcement functions would normally undertake basic training to provide the necessary grounding for their new role. Those advancing in rank, position or experience could receive supervisor level tuition - delivered in the format most suitable to their situations.

Officers taking up mid-level management or command responsibilities should be instructed at the management level - again, training being delivered in the manner most appropriate to their particular circumstances.
Enforcement Training Arranged by Country Offices

Where country offices have projects, which involve the delivery of training to law enforcement personnel within that country, such training should fit within the overall UNDCP regional enforcement training plan and the policy outlined herein. It is essential that all training be appropriate to the level of persons being trained, that it be consistent with national situations, that it comply with the laws of the jurisdiction involved, that it recognise human rights and UN principles, that it form part of an incremental training initiative and that it be delivered by competent people.

To ensure uniformity and a co-ordinated organisational approach, it is desirable that MOU country offices planning to arrange law enforcement training submit proposals to the Regional Centre, Bangkok, for the consideration of the enforcement professionals located there.

Sponsoring Students to Attend ILEA Training Courses

An International Law Enforcement Academy based in Bangkok offers training courses on selected enforcement topics for students from most countries in the region. That training generally fits well with UNDCP objectives and UNDCP funds could be properly be expended in sending persons to ILEA conducted courses where the training is consistent with the terms of this document.

Training Review Committee

In order to ensure that law enforcement training designed [or otherwise intended for delivery] within MOU countries is consistent, relevant and appropriate, it may be necessary in the near future to create a Training Review Committee to examine all training proposals, syllabi or materials.

It would be the function of such a Committee to approve or reject proposals and no UNDCP training would be delivered or received in law enforcement topics unless it had been approved by the Training Review Committee and no UNDCP funds would be expended on sending people to training that has not been so approved.

It is envisaged that such a Training Review Committee would comprise people with enforcement training experience who may or may not be from within UNDCP and that, perhaps, three such people would constitute a meeting of the Committee.

Model Training Packages

Training packages to be produced in the present series of Projects B65 and C46 are as follows:

I Basic Intelligence
II Controlled Delivery
III Undercover Work
IV Surveillance
V  Mutual Assistance
VI  Asset Seizure
VII  Evidence Collection & Presentation
VIII  Command & Leadership
IX  Advanced Intelligence Analysis

In each case, the training notes will be based on a model Policy and Guidelines document which it is suggested each country adopt [with suitable modifications to fit with law and organisation structures] for its enforcement agencies.

Future funding may allow for the development of more packages covering a wider range of topics but the present series will be confined to those listed above.

Confidentiality

Because the material contained in the training notes includes details of operational enforcement procedures, it is necessary to restrict their distribution to law enforcement agencies only.

Regional Centre Co-operation and Assistance

The functions of drug law enforcement are substantially the same world-wide and problems confronted in one jurisdiction are invariably similar to those faced in other places. Sharing information, providing details of successful strategies, receiving students for training from other jurisdictions, adopting substantially the same procedures, granting mutual assistance and providing other operational co-operation can all contribute to a consolidated global offensive against a common problem. There have long been calls for communities and countries to stand united against drugs. Similar emphasis should be placed on law enforcement agencies also standing together to present a united front against those who profit from the production and distribution of such illicit substances. To that end, the UNDCP Regional Centre, Bangkok, is willing to co-operate with any agency wishing to improve its training in the fight against the drug menace and will be pleased to share expertise with them.

Comments Invited

The UNDCP Regional Centre, Bangkok, will be happy to receive comments on how training packages might be improved. Such advice should be sent to the Co-ordinator, Projects B65 and C46, at the address on the letterhead.
HOW TO USE THE MANUAL

Manual Structure

This manual comprises three volumes.

1. Undercover Policy Manual
   This volume covers policy relating to undercover operations.

2. Undercover Procedure Manual
   This volume is the partner to the Policy Manual. It provides information about specialist services and procedures that officers will use in the course of an undercover operation.

3. Undercover Training Manual
   This volume contains some training material, relating to undercover operations. Not all details of undercover training are contained in this manual, as the nature of undercover policing essentially involves specialised and covert policing techniques. These techniques are highly protected and the success of worldwide undercover programmes, relies on strict secrecy and confidentiality.

Each volume begins with a table of contents and ends with an index. The index is specific to that volume - topics that do not appear in the volume do not appear in its index.

Each chapter is divided into several sections. These are headed according to the content of the topic.

Policy

This deals with policy issues of undercover operations and represents the best practice gleaned from years of experience. It will prove invaluable to those involved in undercover operations.

Procedures

This gives the ‘how to’. Although the instructions are usually rough in chronological order, they are there for reference and are not meant to be in strict time line.

Cross References

Please note: If an introduction states that the chapter must be read in conjunction with another chapter or volume, it is necessary to read both chapters in order to gain a full understanding of the topic.

General

This Undercover Training Manual, the Undercover Policy Manual and the Undercover Procedure Manual, are part of a series of manuals and policies for covert investigative techniques which set out standards for...

This Undercover Training Manual is a live document, which will be subject to periodic updating and a comprehensive review. Suggestions for inclusion or amendment may be sent to the Project Coordinator, UNDCP, Regional Centre, Bangkok.

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**Security**

**General Security**

It is public knowledge that the police conduct undercover operations. As with anything secret, these operations are a source of curiosity to other police officers and the public.

Releasing information on any aspects of undercover operations conflict with the principle, that the safety and security of undercover agents is of paramount importance. Any piece of information disclosed may seriously compromise operational security.

The integrity of undercover operations and their continued viability therefore require strict confidentiality by all police officers.

All product gained from undercover deployments will be evaluated, kept securely and only disseminated in accordance with an approved code of practice for the recording and dissemination of intelligence material.

---

**Disclosure of Methodology & Manuals**

The product of undercover operations may be used in evidence.

The methods used in undercover operations, together with any product gained, and are potentially disclosable in the event of these proceedings.

Law enforcement agencies should take all reasonable steps to protect the methodology employed in undercover operations through applications for public interest immunity, even in cases where the product is intended for use in evidence.

Ultimately, whether information should be disclosed depends on the circumstances of each case, bearing in mind that prosecutions stemming from undercover operations often involve a greater need for confidentiality.
Security Classification of Documents

The use of protected markings on case papers, documents and policies should be adopted. Standard markings are:

- Restricted
- Confidential
- Secret
- Top Secret

Documents should be stored and disseminated appropriate to their security classification. Care must be taken to avoid over-classification. Documents should be regularly reviewed and assessed to determine whether the initial classification still applies.

Consideration should be given to reducing the marking at an appropriate time. For example, at the outset of an undercover operation all material will be highly classified to protect the undercover agent and the operation. However, after the arrest and prosecution many of the papers could be declassified to ‘restricted’ as this information is now within the public domain.

Undercover training, methodology and these instructional manuals should be protected at all times to ensure that this specialist covert technique remains ‘secret’ and the ongoing safety of deployed undercover agents, worldwide is ensured.
Pre Selection Course

Introduction
A pre selection course should be conducted by a specialist Undercover Unit, or by using experienced handlers and undercover agents in an assessment and instructional role.

Prospective undercover agents selected for the Pre-Selection Course are those who have successfully completed initial screening by the Police District, a Medical Adviser, and/or a Welfare Officer.

The main purpose of the course is to select suitable undercover agent applicants to attend the Undercover Training Course.

Objective
The objectives of the pre training assessment are:-

- to assess applicants strengths and weaknesses.

- The applicant to learn relevant law in classroom situation.

- The applicant to return to their police area with increased knowledge and skills irrelevant of whether they progress to the undercover training environment.

- Assess whether the applicant is suitable to progress to training, suitable for district based deployments (test purchases) at this stage of their career, or unsuitable for this type of duty.

- Applicant will gain a better appreciation of what is involved in an undercover operation, therefore making a better-informed decision as to whether they wish to be involved.

Syllabus
The course should consist of two main areas:-

- Assessment
- Training

The assessment content should cover :-

- Panel interviews
- Psychological assessment

A suggested training content should include :-

- Ethics & Policy (only relevant policy)
- Relevant Law
• Occupational Health & Safety  
  (Harmful effects of drugs, alcohol & stress)  
• Role of an undercover agent  
• Agent deeds  
• Preparation of basic cover

PowerPoint Presentations

The following PowerPoint presentations have been attached to this manual.

1 Course Opening  
2 Occupational Health & Safety  
3 Role of an Undercover Agent  
4 Agent Deeds  
5 Preparation of Basic Cover

Lesson Plans

A suggested training format has been attached in the format of lesson plans.

NOTE:

The course topics do not include the interview panel format or the assessment phases, which are also required during this course.
1. Course Opening/Ethics

**COURSE OPENING – ETHICS**

**PRESENTER:**

Senior Commissioned Officer  
(Administration Matters by Training Staff)

**MATERIALS:**

PowerPoint projection equipment.  
PowerPoint Presentation Number 1.  
Speakers own notes on Police ethics made prior to the opening address.

**AIM:**

- The course will be opened  
- Participants will have knowledge of the support for undercover policing from the Police administration  
- Participants will have knowledge of the ethical concerns in relation to undercover policing  
- Participants will have introduced themselves  
- Training Staff will have introduced themselves  
- Course timings and course rules will have been explained  
- Accommodation details arranged  
- Chain of command and complaint procedure explained

**METHOD:**

Through oral presentations using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation and input from participants.

Participants introduce themselves and give a brief summary of their Police background, they also summarise their knowledge of undercover policing.

Administration and Training Staff introduce themselves and state their roles.

Staff rosters and timings outlined for any specific duties.

The lesson schedule will be placed on a whiteboard in front of the class each day or half day ahead.
2. Occupational Health & Safety

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY

PRESENTER:

Health Professional(s) and/or a Welfare Officer.

MATERIALS:

OHP if required.
PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 2.
Speakers own notes and reference material.

AIM:

• The participants will know the dangers of alcohol, drugs and stress as they relate to undercover policing.

• The participants will have knowledge of the support for undercover agents from the Police administration.

• Participants will have been fairly informed of the possible dangers and health risks related to undercover policing.

METHOD:

Through oral presentations using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation and input from participants.
3. Role of an Undercover Agent

ROLE OF AN UNDERCOVER AGENT

PRESENTER:
Training Staff

MATERIALS:
PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 3.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:
Following the lesson the participants will:

- Know the definition of an undercover agent.
- Know the person specifications of an undercover agent.
- Know the role of an undercover agent.

METHOD:
Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation, with reference to the Undercover Manuals.

**Note:
This session will not go into any great detail about undercover techniques or methodology.

**Note: Not all of these participants will complete training and therefore only limited information about the undercover programme should be given throughout the course.
4. Agent Deeds

AGENT DEEDS

PRESENTER:

Course Coordinator

MATERIALS:

Speakers own notes.
Undercover Manuals.
PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 4.

AIM:

- The agent deeds will have been explained.

- Participants will have knowledge of the contents of the deeds and have been given an individual copy each to study.

- Participants will understand that they are required to study the agent deeds overnight to consider before signing the following day.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation.

Agent deeds are to be signed by each applicant to confirm that they are volunteers and that they agree to the conditions of the deed.

Those officers, who do not sign the Agent Deed, do not progress further and cease to be involved in the undercover programme. They are removed from the course and their travel is arranged back to their home station.
5. Preparation of Basic Cover

PREPARATION OF BASIC COVER

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 5.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

• Participants will know how to construct basic personal cover.

• Participants will be familiar with the standard of cover that is required.

• Participants will have knowledge of the ethical concerns in relation to using this basic cover to practice prior to receiving any formal training.

• Participants will be aware that they may need to have a ‘cover’ explanation for their time away from normal duties.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation.

Practical experience drawn on and discussed with participants by an experienced handler.
Handler Course

Introduction

The primary aim of the handler’s course is to confirm District selections of handlers by testing the participants’ suitability to manage undercover agents. The prospective handlers should also be assessed by a health professional.

Special emphasis is placed on undercover agent welfare and experience from previous operations is studied. This enables handlers to appreciate the considerable responsibility involved in managing an undercover agent.

The course enables members contemplating being involved in undercover operations to consider a wider range of factors before being able to prepare and submit undercover operation plans.

This course will focus on teaching handlers how to prepare an ‘appreciation’ outlining all the factors in a crime problem, all the options available to address the crime problem, and what risk assessments are required.

Objective

The course should run for five days, and at the conclusion, three categories of personnel will be identified:

- Those who can submit an appreciation along with an operational plan and can run a long term undercover agent
- Those who would be suitable for co-ordinating short term ‘District Deployments’ (i.e. Test Purchases)
- Those who should not be involved in undercover policing

Syllabus

The suggested course should consist of two main areas:-

- Training
- Assessment

The assessment content should cover:-

- Psychological
- Problem solving abilities
- Preparation of operational plans
The training content should include:

- Ethics, security & confidentiality
- History of undercover policing
- Role of handlers
- Role of undercover agents
- Selection of undercover agents
- Identifying & assessing crime problems
- Intelligence processes
- The penetration of target groups & cover
- Operation Orders & Orders Groups
- Debriefing undercover agents
- Planning
- Risk Assessments
- Health & Welfare issues - operational
- Limitations in covert policing techniques
- Termination of short term undercover operations
- Operational case studies

**PowerPoint Presentations**

The following PowerPoint presentations have been included with this manual.

1. Course Opening
2. Role of a Handler
3. Role of Undercover Agents
4. Selection of Undercover Agents
5. Identifying & Assessing Crime Problems
6. Collecting Intelligence
7. Penetration and Cover
8. Operation Orders & Orders Groups
9. Debriefing Undercover Agents
10. Risk Assessments
11. Limitations of Informants/ Surveillance/ Electronic Interception

**Lesson Plans**

A suggested training format has been attached in the format of lesson plans.

**NOTE:**

The course topics do not include the interview panel format or the assessment phases, which are also required during this course.
1. Course Opening

COURSE OPENING

PRESENTER:

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 1.

AIM:

Following the lesson course participants will have knowledge of:

• Course content.

• Ethics of Undercover Policing.

• Participants shall have knowledge of Police Administration support for undercover policing.

• Participants will have knowledge of ethical concerns in relation to undercover policing.

• Participants will be aware of the Confidentiality associated to undercover policing and training within the programme.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation.
HISTORY OF UNDERCOVER POLICING

PRESENTER:
Course Coordinator

MATERIALS:
As required.

AIM:
Following the lesson participants will have an appreciation of:

- The History of Undercover Policing

METHOD:
Presentation and discussion by the Course Coordinator on the history of undercover policing in their respective MOU country.

Training Staff should provide some discussion on how the undercover programme is developing in their country to reflect a progressive approach to undercover policing.
3. Role of Handlers

ROLE OF HANDLERS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment
PowerPoint Presentation Number 3.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson participants will:

- Have a working knowledge of what is expected of a Handler.
- Have an understanding of what may be expected of Handlers Partners.

METHOD:

Oral presentation and opportunity for one on one discussion
4. Role of Undercover Agents

ROLE OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 4.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

- Have knowledge of what an undercover agent is.
- Have knowledge of the types of undercover agents.
- Have knowledge of the role of an undercover agent.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation.
5. Selection of Undercover Agents

SELECTION OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 5.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

- Have an understanding of what qualities are looked for in an undercover agent.

- Have knowledge of what is involved in the selection process of undercover agents.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation.
6. Identifying & Assessing Crime Problems

IDENTIFYING & ASSESSING CRIME PROBLEMS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 6.

AIM:

Following the lesson participants will:

• Have knowledge of where to access crime information.

• Have an overview intelligence and its role.

• Have an understanding of what information is available for the preparation of a plan.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation.
COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE

PRESENTER:
Training Staff.

MATERIALS:
PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 7.

AIM:
Following the lesson the participants will:

- Have an understanding of target priorities and profiles.
- Know the importance of gathering and collating intelligence.
- Know the importance of sharing intelligence.
- Know what intelligence should be disseminated during an undercover deployment.
- Know the application of local intelligence systems.

METHOD:
Oral presentation with PowerPoint presentation - group participation
8. Penetration & Cover  PENETRATION & COVER

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 8.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

- Have an appreciation of what is required in the preparation of agent cover.
- Have an understanding of what is required in preparing for an agent’s penetration.
- Have an understanding of how both inter-relate.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation and open forum discussion.
OPERATION ORDERS & ORDERS GROUPS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 9.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

- Have an appreciation of what is required in preparing an Operation Plan and Formal Orders.
- Have an understanding of how to present an Orders Group briefing.
- Have an understanding of what is required in the Orders Group

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation and open forum discussion.
10. Debriefing Undercover Agents

DEBRIEFING UNDERCOVER AGENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment. 
PowerPoint Presentation Number 10. 
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

- Have an understanding of what is required in the debriefing of an undercover agent.
- Have an understanding of their role to that of the undercover agent.
- Have an understanding of the ethics involved in Undercover Policing.
- Adopt problem solving techniques.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation, with classroom role-plays / problem solving scenarios.
11. Debriefing
Undercover Agents 2

DEBRIEFING UNDERCOVER AGENTS 2
(Role Play – Practical)

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None

AIM:

Following the lesson participants will:

• Have a better understanding of what is required in the debriefing of an undercover agent.

• Have an understanding of what their role involves, dependant on the information supplied by an undercover agent.

• Participants will have knowledge of ethical concerns in relation to undercover policing.

• Participants will identify problem-solving techniques.

• Participants will begin to adopt the undercover programme philosophy of openness and honesty with each other.

METHOD:

Practical exercise in debriefing, and open discussion on points to note by course coordinators and training staff.
12. Examination

EXAMINATION

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

(Pre course material in the form of a ‘Policy manual’, should be sent to each attending participant. This examination is to test the participants on their knowledge of the policy and to evaluate their preparation for the course)

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The Training Staff will be able to make an assessment of the knowledge held by participants of the Undercover Policy Manual.

- The Training Staff will be able to make an assessment of the commitment of participants through knowledge of pre-course material.

- The Training Staff will be able to make an assessment of the participant’s ability to logically think through potential agent situations.

METHOD:

Written examination in exam room conditions
13. Examination Debrief  EXAMINATION DEBRIEF

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment
(A prepared PowerPoint presentation of the examination answers)

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The applicants will have an understanding of the examination.
- The applicants will know the answers to questions.

METHOD:

PowerPoint presentation and discussion.
PREPARATION OF OPERATIONAL PLAN

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals and prepared crime problems.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

• Have put the theory received to practical application
• Identify what Policing methods should be considered in addressing a particular Crime Problem
• Be aware of factors to consider in plan compilation
• Identify in the preparation of an undercover agent deployment:
  • How they will deploy the undercover agent
  • What sort of person is required as the agent
  • What sort of cover is required
• Include a detailed Criminal Intelligence plan
• Include a Command chart, identify the function of each person
• Include what Health and Welfare factors need to be considered

METHOD:

Participants will prepare a draft plan in syndicate groups, including budget, operational briefing orders, method of penetration, length of deployment, and cover details.

This is usually completed overnight. If you have enough crime problems to issue to the participants, they should work alone on the preparation of the plan and orders overnight.
PRESENTER:

Course Participants.

MATERIALS:

As required

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• The Training Staff will have an assessment of the knowledge held by participants of the Undercover Policy, and plan presentation.

• The Training Staff will have an assessment of the commitment of participants.

• Participants will have a better understanding of what other options were available to them.

• Participants will identify areas that they had overlooked, and the relevance of these considerations.

• Participants will self-generate original planning ideas for operational deployments / covers / plans

METHOD:

Oral presentation and review of written plans submitted
DEBRIEF WRITTEN & ORAL ORDERS

PRESENTATION:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

As required

AIM:

Following the lesson participants will:

- Identify areas they should focus on
- Identify areas they did not consider
- Have an understanding of what is required in a plan
- Have an understanding of target priorities

METHOD:

Through oral presentations and input from participants.
17. Risk Assessments  

RISK ASSESSMENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.  
PowerPoint Presentation Number 17.  
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• Identify what a risk assessment is
• Be aware of factors to consider in completing a risk assessment
• Understand the general risks of undercover policing
• Understand ethical risks
• Understand Personal risks
• Understand operational risks

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation and input from participants.
HEALTH & WELFARE – OPERATIONAL

PRESENTER:
Health Professional and/or a Welfare Officer.

MATERIALS:
As required.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:
Following the lesson participants will:

• Have an understanding of the Health and Welfare protocols of the undercover programme.

• Have an understanding of the roles of a ‘district guardian’ post operation.

• Understand the role of Health Professionals and Welfare Officers with the undercover programme.

• Understand what assistance Welfare Officers can give to Agent Handlers.

METHOD:
Oral presentation by the Health Professional and/or a Welfare Officer.
LIMITATIONS OF INFORMANTS-SURVEILLANCE AND ELECTRONIC INTERCEPTION

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number 19.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson all participants will know:

- The limitations of informers.
- When the use of informers is considered.
- Factors to be considered when utilising informers.
- Limitations and requirements of Surveillance.
- Limitations and requirements of electronics.

METHOD:

Presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation and discussion by training staff.

This session is more of an informal session where experienced undercover training staff discuss the different approaches that can be used, those that have succeeded and those that have failed.
20. Case Study

CASE STUDY

PRESENTER:
Invited Guest Speaker.

MATERIALS:
As required

AIM:
Following the lesson participants will have an appreciation of:

- An undercover deployment involving the establishment of cover
- The problems encountered
- Methods adopted to record evidence

METHOD:
Presentation by speaker from their own notes and experience as either an undercover agent or a handler
OPERATION TERMINATIONS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals.
Local Termination File from MOU Country

AIM:

Following the lesson participants will:

- Have an understanding of termination policy
- Have an understanding of termination folders
- Have an understanding of target priorities

METHOD:

Through oral presentation and input from participants.

This session is where experienced undercover training staff discuss the different approaches that can be used those that have succeeded and those that have failed in terminating short-term undercover operations.

It will give participants a chance to learn how to correctly prepare for a termination.

This session will require preparation and practical examples from the MOU country and will need to be prepared in advance by the individual taking the lecture.
22. Course Debrief

COURSE DEBRIEF

PRESENTER:
Course Coordinator and Training Staff

MATERIALS:
None

AIM:
Following the lesson:

- The coordinators will have an assessment of what was worthwhile from the course.

- How the course can be improved for the future.

METHOD:

Open discussion to critique the course and written notes about the value of each topic covered.
PARTICIPANT APPRAISALS

PRESENTER:
Course Coordinator

MATERIALS:
None

AIM:
Following this session participants will:

• Know how well they achieved on the course
• Know whether they successfully completed the course
• Be able to identify areas where they need to improve

METHOD:
Individual interviews with each participant.
24. Informal Case Study  

INFORMAL CASE STUDY

PRESENTER:
Invited Guest Speaker or Training Staff

MATERIALS:
As required

AIM:
Following the lesson participants will:

• Have knowledge of previous operation(s).
• Get ideas for future operations.

METHOD:
Through oral presentations informal discussions.

** Time to be utilised whilst individual participant appraisals take place.

View and discuss, old Operational Plans and old termination files.
Undercover Training Course

Introduction
The undercover training course should be held at a covert location to determine which of the prospective applicants will be deployed as undercover agents.

Objective
The objective of an undercover training course is to enable undercover agents and handlers, as a team, to:

- Identify unknown offenders involved in crime.
- Identify the continued course of business of criminal enterprise.
- Provide quality sustainable evidence on serious criminal offenders.
- Provide evidential backing for asset seizure and proceeds of crime action.
- Apprehend offenders where traditional methods of policing have proven inefficient or unsuccessful.
- Provide quality current intelligence on criminals and their activities.
- Provide quality intelligence that can reduce the incidence and effects of crime.

Syllabus
The undercover training course should be comprehensive, run over a period of two weeks and include both assessment phases and training delivery.

UNDERCOVER AGENTS

Assessment
- Increased knowledge of law
- Increased knowledge of covert policing strategies
- Increased knowledge of policy and procedure

Training
- Self motivation techniques
- Increased Knowledge of drugs/ drug use/ drug prices
- Improve interpersonal skills
- Improve ability to communicate with criminal community
- Enhance problem solving techniques
- Improved policing techniques through enhanced knowledge of criminal behaviour
HANDLERS

Training
- Increased Knowledge of drugs/ drug use/ drug prices
- Improve interpersonal skills
- Enhance problem solving techniques
- Staff management / supervision skills
- Financial control
- Problem solving techniques
- Motivation techniques
- Operational planning

SUPERVISORS

Training
- Increased Knowledge of drugs/ drug use/ drug prices
- Improve interpersonal skills
- Enhance problem solving techniques
- Staff management/ supervision skills
- Financial control
- Problem solving techniques
- Motivation techniques
- Operational planning

The suggested training course should include :-

- Ethics and policy
- Security & confidentiality
- The Law & Agent Provocateur
- Legal protection
- Evidence recording
- Drug identification & knowledge
- Accounting procedures
- Drug avoidance techniques
- Dissuading suspicion
- Criminal behaviour.
- Criminal etiquette.
- Criminal gangs & organised crime
- Cover & backstopping
- Counter & Anti surveillance techniques
- Dealing with the law & arrest
- Communication skills
- Negotiation skills
- Motivation skills
- Stress management, health and welfare issues.
- Occupational health and safety issues.
The course assessment should cover :-

- Psychological.
- Problem solving abilities.
- Assessing practical ability to work undercover.

Lesson Plans

A suggested training format has been attached in the format of lesson plans.

NOTE:

The course topics do not include the assessment phases, which are also required during this course.
1. Course Opening

COURSE OPENING

PRESENTER:

Senior Commissioned Officer

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson course participants will have knowledge of:

- Participants shall have knowledge of Police Administration support for undercover policing.
- Ethics of Undercover Policing
- Participants will have knowledge of ethical concerns in relation to undercover policing.
- Participants will be aware of the Confidentiality associated to undercover policing and training within the programme.

METHOD:

Oral presentation.
ADMINISTRATION MATTERS

PRESENTER:
Course coordinator.

MATERIALS:
None.

AIM:
Following the lesson course participants will have knowledge of:

• Course timings.
• Course rules.
• Accommodation details.
• Removal of all Police identification.
• Chain of command & complaint procedures.
• Reinforcement of ethics & security.

METHOD:
Oral presentation outlining the above aims.

Staff rosters and timings outlined for any specific duties.

The lesson schedule will be placed on a whiteboard in front of the class each day or half-day ahead. (The course participants are not given a course schedule and are not told about the course content)

** Note:
Not all of these participants will complete training and therefore only limited information about the undercover programme should be given throughout the course.

If any participant is deemed to be unsuitable for undercover policing duties they are to leave the course immediately so that undercover policing methodology and tactics are kept strictly confidential and secure
3. Introductions

INTRODUCTIONS

PRESENTER:

All course participants.

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson all of the participants and training staff:

- Have knowledge of other participants and their roles.
- Have an overview of tentative types of planned operations.
- Have brief knowledge of agents cover names and cover details

METHOD:

Undercover agents introduce themselves using their cover details, which they must maintain throughout the course. They also give a brief cover history.

Handlers introduce themselves and give a synopsis of any planned deployment that they may have.

Administration and Training Staff introduce themselves and state their roles.
HANDLERS PARTNERS INTRODUCTION

PRESENTER:

Training Staff including Agent and Handler Trainers. If a Health Professional and/or a Welfare Officer is in attendance at the training course he/she should also attend.

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson the handler's partners/wives will:

- Have knowledge of undercover participants and their roles.
- Have an understanding of how they can assist during the course of an undercover deployment.
- Understand the need for strict confidentiality and secrecy.

METHOD:

Group discussion with Training Staff.

Handlers accompanied by their partners attend a joint session where the ethics of undercover policing are reinforced and security and confidentiality is further explained.

Handlers partners are included on the first day of training so that they have an understanding and appreciation of the commitment required from both the handler and the undercover agent.

Health Professional and/or Welfare Officer also spends time with the partners in a private session, just with the partners in a group session. This is where questions can be raised and concerns explored.
5. Course Photographs

COURSE PHOTOGRAPHS

PRESENTER:

Course Coordinator

MATERIALS:

Camera.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• All participants will be photographed.

METHOD:

Individual and Course photographs.
6. Physical Training

PHYSICAL TRAINING

PRESENTER:

All course participants and training staff.

MATERIALS:

Sports equipment as required.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will have:

• Exercised.
• Learned and practiced each other’s names.
• Team built.

The Training Staff will assess group dynamics.

METHOD:

Team sports.
7. Social Function  

SOCIAL FUNCTION

PRESENTER:

All course participants

MATERIALS:

Bar and related equipment.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• All participants will know each other better.

• The Training Staff will have an opportunity to observe group and individual dynamics and observe interpersonal skills.

METHOD:

Observation and participation in social function.
8. Recording Evidence  

RECORDING EVIDENCE

PRESENTER:
Training Staff.

MATERIALS:
Training Staff.
Undercover Manuals.
Previous daily notes and evidential statements
Lesson Handout: Recording of Evidence.

AIM:

Following the lesson both agents and handlers will have an understanding of:

• Daily notes and security of daily notes.
• Evidential statements.
• Handling of exhibits and securing exhibits.
• Chain of evidence.
• Understanding the necessity for ensuring accuracy and completion of notes as soon as possible.

METHOD:

• Oral presentation with reference to Undercover Manuals.
• Oral presentation using previous examples.
• Handouts of previous notes and recording of evidence handout.
• Requirement of agents to submit daily notes to their appointed handler for the day’s events for the remainder of the course.
• Requirement of agents to complete evidential statements for role plays when instructed to by the Training Staff.
• Practice doing daily notes for the day before as a practical exercise.
9. Drug Use Reporting

DRUG USE REPORTING

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number #.
Undercover Manuals.
Previous evidential statements.

AIM:

Following the lesson all course participants will:

- Have a thorough knowledge of drug use policy.
- Have a thorough knowledge of the reporting requirements and regime.
- Be able to record the details in either daily notes or an evidential statement.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation, and the use of manuals and previous evidential statements and daily notes as examples.
10. Law & Agent Provocateur

LAW & AGENT PROVOCATEUR

PRESENTER:
Training Staff

MATERIALS:
Legislation (where applicable).
Undercover Manuals.
PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number #.
Training Staff.

AIM:
Following the lesson the agents and handlers will have an understanding of the relevance and ingredients of the following offences:

• Parties to offences.
• Conspiracies.
• Drug Legislation.
• Burglary and Receiving Offences.
• Attempts.

Following the lesson the agents and handlers will have an understanding of the relevance of:

• Agent Provocateur

METHOD:
Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation.
Discussion of the offences and practical examples used as illustration.
Short answer questionnaire / classroom discussion.
11. Property Offences

PROPERTY OFFENCES

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

Props, (televisions, video recorders, lap top computers, cameras etc.)
Training Staff
Overhead Transparencies where required.

AIM:

Following the lesson the agents and handlers will:

• Have an understanding of a property deal.
• Be aware of the requirements of exhibit handling.
• Know terminology / jargon in relation to stolen property.
• Know the importance of identifying ownership and the location of the offence.

METHOD:

Oral presentation by the Training Staff, highlighting:

• Serial numbers
• Fingerprinting
• Admissions
• Circumstances
• Prices paid
• Knowledge of property
• Accessories
• Disposal excuses

Role plays by Training Staff.
12. Cannabis Drug Knowledge

CANNABIS DRUG KNOWLEDGE

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Cannabis - in various different grades.
Whiteboard.
Packaging.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

• Have knowledge of the different grades of cannabis
• Have knowledge of jargon / terms.
• Have knowledge of packaging and pricing.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using whiteboard.

Discussion about the different jargon and the correct use of the jargon.

Role plays by Training Staff - simple cannabis purchases.
13. Earns-Payments

EARN-S-PAYMENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson all course participants will:

• Understand what ‘earns’ are and how they are paid.
• Understand the documentation requirements.
• Understand the etiquette of earns.
• Be conversant with the law in relation to the technical supply of illicit drugs.

METHOD:

Oral presentation, using previous and practical experience of the Training Staff.

Reference to any legislation and the Undercover Manuals.
14. Cannabis & Cannabis Derivatives

CANNABIS & CANNABIS DERIVATIVES

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

Tobacco, cannabis, cannabis oil, hashish. Bongs, pipes, knives, and papers.

AIM:

Following the lesson the undercover agents will:

- Understand how to roll cannabis cigarettes.
- Understand how pipes/bongs/knives are used in relation to cannabis and cannabis derivatives.
- Understand jargon/terminology.
- Be able to complete a simple cannabis purchase.

METHOD:

15. Computing/Accounting

COMPUTING ACCOUNTING

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson the handlers will:

- Have computer equipment and software, operational and capable of printing documents.

METHOD:

Practical:

Set aside a particular area for computing and accounting lectures.

Obtain suitable desks and chairs.

Ensure compatibility of software programs and hardware.
16. Practical Exercise 1

PRACTICAL EXERCISE 1

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Money and vehicles.

AIM:

Following the lesson the agents will:

- Be familiar with hotels, bars, and hotel etiquette.
- Have had an opportunity to field test their cover.
- Have been assessed in the field.

METHOD:

Each trainee agent visits a hotel bar, with a visit by the Training Staff to assess and check progress.
BRIEFING & DEBRIEFING UNDERCOVER AGENTS

PRESENTER:
Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:
Following the lesson the handlers will:

• Be conversant with briefing (tasking) and debriefing of undercover agents.

• Be able to brief and debrief undercover agents on a daily basis and as and when required.

METHOD:
Oral presentation by Handler Training Staff using the Undercover Manuals as procedure guides and illustrating the presentation by using examples of previous operations.

General group discussion.
18. Debrief Practical Exercise 1

DEBRIEF PRACTICAL EXERCISE 1

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The undercover agents and handlers will debrief Practical Exercise 1.
- Course participants will be aware of the positive and negative aspects from the exercise.

METHOD:

In front of the classroom, oral presentations by the undercover agents recounting their activities and discussion.

Training Staff referral to documentation submitted (daily notes) and cross referencing the oral account to their documented version.
19. Drug Avoidance Techniques

DRUG AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals.
Training Staff.

AIM:

Following the lesson all course participants will:

- Be conversant with the policy in relation to drug use.
- Be aware of the terms avoidance and simulation.
- Be familiar with the methods of avoiding and simulating cannabis.
- Understand the nature of challenges – relating to drug use.

METHOD:

Oral presentation by Training Staff with reference to the Undercover Manuals.

Anecdotal reference to practical situations by Training Staff – Agent.

Role plays by Training Staff and trainees.

General discussion with group.
20. Dissuading Suspicion

DISSUADING SUSPICION

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

• Understand and be able to deal with ‘inquisitory suspicion’.
• Understand and be able to deal with ‘exclamatory suspicion’.
• Understand and be able to deal with ‘cold shoulder’.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using the Undercover Manuals as reference.

Training Staff to give practical examples from experience.

There are three basic types of suspicion which undercover agents are likely to come across in the performance of their duties. All three types of suspicion can be encountered in a variety of ways and all three demand distinct responses if the undercover agent is to retain his credibility. These are covered and dealt with in this session.
21. 

cannabis/ derivatives & alcohol - harmful effects

CANNABIS/ DERIVATIVES & ALCOHOL - HARMFUL EFFECTS

PRESENTER:

Health Professional and/or a Welfare Officer. Assisted by Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Overhead Transparencies as required. Text prepared in advance by speakers.

AIM:

Following the lesson all course participants will:

- Understand the harmful, short-term and long-term effects of sustained cannabis / cannabis derivative use.

- Understand the harmful, short-term and long-term effects of sustained alcohol use.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using prepared text and medical literature, using transparencies where required.

Anecdotal references.
22. Money Handling

MONEY HANDLING

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Money.
Training Staff – Agent.

AIM:

Following the lesson the undercover agents will:

- Be familiar and comfortable with handling and counting large quantities of cash.

METHOD:

Practical demonstration by Training Staff – Agent.

Group and individual practice following demonstration.
23. Managing Financial Expenditure 1

MANAGING FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE 1

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:

Computers and software.
Training documents and Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- Handlers will be aware of the requirements for accounting procedures and have knowledge of undercover policy.
- Handlers will be aware of the requirement to account for ‘living’ and ‘evidential’ monies separately.

METHOD:

Oral presentations, using training documents and Undercover Manuals.
PRACTICAL ROLE PLAY – CANNABIS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff – Agent.

MATERIALS:

Cannabis (different grades), scales and money.

AIM:

Following the lesson the undercover agents will:

- Be familiar with purchasing cannabis of different qualities.
- Be familiar with handling money.

METHOD:

Role plays directed by the Training Staff – Agent, involving cannabis purchases.

Group discussion and debrief.
25. Briefing & Debriefing 2

BRIEFING & DEBRIEFING 2

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the handlers will:

- Be able to debrief the agents following an evidential role play.
- Complete statements, deal with exhibits, and complete correspondence and reports according to undercover policy and procedure.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using Undercover Manuals.

Group discussion and participation.
PRACTICAL EVIDENTIAL ROLE PLAY

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Cannabis, scales and money.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• The undercover agents will complete a cannabis purchase.
• The Undercover agents will complete all evidential documentation.
• The undercover agents will deal with the transfer of exhibits.

METHOD:

Role play conducted by Training Staff, involving ounces of cannabis.

Assessment of their actions by Training Staff.
27. Physical Training

PHYSICAL TRAINING

PRESENTER:
All course participants and training staff.

MATERIALS:
Sports equipment as required.

AIM:
Following the lesson the participants will have:

- Exercised.
- Learned and practiced each other’s names.
- Team built.

The Training Staff will assess group dynamics.

METHOD:
Team sports.
MANAGING FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE 2

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:

Computers and software.
PowerPoint projection equipment.
Training documents and Undercover Manuals.
Receipts and notes from Practical Exercise 1.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- Handlers will have their level of competence raised to be able to complete a basic set of books.
- Handlers will complete financial transactions from Practical Exercise 1 in the classroom under tuition.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using training documents and Undercover Manuals.

PowerPoint used to display one computer screen onto the wall so that instruction can take place in a ‘live’ environment.

Group will complete the tasking as a group and participate in group discussion.
SIMULATION TECHNIQUES

PRESENTER:

Administration, Training Staff - Agent.

MATERIALS:

Tobacco, Cannabis, bongs, pipes and knives.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The agents will be more competent at rolling cannabis cigarettes.

- The agents will be more competent at ‘simulating’ the smoking of cannabis, and the use of avoidance techniques to avoid smoking cannabis.

METHOD:

Policy relating to the use of cannabis is explained by Administrators of the training.

Demonstration and practice rolling and handling cannabis.

Demonstrated use of equipment and instruments using tobacco.

Demonstrated ‘simulation’ and practice of this skill using tobacco.
ILlicit Drugs – General

Presenter:

Training Staff.

Materials:

Samples of various types of illicit drugs.
- Heroin
- Cocaine
- LSD etc. (excluding methamphetamine)
Photographs, paraphernalia and drug memorabilia.
Whiteboard and Handouts.

AIM:

Following the lesson all course participants will be thoroughly aware of:

- The various classes of illicit drugs.
- Recognise different types of illicit drugs.
- Be conversant with prices, jargon / terms, effects and methods of use.
- Know viable reasons for avoidance.
- Know respective packaging and units of sale.

Method:

Oral presentation with reference to the training aids, and other course material on pricing and trends dependent upon region.

Demonstration by Training Staff on methods of use of the particular illicit drugs.

Whiteboard graphs of prices and weights.
31. Physical Training

PHYSICAL TRAINING

PRESENTER:
All course participants and training staff.

MATERIALS:
Sports equipment as required.

AIM:
Following the lesson the participants will have:

• Exercised.
• Learned and practiced each other’s names.
• Team built.

The Training Staff will assess group dynamics.

METHOD:
Team sports.
32. Practical Role Plays – Illicit Drugs

PRACTICAL ROLE PLAYS – ILLICIT DRUGS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Dummy illicit drugs (various types)
Scales and money.

AIM:

Following the lesson the undercover agents:

• Will be conversant with completing a purchase of illicit drugs.
• Will be more competent at handling large quantities of money.

METHOD:

Role plays directed by the Training Staff involving a variety of illicit drugs.

Group debrief discussing improvements.
33. Intelligence Dissemination

INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION

PRESENTER:

Training Staff & Administration.

MATERIALS:

As required by the presenters, and relative to the intelligence systems of the particular country.

AIM:

Following the lesson all course participants will:

- Be aware of the requirements of intelligence gathering and dissemination.
- Be aware of the systems and procedures for the particular law enforcement agency.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using any other materials as required.

All handlers should be advised of the benefits in the correct dissemination of the intelligence gathered during undercover operations.
PRACTICAL EVIDENTIAL ROLE PLAY - ILLICIT DRUGS

PRESENTER:
Training Staff – Agent.

MATERIALS:
Dummy LSD and money.

AIM:
Following the lesson:

- The undercover agents will be familiar with purchasing LSD.
- The handlers will complete a full debrief of the undercover agent and they will complete all evidential documentation.

METHOD:
Role plays directed by Training Staff involving the purchase of dummy LSD.

Evidential debrief and evidential recording by undercover agents and handlers.
MANAGING FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE 3

PRESENTER:
Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:
Computers and software.
Training documents and Undercover Manuals.
Trial set of accounts.

AIM:
Following the lesson:

- Handlers will have raised their level of competence in preparing books to a sufficient standard to be able to complete a set of permanent books of record.

METHOD:
Oral presentation using training documents and Undercover Manuals.

PowerPoint used to display one computer screen onto the wall so that instruction can take place in a ‘live’ environment.

Group will complete the tasking as a group and participate in group discussion.
ILLICIT DRUG EQUIPMENT

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Illicit Drugs and related equipment, such as pipes bongs, knives etc. Tobacco.

AIM:

Following the lesson the undercover agents will:

- Be more familiar with the different types of equipment and paraphernalia used with illicit drugs.
- Be proficient at simulation and avoidance techniques.

METHOD:

Familiarisation with equipment and paraphernalia in group discussion and practical session.

Group discussion and participation in avoidance techniques.
37. Practical Exercise 2  PRACTICAL EXERCISE 2

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Money and vehicles.

AIM:

Following the lesson the agents will:

- Be more familiar with hotels, bars, and hotel etiquette.
- Have had further opportunity to field test their cover.
- Have been assessed in the field.

METHOD:

Each trainee agent visits a hotel bar, with a visit by the Training Staff to assess and check progress.
38. Debrief Practical Exercise 2

DEBRIEF PRACTICAL EXERCISE 2

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• The undercover agents and handlers will debrief Practical Exercise 2.

• Course participants will be aware of the positive and negative aspects from the exercise.

METHOD:

In front of the classroom, oral presentations by the undercover agents recounting their activities and discussion.

Training Staff referral to documentation submitted (daily notes) and cross referencing the oral account to their documented version.
39. Criminal Gangs & Organised Crime

CRIMINAL GANGS & ORGANISED CRIME

PRESENTER:

Expert: Officer from Organised Crime Unit or Similar Specialist Criminal Gang Investigation Unit.
Assistance from Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Regalia and handouts together with prepared material from the expert.

AIM:

Following the lesson all course participants will:

• Have a better understanding of the makeup, regalia, methods and terminology used by criminal gangs of their country.

METHOD:

Oral presentation with other visual aids as required by the invited expert.
40. Illicit Drugs – Methamphetamine

ILlicit DRUGS – METHAMPHETAMINE

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Methamphetamine, scales and money.

AIM:

Following the lesson the undercover agents will:

- Be more familiar with purchasing quantities of methamphetamine.
- Be familiar with jargon / terms relating to methamphetamine.
- Understand the basic philosophy of Clandestine Laboratories and the manufacture process of methamphetamine.

METHOD:

Role plays directed by Training Staff.

Group discussion of jargon and terminology.

Group debrief with suggested improvements to purchase techniques and etiquette.
MANAGING FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE – BANKING

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:

Training documents and Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson handlers will:

• Be aware of the requirements and mechanics of running covert bank accounts at financial institutions, for both the operation and for the undercover agents.

METHOD:

Oral presentation, utilising previous experiences from Training Staff.
42. Practical Role Plays – Illicit Drugs

PRACTICAL ROLE PLAYS – ILLICIT DRUGS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Illicit Drugs (variety of types), scales and money.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The undercover agents will purchase a variety of three types of illicit drugs.
- The undercover agents will be debriefed by their handlers.
- All evidential correspondence and procedures to be completed by both undercover agent and handlers.

METHOD:

Role plays directed by Training Staff, the trainee undercover agent will be ‘challenged’ but will be able to avoid smoking cannabis.

Trainee agents will complete a series of three purchases and then be debriefed by their handlers.

Trainee undercover agents and trainee handlers will be observed by Training Staff.
43. Cover

COVER

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The undercover agents will have practiced giving cover details and answering questions about their cover.
- The Training Staff will have compiled a list of questions to ask each trainee at a later session.
- The undercover agents will be more confident with their cover.

METHOD:

Trainee undercover agents give cover details to the other course participants.

One of the Training Staff per trainee will ask a few questions probing some of the cover detail so that Training Staff can gauge their reaction.

Course participants will also ask questions where there has been some relevant point brought up that they have knowledge of, such as an area that they claim to have lived in or a previous occupation.
MANAGING FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE 4

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:

Computers and software.
Training documents and Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• Handlers will have reinforced their instruction on accounting procedures and raised their standards of competence.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using training documents and Undercover Manuals.

PowerPoint used to display one computer screen onto the wall so that instruction can take place in a 'live' environment.

Group will complete the tasking together and participate in group discussion.
45. Practical Exercise 3  PRACTICAL EXERCISE 3

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Money and vehicles.

AIM:

Following the lesson the undercover agents will:

- Be more familiar with hotel bars and etiquette.
- Have further practiced their cover details.
- Be able to identify different hotel patrons, i.e. dealers, locals, bookmakers, etc.

METHOD:

Trainee agent is assigned to visit a particular hotel bar.

They are given minor tasking by their handler to:

- Obtain the barman’s name.
- Explain their cover to at least one patron.
- Leave the hotel bar for at least 5 minutes and then return.

Uplifted later by Training Staff.

Handler completes a debrief and all documentation completed.
DEBRIEF PRACTICAL EXERCISE 3

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The Practical Exercise is debriefed in group debriefing.
- The participants will be more familiar with briefing and debriefing.
- The course participants will be aware of positive/ negative aspects of each hotel deployment.

METHOD:

Group operational debrief in the classroom.
47. Surveillance

SURVEILLANCE

PRESENTER:

Expert:
Surveillance Unit NCO.
Assisted by Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

• Have an understanding of requirements of working with surveillance
• Learn methods of anti surveillance
• Learn methods of counter surveillance

METHOD:

Oral presentation with group discussion.

Undercover Manuals should be used to reinforce instruction given in classroom on the topics of anti surveillance and counter surveillance.
UNDERCOVER AGENT CRIMINALITY

PRESENTER:

Training Staff – Agent.

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson the undercover agents will:

Have a better understanding of undercover policing relating to:

- Paranoia, drug or otherwise.
- Running mates.
- Females in the scene.
- Gangs and etiquette.
- Vehicle crime.
- Cultivation of cannabis.
- Other aspects of criminality projected to enhance cover/penetration.

METHOD:

Discussion and anecdotal teaching by Training Staff.
49. Prosecution Files

PROSECUTION FILES

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number #.
Previous files as examples.

AIM:

Following the lesson the handlers will:

- Be aware of the requirement for file preparation.
- Be aware of the standards required in the presentation of files.
- Be aware of ancillary prosecutorial matters.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation, along with previous files as examples.
PRACTICAL EXERCISE 4

PRESENTATION:
Training Staff.

MATERIALS:
Money and vehicles.

AIM:
Following the lesson the undercover agents will:

• Be more familiar with hotel bars and etiquette.
• Have further practiced their cover details.
• Be able to identify different hotel patrons, i.e. dealers, locals, bookmakers, etc.
• Have telephoned their handler
• Have met their handler ‘in the scene’ whilst deployed.
• Have identified a possible ‘running mate’.

METHOD:
Trainee agent is assigned to visit a particular hotel bar.

They are given minor tasking by their handler to:

• Obtain the barman’s name
• Explain their cover to at least one patron
• Leave the hotel bar for at least 5 minutes to telephone their handler, they are then to return to the hotel.
• They are to meet in the scene to give an update on their progress.
• They are to try and identify a possible running mate.

Trainee undercover agents are taken to a hotel bar and uplifted later by Training Staff.

Handler travels to the scene and meets with his/her undercover agent to obtain a progress report and then returns to the training location.

Handler completes a debrief and all documentation completed.
51. Debrief Practical Exercise 4

DEBRIEF PRACTICAL EXERCISE 4

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The Practical Exercise is debriefed in group debriefing.
- The participants will be more familiar with briefing and debriefing.
- The course participants will be aware of positive / negative aspects of each hotel deployment.

METHOD:

Group discussion and debrief in the classroom.

Oral presentation by 2 or 3 of the operational teams (agent / handler)

Opportunity for discussion on any other matters raised, and general comments welcomed.
UNDERCOVER AGENT EXAMINATION OF COVER

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Maps and notes made from previous cover presentations.

AIM:

Following the lesson the agents will:

- Know areas where their cover details need improving.
- Be more familiar with answering questions on their cover

METHOD:

Agents spoken to by Training Staff individually in a scenario that interrogates them on aspects of their cover.

At completion, an individual debrief is held on areas that need improvement.
DIRECTION & SUPERVISION OF AGENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:

None

AIM:

Following the lesson the handlers will:

- Be aware of some of the problems encountered in the course of an undercover operation, be aware of what a comfort zone is and discuss lack of motivation.

METHOD:

Oral presentation and group discussion.
DEALING WITH THE LAW

PRESENTER:

Administration, and Training Staff

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals.
PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number #

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

• Be conversant with the laws of drinking and driving motor vehicles.
• Be familiar with methods of dealing with front line police.
• Understand the protocol and policy on arrest of undercover agent.
• Be familiar with the attitude towards police in street stops and turnovers.
• Deliberate arrest and detention in police cells.

METHOD:

Administration will outline the undercover manual policy.

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation.

Training Staff give practical examples from previous experiences.

Group discussion on methods of avoiding drinking and driving, search warrants and arrest of undercover agents.
PRactical Role Plays - Illicit Drugs

PRACTICAL ROLE PLAYS - ILLICIT DRUGS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Dummy illicit drugs (powder), scales, money.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• The agents will be familiar with completing deals involving powdered illicit drugs.

METHOD:

Training Staff - Agent conducting role plays.
OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES – HANDLERS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson the handlers will:

• Be further aware of comfort zones and able to motivate undercover agents.

• Be able to consider use of scenarios to enhance credibility and penetration.

• Be aware of managing rest & recreation time, family visits and problems with police friends stationed near the deployed undercover agent.

METHOD:

Oral presentation, relating to previous experiences.
PRACTICAL EVIDENTIAL ROLE PLAY - ILLICIT DRUGS

PRESENTER:
Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:
Dummy illicit drugs (powder), scales, money

AIM:
Following the lesson:

- The agents will complete and evidential purchase of ‘powdered’ drugs.
- The handlers will debrief the purchase and complete all necessary evidential documentation.

METHOD:
Training Staff – Agent in role plays involving powdered illicit drugs.

The Handler debriefing of the undercover agent is assessed by the Training Staff.
58. Physical Training  PHYSICAL TRAINING

PRESENTER:
All course participants and training staff.

MATERIALS:
Sports equipment as required.

AIM:
Following the lesson the participants will have:

- Exercised.
- Learned and practiced each other’s names.
- Team built.

The Training Staff will assess group dynamics.

METHOD:
Team sports.
COMMUNICATION SKILLS/ MONITORING CONCERNS

PRESENTER:

Expert:
Health professional and/ or a Welfare Officer.

MATERIALS:

Overhead Transparencies if required.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

- Have a better understanding of communication and monitoring concerns.
- Be able to deal with matters and issues as they arise.

METHOD:

Oral presentation, group discussion and overhead transparencies if required.

Reference to Undercover Manuals.
UNDERCOVER AGENTS STRESS

PRESENTER:

Expert:
Health Professional and/or a Welfare Officer, along with Training Staff - Agent.

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson the agents will:

• Understand the signs of stress
• Be aware of the methods of reducing stress
• Understand practical problems they will encounter as discussed by Training Staff - Agent.

METHOD:

Oral presentation by expert.

Practical examples from experienced Training Staff.
MANAGING FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE 5

PRESENTER:
Training Staff - Handler

MATERIALS:
None.

AIM:
Following the lesson the handlers will:

• Complete the permanent books of record up to audit standard for Practical Exercise 4.

METHOD:
General discussion work groups on completion of books and accounting procedures.
62. Evaluation – Progress Meeting – Agents

EVALUATION – PROGRESS MEETING – AGENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff – Agent.

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson the agents will:

- Be aware of areas of weakness.
- Be advised of methods of improving.
- Be aware of their strengths.
- Training Staff will be aware of any agent/handler problems.
- Training Staff will be aware of an agent that is not suitable to a particular type of deployment.

METHOD:

Individual meetings between Training Staff and Trainee Agents.
63. Stress – Handlers

STRESS – HANDLERS

PRESENTER:

Expert:
Health Professional and/ or a Welfare Officer, along with Training Staff - Handler.

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson the handlers will:

• Understand the signs of stress

• Be aware of the methods of reducing stress

• Understand practical problems they will encounter as discussed by Training Staff - Handlers.

METHOD:

Oral presentation by expert.

Practical examples from experienced Training Staff.
64. Revision - Agents

REVISION - AGENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent.

MATERIALS:

As required.

AIM:

Following the lesson the agents will:

- Have an opportunity to discuss any areas they feel need improvement.

METHOD:

Group discussion and questions.

Specific direction on improvement.
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS – HANDLERS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff – Handler.

MATERIALS:

None.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- Debrief handlers on problems encountered in operations and relate these to operational problems from Practical Exercise 4.

METHOD:

General discussion.

Specific direction on areas of improvement.
66. Practical Evidential Role Play

PRACTICAL EVIDENTIAL ROLE PLAY

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Cannabis, scales, money.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- The undercover agents will complete a cannabis purchase
- The handlers will debrief the undercover agents
- An evidential statement will be completed

METHOD:

Role play involving Agent Training Staff, selling large quantities of cannabis.
67. Asset Seizure – Proceeds of Crime

ASSET SEIZURE – PROCEEDS OF CRIME

PRESENTER:

Expert:
Officer from Asset Seizure or Proceeds of Crime Unit from Law Enforcement Agency.

MATERIALS:

Overhead transparencies as required.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• Participants will have a greater understanding of asset seizure legislation and/or procedures for seizures as they relate to undercover operations and the respective law enforcement agency.

METHOD:

Oral presentation from the expert followed by group discussion and questions.
68. Physical Training

PHYSICAL TRAINING

PRESENTER:
All course participants and training staff.

MATERIALS:
Sports equipment as required.

AIM:
Following the lesson the participants will have:

• Exercised
• Learned and practiced each other’s names
• Team built

METHOD:
Team sports.
Practical Exercise 5

**PRESENTATION:**
Training Staff and other staff as required.

**MATERIALS:**
Cash, exhibits, vehicles, premises, cell phones, computers, cover aids, documentation, etc as required.

**AIM:**
Following this training session the participants will:

- Completed an evidential purchase
- Completed reporting requirements
- Completed evidential recording of notes and statements
- Have been tested on motivation and individual personal abilities
- Deficiencies will have been identified
- Feedback will have been given

**METHOD:**
Trainee agents and trainee handlers will participate in an exercise consisting of a progressive series of staged scenarios, designed to test the trainee team.

The nature of the scenarios and type of testing is required to be planned by the Training Staff. The resources that they have available will limit each country.
DEBRIEF PRACTICAL EXERCISE 5

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None

AIM:

Following the lesson:

Complete a full exercise debrief on all issues.

For example:

- Introductions
- Penetration
- Suspicion & Dissuading Suspicion
- Illicit Drugs
- Money Handling
- Exhibit Handling
- Handler/Agent Performance
- Problems Encountered

METHOD:

Oral presentation involving group discussion.
71. Risk Assessments

RISK ASSESSMENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

PowerPoint projection equipment.
PowerPoint Presentation Number #.
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• Identify what a risk assessment is
• Be aware of factors to consider in completing a risk assessment
• Understand the general risks of undercover policing
• Understand ethical risks
• Understand Personal risks
• Understand operational risks

METHOD:

Oral presentation using PowerPoint to enhance the presentation and input from participants.
72. Physical Training  

PHYSICAL TRAINING

PRESENTER:

All course participants and training staff.

MATERIALS:

Sports equipment as required.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will have:

• Exercised
• Learned and practiced each other’s names
• Team built

METHOD:

Team sports.
73. Negotiation Skills

NEGOTIATION SKILLS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

- Understand how negotiation can assist an undercover agent.
- Understand the ‘power of negotiation’.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using the Undercover Manuals as reference guides.

Training Staff to draw on previous experiences as practical examples.
74. Improving Memory

IMPROVING MEMORY

PRESENTER:

Training Staff.

MATERIALS:

Undercover Manuals.

AIM:

Following the lesson the participants will:

- Understand the importance of accurately recalling events.
- Understand and be more familiar with memory improving techniques.
- Be able to use ‘gathering techniques’.
- Be able to use ‘recall techniques’.

METHOD:

Oral presentation using the Undercover Manuals as reference guides.
OPERATIONAL TEAM SELECTIONS & INTERVIEWS

PRESENTER:
Training Staff

MATERIALS:
None

AIM:
Following the lesson:

• Operational team will be finalised pending completion of the course, for any pending undercover deployments.

• Undercover Agents not assigned to a particular operation will be discussed in relation to suitable types of deployments in the future.

• Handlers will be assessed and discussed in relation to suitable types of operations they are capable of running.

METHOD:
Administration meeting.
76. Cover Preparation

COVER PREPARATION

PRESENTER:

Training Staff

MATERIALS:

None

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- All undercover agents’ cover will have been finalised.

- All undercover agents will complete any documentation required for application for licences, passports etc.

- Training Staff will have tested individual cover.

METHOD:

Documentation completed by agents and handlers.

Oral presentations by undercover agents.
77. Termination Orders

TERMINATION ORDERS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Handler.

MATERIALS:

Previous termination orders.

AIM:

Following the lesson handlers will:

- Have a thorough knowledge of termination orders, what is required and how they prepare them.

METHOD:

Oral presentation
78. Revision – Agents

REVISION AGENTS

PRESENTER:
Training Staff – Agent.

MATERIALS:
As required.

AIM:
Following the lesson the undercover agents:

• Will have brought up any areas that they need assistance with.
• Will have prepared for an examination.

(scheduled for the following day)

METHOD:
Group discussion and questions.
Role plays.
Self testing.
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION & OFFICIAL INFORMATION

PRESENTER:
Training Staff

MATERIALS:
Undercover Manuals.

AIM:
Following the lesson the handlers will be:

- Fully aware of the policy and procedure on disclosure of information about undercover operations.
- Fully aware of obligations in relation to disclosure of official information.

METHOD:
Oral presentation.
80. Practical Examination – Agents

PRACTICAL EXAMINATION – AGENTS

PRESENTER:
Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:
Pre prepared practical examination from course content.

AIM:
Following the lesson:

• The trainee undercover agent will have passed a series of evidential purchases to the satisfactory standard set by the Training Staff.

METHOD:
1. Evidential role play involving the purchase of cannabis
2. Evidential role play involving stolen property
3. Evidential role play involving (LSD or Cocaine)
4. Evidential statements to be completed and submitted to the Training Staff.
5. Individual trainee de-briefed
6. Group de-brief
81. Written Examination  
– Agents

WRITTEN EXAMINATION – AGENTS

PRESENTER:

Training Staff - Agent

MATERIALS:

Prepared short answer questions drawn from the course content.

AIM:

Following the lesson:

• The trainee undercover agent will have passed a series of written questions to the satisfactory standard set by the Training Staff.

METHOD:

A series of 50 questions will be orally read to the agents requiring short answers.

Answers are written down and subsequently marked by the Training Staff.

Debriefing and corrections in group setting after completion of marking the answer papers.
82. Graduation Function

GRADUATION FUNCTION

PRESENTER:

Officer in Charge of Course

MATERIALS:

None

AIM:

Following the lesson:

- Trainee undercover agents and trainee handlers will have graduated.

METHOD:

Social function – formal dinner.
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